The antecedents and consequence of trade union commitment in a developing country: The case of Nigeria. by Oikelome, Franklin Omobhude
THE ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCE 
OF TRADE UNION COMMITMENT IN 
A DEVELOPING COUNTRY:
THE CASE OF NIGERIA.
FRANKLIN OMOBHUDE OIKELOME
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Industrial Relations,
London School of Economics and Political Science, 
University of London
UMI Number: U61584B
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615843
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
F
8 1 7 2 .
\o \zac\o
ABSTRACT
This thesis examined the antecedents and consequence of trade union commitment in 
Nigerian trade unions. Data obtained from 512 unionised employees in Nigeria was 
analysed using mainly correlation and regression analysis. From the results, the 
significant predictors of union commitment were factors associated with union 
characteristics and perception namely union instrumentality perception, satisfaction 
with union leadership and early union socialisation experience. Sector was a 
significant moderator in the model: union commitment was greater in the public 
sector while union participation was greater in the private sector. Males participated 
significantly more in union activities than females although there was no significant 
gender difference in union commitment. Factors associated with union attitudes were 
found to moderate the relationship between union commitment and union 
participation. Union commitment was also found to predict union participation in the 
overall model as hypothesised. The qualitative study involved personal interviews as 
well as content analysis of relevant union materials including logbooks. The results 
confirmed the relevance of the unions’ settings and specific individual experiences to 
the quantitative findings. The overall findings provided limited support for the view 
that antecedents of union commitment differ across countries or contexts. Because 
some of the findings were partially consistent with those from the western literature, it 
cautions against generalising a notion that western models are dysfunctional in 
developing countries. The applications, implications and limitations of the findings 
were discussed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Academics, social theorists, employers of labour and trade unions have shown 
considerable interest in the subject of union commitment (Barling et al, 1992). There is a 
growing recognition of the importance and relevance of union commitment, especially 
among trade union practitioners. The need for unions to devise effective ways of 
maintaining and retaining the commitment of members in order to ensure the former’s 
continued existence has been noted1. Related to this is an observation that beleagured 
unions especially need the support of a loyal constituency in order to weather the storms 
of unfavorable and hostile situations (Jose, 2000).
Unions generally are confronted with challenges, which threaten their continued 
relevance in the world’s scheme of things. Some of these challenges are represented by 
the universal trend towards greater liberalization of economic and political regimes and a 
waning influence occasioned by a decline in union densities (Galenson, 1994; Undy et al, 
1995). Globalisation and privatisation have put many people out of employment in 
Zambia, while in Nigeria trade union rights are being systematically reversed . The 
South African trade unions in the mining industry alone lost more than 40,000 workers to 
privatization in 1987 (Molapo, 1999). This situation has prompted calls for new 
approaches and strategies on the part of unions if they are to remain major actors
1 At an ILO seminar titled: Organised Labour in the 21st Century: Trade Unions and Organising Strategies”, 
Jan/Feb 2001.
2The 89th conference of the International Labour Organisation where members discussed extensively the 
impact of globalisation on the economies of member countries, Nigerian Vanguard, Thursday, 26th July, 
2001
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contributing to dynamic and equitable growth (Valkenburg, 1996; Otobo, 1997; 
Sunmonu, 1997).
1.1. Problem Statement
This treatise is specifically about trade unions in Nigeria, so comments on the problems 
confronting the unions there as they relate to the subject under discussion is pertinent. 
Basically, the unions are experiencing a decline, which is partly related to retrenchment- 
inducing policies of government and general membership apathy. The former is partly 
engendered by a privatization program embarked upon by the federal government, which 
will result in 20% of the civil service employees losing their jobs4. The Nigerian civil 
service has about 1 million employees5; so about 200,000 stand to lose their source of 
livelihood.
Hundreds of civil servants at the state level are already in the job market having been 
retrenched by various state governments. For example, at least 21,000 employees were 
laid off by three state governments between 1999 and 2000. In Kwara State, the state 
government sacked 5,000; 10,000 workers were retrenched in Lagos state while in Osun 
State, the state laid off 6,000 workers6. An estimated 18,000 NEPA workers would be
3 The National Council on Privatization inaugurated in July 1999 evolved a three-phase implementation 
process. The first phase include the privatization of commercial and merchant banks and cement plants. 
The second phase involves hotels, and motor and vehicle assembly plants. The last phase entail the 
privatization of National Electricity Power Authority (NEPA), Nigeria Telecommunications Limited 
(NITEL), National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria (NAFCON), Nigerian Airways and Petroleum 
Refineries. The first phase was completed in December 1999 and progress is on going with regards the 
remaining two phases (www.nigerianembassy.nl/invest_privatisation.htm).
4 African Perspective, Issue no 26, 5 May 1999
5 ibid.
6 Committee for a Workers’ International, Press Release. December 19 2000.
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retrenched before it is privatised according to a report7. Nigeria Railway Corporation 
(NRC) has already laid off 1,000 workers as part of its plan to restructure the 
organisation8. Similarly, no fewer than 1,000 staff of the Nigeria Airways have been 
relieved of their jobs9.
The Nigerian private sector is not exempt from the problem. For unions in the private 
sector, redundancies are mainly related to the economic situation in the country. For 
example, the African Petroleum pic retrenched hundreds of its staff across the country in 
early 2002, citing economic reasons. In a particular state (Port-Harcourt), a whole 
installation (branch) was reportedly closed down and all the staff retrenched10. The 
question may be asked as to how this situation affects the union. In response, it can be 
argued that one of the consequences of privatisation, for the unions, is a gradual erosion 
of their constituency. The unions have already witnessed a drop in their density from 11 
to 10% between 1994 and 200011 (Harper, 2001). More job losses could result in a 
further slump in union density. This situation threatens the life of the unions, which 
need members to maintain their existence and relevance (Barling et al, 1992).
The question at this juncture relates to the relevance of union commitment to the situation 
described above. Firstly, the unions need their members’ loyalty and support in these 
circumstances if they are to provide a credible and effective ‘resistance’ to management.
7 Nigerian Tribune, 27th October, 2000
8 Daily trust, Abuja. January 17, 2002
9 The vanguard, Lagos. January 4 2002
10 From a source within the company’s head office based in Lagos.
11 This figure may be inaccurate. There are no current official figures; the assistant national registrar of 
trade unions told the author union officials are either slow in supplying periodic information or sometimes 
provide wrong figures to deliberately mislead auditors investigating union accounts.
16
Clark et al (1993) argued that the overall effectiveness of labour is closely tied to 
membership support. To try and counter the situation or at best alleviate the effects of 
the redundant policies by obtaining the best possible deal for affected workers, the unions 
need their members to be loyal and to actively support their activities. In their 
negotiations with managements, unions need to be confident that they have the support of 
a committed membership, which is ready to back them all the way. Their ability to 
collectively bargain with employers from a strong position depends heavily on the loyalty 
of their constituency (Barling et al, 1992). The unions’ struggle for relevance amidst the 
tides of economic realities may not succeed without the workers expressing unwavering 
solidarity.
Secondly, the slump in workers’ numerical strength in the present situation should be a 
concern to unions because in a sense, the proportion of workers who belong to a union is 
the most visible symbol of union strength (Rogers, 1993). The point being that the 
erosion of unions’ membership base means they have less people they can rely on in the 
event of public rallies or mass demonstrations. For instance, large turn outs at public 
rallies often indicate a popular support and protests involving a large number of workers 
may end up becoming important watersheds12. In the same vein, some of the problems 
which the Nigerian trade unions faced in the pre-restructure era (before 1978) centered on 
the fact that the unions were very ineffective partly due to the existence of loosely 
organised unions with very few members (Tokunbo, 1987). Consequently, most of them 
were incapable of providing any meaningful opposition to managements (Ubeku, 1983).
12 The French revolution, sparked off by bread scarcity and the mass demonstration o f half a million in 
Belgrade, which ended the reign of Serbia’s former leader Milosevic are good examples
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The amalgamation of the fragmented unions along industrial lines in 1978 bolstered their 
figures from a few hundreds into thousands and played a role in their subsequent 
effectiveness (Fashoyin, 1987). Thus, against the backdrop of a persisting trend 
represented by decreasing membership, there may be some implications for the union’s 
future efficiency and militancy.
The other dimension of the problem faced by Nigerian trade unions is membership 
apathy towards union activities. A demonstration of apathy towards union activity by 
workers is often interpreted as signalying a lack of commitment (Cohen, 1974; Fashoyin, 
1987). Membership indifference to union activity may occur both at local and national 
level. At the local level, Cohen (1974, pg. 129) noted the “intermittent interest of most 
trade union members in the affairs of the union”. To cite an example of member apathy 
at the national level, a nationwide general strike against fuel price rises called for by the 
Nigerian trade union leaders on January 16, 2002 was called off at the end of its second 
day. The first day of strikes paralyzed the country, but by the next day, some buses and 
cars began to return to the streets and many offices reopened. According to a report, “the 
strike was not holding firm, and calling it off was a humiliating defeat for the unions”13. 
The lack of support for the strike action by the workers may be attributed to a number of 
reasons, but in the final analysis, it does represents a lack of commitment by members on 
the occasion. The union leaders consequently appeared weak and their authority and 
legitimacy seemed undermined.
13 BBC news, 17 January 2002.
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An understanding of commitment is vital for the unions because failure to understand 
members’ union related behaviours could turn out to be a serious and potential omission 
for unions (Kuruvilla et al, 1993). Behavioural scientists argue that people are not bom 
with their attitudes and behaviours intact (Clark, 2000). Thus, in order to elicit particular 
behaviours from their members, unions need to first identify, understand and nurture the 
right conditions capable of producing such desired behaviours. Thus, commitment (an 
attitude) and union participation ( its behavioural consequence) can be elicited from 
members if unions (1) understand the circumstances or factors associated with them and 
(2) take appropriate steps in creating or fostering these circumstances.
An accurate way to measure union commitment has been established thus making it 
possible to examine the relationship of union commitment to a wide range of factors, 
including union participation. Union-focused behavioural research has found that a wide 
variety of attitudes and opinions are ultimately manifested in a broader attitude known as 
union members commitment. This research has shown that individuals who are more 
satisfied with their union’s performance, their treatment by union officials, the operation 
of their grievance procedures and their first year’s experiences with the union are more 
committed to or supportive of the union than members who have negative attitudes about 
their experiences (Clark, 2000).
The relationship between commitment (an attitude) and member participation in union 
activities (a behaviour) has received particular attention (Gordon et al, 1980; Gallagher 
and Clark, 1989) and the former has been identified as a key antecedent of the
19
willingness to participate actively in the union (Bamberger et al; Fullager and Barling 
1989; Fuller and Hester 1998; Kelloway and Barling, 1993; Sverke, 1997). In other 
words, members who have high levels of commitment are more likely to participate in 
union activities such as meetings, rallies, and elections. Highly committed members have 
also been found to be more willing to go on strike in support of bargaining demands 
(Barling et al,1992), more likely to support political action by the union (Fields et al, 
1990) than members with low levels of commitment. In sum, the relationship between 
commitment and participation in union activities is clear. High levels of participation in 
union activities can lead to more effective unions. Strategically, this suggests that if a 
union wishes to become more effective through increased member participation it can do 
so by raising the level of member commitment to the union (Clark, 2000).
Gordon M.E. and Nurick, A.J. (1981) made a significant attempt in investigating the 
concept of union commitment with a view to identifying its main dimensions. The study 
identified four dimensions of union commitment using factor analysis and correlational 
data. Factor analysis was used to identify the statistical structure of the construct and 
correlational data was employed to provide evidence of the construct validity of the 
dimensions identified. Factor analysis produced four interpretable dimensions: union 
loyalty (39%) of common variance, responsibility to the union (19%), willingness to 
work for the union (17%) and beliefs in unionism (13%). Union loyalty denotes a feeling 
of pride in the union (Ladd et al, 1982) and also implies a desire to retain union 
membership (Klandermans, 1989). Responsibility to the union refers to those day-to-day 
behaviours that are required for normal role fulfillment while the willingness to work for
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the union reflects the voluntary nature of behavioral acts that go beyond those required 
for normal role fulfillment. Schneider (1985) suggests that the willingness to exert effort 
beyond that normally required for membership of an organisation is the hallmark of 
commitment.
Barling et al (1992) argued that the willingness to work for the union supercedes the 
feeling of responsibility to it since the former not only includes the fulfillment of 
dependable role behaviours, but also encompasses behaviour that go beyond prescribed 
roles. Belief in the values and goals of unions is akin to Kanter (1968)’s concept of 
ideological conformity and support. Basically it reflects a belief in the goals of unionism 
as against a union-specific belief (Barling et al, 1992). This dimension is consistent with 
Porter and Smith’s (1970) definition of commitment as a belief in the values and 
objectives of the organisation. In the aftermath of Gordon et al’s (1980) original study, 
many researchers investigated the structure of union commitment and the dimensionality 
of the measuring instrument they provided. While some works have challenged the four- 
factor structure (Friedman and Harvey, 1986), most of the available research suggests 
that the four dimensions of union commitment are valid, generally stable and operational 
(Ladd et al, 1982; Thacker et al, 1989; Tetrick et al, 1989; Wellington et al, 1996).
Union participation has various dimensions and includes formal activities such as 
attending union meetings, voting in elections and holding union office and also informal 
activities such as discussing union issues with colleagues, reading union literature and 
helping in union campaigns (Kelloway et al. 1995). Substantive issues concerning union
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participation will be dealt with in greater detail in subsequent chapters under literature 
review. It should suffice at this stage to point out the importance of membership 
participation to trade unions. Member participation is important for the following 
reasons:
1. Mitigating Sectionalism: Active involvement by a cross section of members is 
necessary if sectionalism is to be avoided. At workplace level, sectionalism may 
act to defeat the achievement of collective goals. This was aptly demonstrated by 
Smock (1969)’s study of coalminers located in the eastern part of the country. 
Workers were tom in between two opposite factions of union leadership each 
vying for sole authority. Intrigues, plots and counter plots by the two camps 
effectively hampered the business of union administration and weakened the 
position of the unions with management.
2. Policy initiative and Legitimacy: Trade unions rely on their membership both for 
policy initiative and implementation. Trade unions serve claims on employers 
which are drawn up on behalf of their members. In situations of employer 
opposition the union must be capable of mobilising its members in order to 
strengthen its hand in negotiations. If a trade union fails in this regard, both its 
external legitmacy and bargaining authority are undermined. Again, the example 
cited earlier about the failed strike action by the Nigerian Labour Congress 
becomes relevant. The seeming nonchallant attitude of the workers to the strike 
cast a shadow on the authority of the union leaders. Thus, a low level of 
membership involvement can undermine the legitimacy and authority of trade
22
unions. Similarly, the extent to which a trade union claims to speak on behalf of 
its members on social and political issues will depend on the extent to which it 
involves its members. Involvement, in turn, will affect the extent to which a 
union’s social and political commitments are honoured by its membership.
3. Moderating oligarchy: Trade unions are frequently attacked on the basis that they 
are undemocratic organisations, which seek to articulate the aims and objectives 
of a vociferous and militant minority while ignoring the true preferences of the 
majority of its members. Membership participation thus viewed becomes a test of 
internal democracy. Some authors have portrayed union leaders in the country as 
displaying autocratic behaviour, often not allowing democratic involvement of 
members when taking decisions (Cohen, 1974; Smock, 1969). Membership 
involvement in union affairs has been shown to moderate oligarchy in trade 
unions (James, 1984). A trade union which can demonstrate high levels of 
membership participation can therefore claim to be something other than an 
oligarchy.
4. Resisting infilteration: Low levels of membership participation, particularly in 
union elections, may favour the interests of minority groups who seek to gain 
control of key positions in the formal organs of union government. When 
members are not committed to using their voting rights or are nonchallant about 
the democratic procedure within their unions, a few union activists may succeed 
in dictating the affairs of the union (Cohen, 1974; Fashoyin, 1987).
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5. Good leadership: When ordinary members who possess the necessary 
qualifications, skills and other good leadership qualities do not aspire to the 
positions of leadership, the unions consequently lose out on whatever positive 
impact their participation might have engendered. Invariably, the best candidates 
may end up not getting elected to offices. The paucity of capable union leaders 
within the Nigerian labour movement have been noted (Otobo, 1995; Tokunbo,
1985).
6. Assisting union administration: Trade unions depend heavily upon lay activists to 
ensure that the interests of members at workplace level are adequately serviced to 
minimise disaffection and avoid the possibility of dissatisfied members 
transferring to another union. Furthermore, it also ensures that the burden of 
work on full-time officers is reduced to manageable levels.
7. Developing members: Participation in the internal affairs of the union provides 
the opportunity for members to develop the knowledge, skills and confidence 
necessary to contribute to debate an policy formulation within the union. Having 
received this training, members may become more aware of the political process 
generally (within and outside of the unions) and be better equipped to contribute 
to it.
Since union participation is a consequence of union commitment, it can be argued that 
the importance of union participation described above also underscore the relevance of
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union commitment. The significance of membership commitment to the achievement of 
union objectives thus makes it part of the very fabric of unions (Gordon et al., 480). This 
study represents an attempt to investigate the causes and consequences of union 
commitment in the Nigerian context. The effort to identify the determinants of union 
commitment and involvement in trade union activities by union members in the country 
would necessarily require a carefully formulated model of investigation. Barling et al., 
1992) proposed a psychological model of union commitment (Fig. 1.1) based on Gordon 
et al (1980)’s initial work and other subsequent studies (Barling et al, 1992; Fullager & 
Barling, 1989; Fullager et al, 1992; Thacker et al, 1992). In this model the authors 
distinguished between antecedents or causes of union commitment and the consequences 
of union commitment. Under antecedents, they outlined twenty-five factors under seven 
main categories of demographics, personality/work beliefs, union attitude/beliefs, role 
experiences, work experiences, structural characteristics and environmental 
characteristics. The products of the interaction between these antecedents and union 
commitment were outlined as consequences. These include participation in union 
activities, perceived industrial relations climate, strike propensity, support for political 
action, support for endorsement of political climate and turnover.
Fig 1.1. Antecedents and Consequences of Union Commitment (Barling et al, 
1992).
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1.2 Rationale for Research
It is surprising that no Nigerian study appears to have empirically investigated the 
relationship between union commitment and member participation. This situation may
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be explained by a suggestion that researchers in developing countries seem to shy away 
from an unqualified adoption of western theories in their analysis of IR problems relating 
to their own setting (Fajana, 1995). This argument is often based on a notion that western 
models are dysfunctional when it comes to investigating issues in developing countries. 
Thus most Nigerian studies seem to be based on descriptive or historical analysis, thereby 
making the Nigerian industrial relations literature replete with works of this nature 
(Yesusfu, 1962; Fashoyin, 1980; Diejomaoh, 1979; Kraus, 1979). Union surveys in the 
country seem not to be paying any particular attention to the subject of union 
commitment as portrayed in the western literature. It is the aim of this research to 
address this particular gap between the two literatures.
Also, this study is predicated on the recognition that there are wide diversities in national 
systems of industrial relations arising from contextual differences (Dunlop, 1958; Poole,
1986) and these differences could cause predictors of union commitment to differ across 
countries or contexts (Barling et al, 1992:93). The social system in any country has 
other sub-systems including the economic system, the political system and the industrial 
relations system. An industrial relations system therefore overlaps with the other 
subsystems in the other social system. In its development, an industrial relations system 
comprises three groups of actors: the workers and their unions, the employers and their 
associations and the government agencies concerned with the workplace and work 
community. Contextual factors, which contribute to the variations in industrial relations 
in any country, include technology, market or budgetary constraints, power relations and
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status of the actors and an ideology, which binds the industrial relations system together 
(Wilczynski, 1983; Berg, 1968; Fox, 1985).
In every system, the three actors together create the “web of rules” to govern the 
workplace and community. These rules are made within the constraints imposed by the 
contexts and their ideology, and take a variety of forms in different systems including 
agreements, statutes, decrees, regulations, awards policies and practices and customs. Of 
the actors in the system, the government agencies in some systems may have such a 
broad and decisive role that they can override the hierarchies of managers and workers on 
almost all matters. For example, in former communist countries, no separate role was 
envisaged for employers and workers’ trade unions. They must operate within the 
directives of the political party and the guidelines of the state plan.
In other systems, the role of the government may be so minor and constricted as to permit 
consideration of the direct relationships between the two hierarchies with little reference 
to governmental agencies. Thus under the Anglo-Saxon model (e.g. United Kingdom), 
the approach is based on the Laissez faire doctrine which permits employers and unions 
reasonable latitude to determine their own affairs within a framework established.
Yet in other systems, the workers hierarchy or even the managerial hierarchy may be 
assigned a relatively narrow role. This is the position in some developing countries 
where the government of those countries plays a more active role in industrial relations. 
For instance, the collective bargaining process under these systems is hedged about with 
constraints. Such constraints include the significant role of the law and wage
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determination policies of the governments. Nigeria will conveniently fit into this last 
category.
Hofstede (1980) argued that the development of any social theory is influenced by an 
interaction of external influences (e.g. trade and scientific discovery), geographic, 
economic, demographic, historical, technological factors and cultural factors such as a 
group’s value system. This implies that one cannot understand one element (e.g. in our 
case, causes of union commitment) without its social context. Similarly, Lawrence
(1987) and Pfeffer (1982) underscored the importance of appreciating social context and 
its influence on theory development. Avdan and Adler (1991) also suggested that 
cultural values often influence the direction and outlook of research depending on the 
country involved and they cited the example of the United States where cultural values 
have fundamentally framed management research.
Across the world, trade unions have varied functions, which may affect the value of
joining (and possibly the intention to remain in membership) and consequently may make
generalising from research findings from one country to another problematic (Hartley,
1992). Otobo (1995) argued as follows:
"In a dynamic situation involving the transformation 
o f the state and economy over time, the role o f trade 
unions is best seen as constantly changing, making 
unrealistic any notion o f a union role which may be 
regarded as ‘constant’, ‘representative’ or 
‘typical’...given the colonial and subsequent 
geopolitical and ideological developments, the
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language which have been used in describing unions 
and the conception o f their role in Nigerian society 
have been borrowed or, at least greatly influenced, 
by external forces...the socio-political setting o f any 
country, its own economic, legal and other 
institutional arrangements, serve to impose limits on 
what trade unions may do".
But the debates generated by this controversy have mostly remained armchair theorising 
which often times are mostly conjectures. The most plausible means of resolving 
disputes of this nature is to conduct empirical enquiries. Arguably, not all the factors 
advanced in fig. 1.1 will necessarily apply in the Nigerian context. Those that may be 
relevant might not be that significant in their measure of predictiveness. Conversely, 
influential factors in the Nigerian context may actually be inconsequential in western 
settings. For example, although union loyalty was predicted by job alienation for white- 
collar workers and by job alienation for blue-collar workers in South Africa (Fullager and 
Barling, 1989), no such relationship emerged in Canada (Barling et al, 1989). Likewise, 
extrinsic job dissatisfaction had a direct effect on union loyalty among white-collar 
workers in South Africa, but not in Canada.
Furthermore, while the four commitment dimensions did not predict union turn over in 
America (Gordon et al, 1980), they did in Klanderman’ s (1989) Dutch sample. Focusing 
research effort on the applicability of an existing model across geographical divides will 
help to determine the extent to which that model can apply in a different context. 
Therefore, research questions need to focus on the extent to which existing theories may
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be parochial, restricted or universally binding in their applications. Thus we may ask: to 
what extent is the union commitment model shown in figure 1.1 appropriate for 
explaining union dynamics within the Nigerian trade unions?
1.3 Objective of study
Against the backdrop of the foregoing, this study seeks to investigate the factors 
responsible for the development and sustenance of union commitment amongst trade 
union members in Nigeria. Having established the importance of union commitment, this 
understanding will not be complete without knowing if an existing model is adequate in 
explaining situations on a context-specific basis, especially in a developing country.
Using fig. 1.1 to develop the study’s theoretical framework, the objective is to identify 
the predictors of union commitment and how this links with union participation for the 
Nigerian sample. Since the model is based mostly on studies conducted in developed 
countries, this study provides an opportunity to make comparisons with findings in the 
western literature in the final analysis. Another objective is to fill the gap in the western 
conceptualisation of union commitment and current research products within the Nigerian 
literature with special emphasis on whether the commitment-participation link portrayed 
in the western literature can be applied to the Nigerian situation.
1.4 Significance of Study
The significance of a study of this nature is of both theoretical and practical 
consequences. The knowledge to be gained from the investigation of a standardised 
model of union commitment amongst Nigerian union members is of unprecedented
31
research value to the Nigerian industrial relations literature. The paucity of empirical 
contents of the Nigerian literature on trade unions has been decried (Matanmi, 1992) but 
little it seems has been done to empirically ascertain what some authors seem to take for 
granted. This study attempts to advance empirical validated accounts of what determines 
members’ commitment to the union and the implications this has for different aspects of 
union participation. The practical significance of this study will be of interest to union 
leaders who may wish to address union membership apathy through an effective 
application of ideas that may help to enhance the development and sustenance of 
commitment amongst members. More specifically, labour leaders in developing 
countries need to be able to understand the processes leading up to the development and 
sustenance of union commitment. Hopefully, this study should be of some assistance in 
this regard.
1.5 Structure of Thesis
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 are wholly devoted to 
literature review; the former focusing on mainly western studies while chapter 3 is 
devoted to Nigerian studies. In both chapters, the aim is to critically examine existing 
research that is significant to the present study by summarizing relevant studies, 
evaluating them, showing the relationships between different works, and showing how 
they relate to present study. This provides the context for the present research by looking 
at what work has already been done in the area of union commitment. Chapter 4 is 
devoted to the methods adopted in both quantitative and qualitative research. It entails 
the definition of the activity of research is, describes the model used for investigation,
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steps taken in securing access to samples, pilot study, the main population sample, the 
rationale for their selection, the scales of measurement employed for the investigation, 
the research hypotheses, the administration of questionnaires, response rates and the 
techniques employed for data analysis. Essentially, there were two quantitative surveys.
The multivariate analysis and descriptive statistics of the research (first survey) are 
shown in chapter 5. Test for missing data, reliability tests and factor analysis were used 
to ascertain and improve the dependability of the research instruments employed in the 
study. Afterwards, test of correlation was used to test for the model’s hypothesized 
relationships. Chapter 6 uses multiple regression to further elaborate on the nature of the 
relationships uncovered in chapter 5 and to pinpoint the most predictive independent 
variables for the dependent variables. Chapter 7 is primarily concerned with the analysis 
of data obtained from the second quantitative survey and uses multiple regression and 
other methods of statistical analysis. In chapter 8, the results of the qualitative 
investigation are presented. In chapter chapter 9, a conclusion of the themes of the 
research and their implications are presented.
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review
Introduction
In this chapter, an attempt is made to identify the antecedents and consequences of 
union commitment from various studies conducted mainly in America and Europe in 
order to put the proposed study into perspective. A primary basis for the concerted 
attempt to formalise a definition of union commitment was the data already available 
on organisational commitment. Initial research in the area of union commitment 
considered commitment as a zero-sum commodity, which postulates that commitment 
to a union precludes commitment to the employing institution. This mutual 
exclusivity principle stimulated interest in investigating the extent to which union 
growth competed with loyalty to the employing organization. However, several 
empirical studies (Dean, 1954; Purcell 1953; Stagner, 1954) indicated a positive 
relationship between company and union commitment, which contradicted the zero 
sum theory and led to the formulation of the concept of dual commitment or dual 
loyalty. This positive relationship between company and union commitment was 
found to be a function of the perceived labour-management relationships existing in 
the workplace between the unions and the employer (Angle and Perry, 1986).
The process by which commitment is built up, the factors influencing commitment 
and the resultant outcomes of commitment have been extensively studied. To 
measure union commitment, scales parallel to the "organizational commitment 
questionnaire" (OCQ) scale (Porter et al, 1976) have been constructed. Some scales 
are unidimensional (Porter et al. 1976), while others model union commitment as a 
multidimensional concept (Gordon et al, 1980). Gordon et al (1980) developed a 30-
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item measure of union commitment, based on the attitudinal approach and drawing 
partly on the existing organisation commitment literature for questionnaire items. 
Their research produced a four-factor measure of commitment comprising ‘union 
loyalty’ (reflecting a sense of pride and an awareness of the benefits of union 
membership), ‘responsibility to the union’ (referring to the members’ willingness to 
fulfil day-to-day obligations to the union, for example by providing information to the 
union and supporting others’ use of the grievance procedure), ‘willingness to work for 
the union’ (reflecting the willingness to participate in union activity beyond that 
normally expected of the rank and file member), and ‘belief in unionism’ (reflecting a 
general belief in the concept of trade unionism). While there have been debates 
about the dimensionality of the construct (Fullager, 1986; Kelloway et al, 1992; 
Thacker et al, 1989) much of the subsequent research has utilised the Gordon et al 
(1980) scales, or items derived from them.
Since Gordon et al’s (1980) study, numerous studies have been conducted to 
investigate the structure of union commitment and the dimensionality of the 
measuring instrument they provided. Ladd et al (1982) demonstrated the validity of 
the dimensions of union commitment in samples of engineers, technicians and non­
professional workers who were members of white-collar unions. Fullager (1986) 
conducted a test of the union commitment measure in Africa and five factors emerged 
(essentially Gordon et al.’s four factors plus a factor Fullager labelled “loyalty to the 
Employing Organisation and Work”).
Friedman and Harvey’s (1986) work provided the first direct challenge to the four 
factor structure. Although based on Gordon et al’s (1980) data, they used a different
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data analytic strategy (namely, an oblique confirmatory factor analytic model), and 
found support for two dimensions, namely union attitudes and opinions (which 
incorporated the loyalty and belief in unionism factors) and prounion behavioural 
intentions (comprising the responsibility and willingness dimensions). Friedman and 
Harvey (1986) noticed that their findings are consistent with Fishbein and Azjen’s 
(1975) theory of behavioural intentions.
In an attempt to resolve the apparent confusion, Thacker et al (1989), in a direct 
contrast to the two- and four-dimensional models using confirmatory factor analytical 
techniques, suggested that Gordon et al.’s four dimensions provide a more accurate 
perspective of the dimensionality of union commitment than do Friedman and 
Harvey’s (1986) two factor structure, but that the four union commitment dimensions 
are substantially interrelated. Tetrick et al (1989) also showed that the four factors 
were stable over an eight-month period and that there was some causal ordering 
among these four dimensions. Specifically, belief in unionism influenced union 
loyalty and feelings of responsibility to the union. In turn the willingness to work for 
the union was predicted by loyalty and responsibility. Tertrick (1989) further showed 
that belief in unionism was the most stable of the four dimensions and union loyalty 
the least stable.
Iverson and Ballard (1996)’s study examined the stability of the dimension of union 
commitment as proposed by Gordon et al (1980) in the cultural context of New 
Zealand. Results indicate that union commitment is best represented by the four 
factors of union loyalty, responsibility to the union, willingness to work for the union 
and belief in unionism. The factors displayed discriminant validity as evidenced by
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the differential relationships and explained variances with a common set of 
explanatory variables. Thus, most of the available research suggests that the four 
dimensions of union commitment are stable and valid.
2.1 Antecedents of Union Commitment
Based on previous research and the theory developed in the organizational 
commitment literature, several antecedent variables of union commitment have been 
identified (Gallagher and Clark, 1989), and include the demographic characteristics of 
the workforce, individual beliefs, union characteristics, work experiences, structural 
characteristics and industrial relations climate.
Demographic/ Personal characteristics
Several studies have found no significant relationship between age and union loyalty 
(e.g. Bemmels, 1995; Deery et al, 1994; Magenau et al, 1988; Sherer and Morishima,
1989), while others have found a significant positive relationship (Conlon and 
Gallagher, 1987). Organisational commitment researchers have suggested that older 
workers are more strongly committed to their organisations because of the 
investments they have made in their jobs and their achievement of a better job fit over 
time (Meyer and Allen, 1997). In the same vein, older members’ higher commitment 
level may be a reflection of their future ambition to contest for leadership positions 
having been in the union far longer; they might also feel they are best placed to lead 
the union.
Gordon et al (1980) found that female members’ expression of union loyalty was 
more positive than male workers although males participate more in union activities.
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This apparent discrepancy may not be due to gender per se, but rather to differences 
between men and women with respect to diverse variables such as the greater 
experience of work/family conflict among working women, lack of opportunity or 
discrimination. The traditional family responsibilities of women may limit their 
ability to work for the union, while the fact that most union leaders are men restricts 
the availability of female role models and may limit the attraction of an activist 
‘career’ for women (Gallagher and Clark, 1989). A survey of union leaders in the 
United States for instance indicates that women are underrepresented in top union 
positions (Dale, 1992).
Marital status has not usually been included in studies of union commitment (Barling 
et al, 1992). However, Magenau et al (1988) found no significant relationship 
between ‘family status’ (a composite index of marital status and the presence of 
children in the household) and commitment to either organisation or union. But this 
is not to suggest that marital status should be conclusively discarded as 
inconsequential. Concerning education, there seem to be mixed findings. Some have 
found no significant relationship between education and union commitment (Barling 
et al, 1990; Fukami and Larson, 1984; Magenau et al, 1988), while others found a 
negative relationship (Bemmels, 1995; Deery et al. 1984). It seems likely that the 
impact of educational level will reflect composition of the particular sample being 
investigated. For example, Deery et al (1994) used a sample of 249 white-collar 
unionists in Australia while Barling et al (1990)’s data were obtained from 100 
members of a white-collar union in Canada. Cultural factors may thus account for the 
difference.
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Ethnicity in Nigeria, is a very important variable which has influenced the people’s 
history, politics and geography (Warmington, 1960; Otobo, 1997). The country is a 
predominantly multicultural society with different tribes and languages all co-existing 
as a nation. Consequently, some problems faced by the unions may have been related 
to divisions and factionalisations on ethnic lines (Smock, 1969; Tokunbo, 1987). 
Smock (1969)’s investigation revealed that around 36 percent of his respondents said 
they would prefer to have top officers of the union from their part of Ibo land. Also 
unskilled workers were more likely to say they wanted the top officers to come from 
their area than skilled workers. Similarly, in another study, union members’ support 
for a labour party was influenced by ethnic considerations (Melson, 1975).
Individual Beliefs, Personal Characteristics and Political Inclinations
Several studies have shown that individuals who become members of organisations 
and who have realistic expectations of the benefits offered by that organisation, are 
less likely to leave voluntarily than if  they hold unrealistic beliefs (Wanous, 1980). 
There is also research evidence suggesting that the extent to which the expectations of 
new organisation members are met has a direct, albeit limited influence on 
commitment (Grusky, 1966; Steers, 1977). Fullager and Barling (1989) showed that 
for privileged workers (i.e. workers with access to decision making), the work ethic 
predicted union loyalty.
However the work ethic is only one of many belief systems (Bucholz, 1978). Others 
such as the Marxist belief system and the humanistic belief system may be related to 
union commitment, particularly because they predict union attitudes (Barling et al,
1991). Likewise psychological conservatism which reflects the fear of change, might
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be particularly salient in the context of industrial relations: first, psychological 
conservatism predicts union attitudes (Barling et al, 1990) and second, change is a 
central element of the industrial relations process (Bluen and Barling, 1988). Glick et 
al (1977) have suggested that the relationship between satisfaction and participation is 
moderated by personality characteristics. Satisfaction is positively correlated with 
participation among members who express high needs for participation in decision 
making, achievement, and personal growth. For union members whose needs for 
accomplishment and growth are relatively weak, participation may follow 
dissatisfaction with the union.
The relationship between work values and union commitment seems to be moderated 
by race (Fullager and Barling, 1989). Among white “affluent” workers, work ethic 
beliefs are more important determinants of union commitment. By contrast, among 
black disenfranchised workers, Marxist-related work beliefs are stronger predictors of 
union commitment. The indication here is that greater personal feelings of alienation 
and exploitation, and a strong development of class consciousness, cause greater 
loyalty to the union among less privileged sectors of the blue-collar labour force.
With regards to politics, studies of American unions have found evidence that a 
majority of members supported their union’s involvement in the political process. 
These same studies however have also found that 20 to 45 percent of a union’s 
members typically oppose their union’s participation in these activities (Delaney and 
Masters, 1991). Clark (2000) argued that if union political action programs desire to 
enlist members’ support for union-endorsed political candidates and union-supported
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legislation, they must first convince their members that involvement in politics is a 
legitimate and important endeavour for the union.
Fields et al’s (1987) investigation of the relationship between union commitment and 
members' support for their national union's political involvement revealed a positive 
and significant relationship between union commitment and members' political 
support, suggesting that members' identification with the union influences their views 
about the propriety of the national's political involvement. This study also found the 
same relationship between the members’ perception of his or her local union 
instrumentality (influence on economic and non-economic issues in the workplace) 
and support for union involvement in politics. Finally, the research found that female 
members are more supportive of union political involvement than are male members. 
Numerous studies have shown that a majority of union members vote for union- 
endorsed candidates. One such study suggests that on average, American union 
members vote for endorsed candidates a rate 15 to 20 percentage points higher than 
non-members (Delaney et al, 1990). This is balanced, however, by the fact that a 
significant number of members ignore their union’ s endorsement, sometimes 
providing the margin of victory for candidates opposed by labour (Clark, 2000).
Union Characteristics and Perceptions
Several studies suggest that union commitment is closely related to union leadership 
characteristics, attitudes towards the unions (general and specific attitudes) and early 
union socialisation experiences. These are discussed below.
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Union leadership styles
Studies have shown an association between participative styles of leadership and 
increased membership involvement and participation (Gallagher and Clark, 1989). 
Morishima (1995), using a single item measure of allowing members to have 
influence on how the union is run, found it to predict union loyalty significantly 
among Japanese white-collar and technical workers. Similarly, Magenau et al,
(1988) found that member’ perceived degree of influence in union decisions was the 
most significant predictor of union commitment for both union activists and rank and 
file members. Sverke and Sjoberg (1994), in a study of Swedish public-sector white- 
collar workers, found that the perceived responsiveness of local union leaders was a 
positive predictor of union commitment.
In another study, responsibility to the union and participation in union activities were 
predicted by member perceptions of shop stewards’ leadership qualities (Kelloway 
and Barling, 1993). It has been argued that participatory leaders can build upon 
surges of membership interest and participation to increase the strength of workplace 
unionism (Darlington, 1994; Fairbrother, 1989; Fosh, 1993). A participatory style 
stresses the importance of communications, consultations and the involvement of 
members in decision-making.
Members’ participation in union activities has been found to vary with union leaders’ 
interpersonal skills and with their accessibility to members (Nicholson et al, 1980). 
Fosh (1993) similarly identified how the changing patterns of swells and depressions 
in membership participation were influenced by leadership style. The style and 
character of leadership exerts a critical influence on how the union organization is
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responsive to general membership aspirations and the way in which collective 
awareness and the activism of the mass of workers is stimulated (Hyman, 1979). 
Much research on leadership has been given over to the development of typologies 
attempting to categorise leadership behaviour. Perhaps the best known of the 
typologies is that of Batstone et al (1977). Batstone et al (1977) identified two union 
leadership styles. The first the ‘delegate’ has the mandate by members to do no more 
than carry out their wishes. By contrast the second style the ‘representative’ adopts a 
leadership role, and takes personal initiatives as well as executing policies according 
to the wishes of their membership. On two dimensions of power -  the initiation and 
control of issues in procedural terms, and the maintenance of an ideology and set of 
institutions - it was the representative leaders that were demonstrably more effective.
Glick et al (1972) identified a link between leadership style and the quality of union- 
management relations and found that the latter was an important influence on 
membership satisfaction with their union. Their evidence raises questions about the 
nature of the engagement between unions and management in the workplace and the 
way in which the union leader manages this relationship. There is much debate on 
whether or not unions should emphasise the shared interests that exist between them 
and management rather than stressing adversarialism (Bacon and Story, 1996; Kelly, 
1996). Green et al (2000) argue that the terms of any cooperation with management 
at the workplace need to be carefully formulated if the support of members is to be 
maintained. Many writers agree that the employment relationship involves a 
dialectic of conflict and co-operation.
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Attitudes towards supervisor behaviour have been suggested as an antecedent of 
commitment to both organisation and union. There is a great deal of research 
evidence confirming the positive impact on organisational commitment of 
participative management styles, good communication and supportive supervisor 
behaviour (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990; Meyer and Allen, 1997). ‘Supervisor support’, 
reflecting the extent to which the supervisor is perceived as acting fairly, allowing 
participation and acting in the best interests of staff was included in the study by 
Magenau et al (1988). Results showed no significant impact on organisational 
commitment but a negative impact on union commitment for union stewards only (i.e. 
not for rank and file members) in one of the two years studied. Bemmels (1995) found 
a positive relationship between the extent to which the supervisor displays 
‘consideration’ towards employees and organisational commitment and a negative 
relationship with union commitment. The reverse was found in the case of the extent 
of the supervisors’ s concern for ‘structure’. Overall, it seems that a positive view of 
the relationship with the supervisor may favour commitment to the organisation but 
may undermine commitment to the union in some cases.
Recent research has suggested that there are two general styles of leadership in 
organisations. Transactional leadership is the traditional approach of most leaders. 
This form of leadership motivates people by exchanging rewards for services 
rendered. A transactional leader identifies roles organisational members must play to 
achieve the organisation’s objectives. At the same time, these leaders discern what 
the members need from the organisation and communicate to them how the 
organisation will fulfil those needs in exchange for the members performing the 
necessary roles (Bass, 1990).
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A second style of leadership that has received a significant amount of attention is 
transformational or charismatic leadership. Transformational leaders focus their 
efforts on communicating group goals to the organisation’s members and endeavour 
to convince members to put those goals above their own (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 
1998). These leaders work to transform the organisational culture, challenging 
members to do more than has been asked of them. Evidence suggests that this 
approach can generate more membership involvement than transactional leadership 
(Bass, 1998). Several studies have found that transformational leadership is 
associated with higher levels of member satisfaction with and commitment to an 
organisation than are other leadership approaches.
A transformational leadership style is also associated with higher levels of member 
participation and performance (Bass and Avolio, 1994; Shamir et al, 1993). Some of 
these studies have looked at union officer and steward leadership styles and have 
concluded that transformational leadership has a positive effect on union members’ 
“loyalty, sense of responsibility and actual participation in union activities” 
(Kelloway and Barling, 1993, p.263). In addition, work on transformational 
leadership has found that leaders can be taught to practise this style of leadership 
(Bass, 1998). This suggests that transformational leaders are not simply “bom”, but 
rather can be developed.
Transformational leadership is applicable at all levels of leadership, be it national and 
local levels (Bass and Avolio, 1990). Several studies have examined the extent to 
which union stewards can be taught to use the transformational leadership approach
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and the impact this approach has on members’ participation. In one such study some 
of the stewards in a local union of Canadian public employees were given a one-day 
training session on transformational leadership while others were not. Those who 
received the training were also given periodic follow-up sessions to ensure that they 
were practising effective transformational leadership (Kelloway and Barling, 1996; 
Kelloway, Barling and Cantano, 1996). After several months, members in the units 
with stewards who were practising transformational leadership showed significantly 
greater satisfaction with their local union. Those in units led by stewards who had not 
received training showed no increase in membership satisfaction.
Additional research at the local union level has also found links between 
transformational leadership, as practised by stewards, and increased membership 
commitment and participation (Kelloway and Barling, 1993). These findings are 
significant because they demonstrate the effectiveness of transformational leadership 
in a union context. The research shows that local union leaders can with appropriate 
training, learn to practise the transformational style of leadership. It also shows that 
transformational leadership is more effective at shaping members’ attitudes toward 
the union and increasing members’ participation in the organisation than the more 
common transactional approach.
Union Attitudes: general and specific attitudes
The focus of research on union attitudes seems to be based on a premise of 
behavioural science that individuals are not bom with their attitudes and beliefs in 
place, but are rather, in large part, the product of experiences to which people are 
exposed and information they receive from a variety of sources. This suggests that a
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person’s attitudes about unions can be influenced either directly or indirectly by a 
union or by individual union activists (Clark, 2000). A distinction is made between 
general attitudes and specific attitudes towards unions. General attitudes towards 
union include how individuals view the institution of organised labour, its goals, 
achievements, and leadership, in the abstract (Youngblood et al, 1984; Kochan et al, 
1986). A 1989 study found that these general attitudes about unions tend to centre 
around two issues -  “the big labour image” and “union instrumentality” (Clark, 2000).
The image of unions as ‘big labour’ involves the extent to which people view unions 
and union leaders as self-interested, opposed to change, autocratic, overly focused on 
politics and “blue collar” in orientation. In contrast, general “union instrumentality” 
reflects people’s evaluations of the labour movement’s ability to deliver or to give 
members their money’s worth for the dues they pay. This might involve the degree to 
which unions are able to win higher wages, better working conditions or favourable 
legislation (Clark, 2000).
Both dimensions of general attitudes towards unions were reflected in some surveys 
which indicated that approximately 69 percent of the overall workforce thinks 
employees are more successful in getting problems resolved with their employers 
when they bring these problems up as a group rather than as individuals. Yet less 
than 43 percent say they would definitely or probably vote for a union if given the 
chance (Clark, 2000 p. 24). Behavioural research suggests that general beliefs often 
have deep roots and that once in place, they are not easily changed. Research also 
suggests that these beliefs are very important and play a key role in shaping related
47
attitudes throughout a person’s life (Zimbardo and Ebbesen, 1970; Youngblood et al, 
1984).
Attitudes about specific unions focus on how an individual views the specific union 
that represents, or is attempting to represent them. Research on unionism has 
suggested that specific union beliefs can be grouped into three important dimensions -  
“instrumentality”, “union satisfaction” and “perceived union support”. Specific union 
instrumentality refers to the extent to which individuals feel that a given union is able 
to win tangible gains on behalf of its members (Deshpande and Fiorito, 1989). 
Research has found beliefs about the union’s instrumentality to be a strong predictor 
of both attitudes of commitment to the union and behavioural participation in union 
activities (Fullgar and Barling, 1989; Kelloway et al, 1990; Bamberger et al, 1999; 
Fuller and Hester, 1993; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1994). For instance, Bamberger et al 
(1999), identified union instrumentality as a key antecedent of union commitment, 
their results also suggesting that instrumentality plays a key role in building pro-union 
beliefs.
Although specific union satisfaction shares some similarities with instrumentality, it 
also represents a members’ feelings concerning the representation that a member 
receives from the union in his or her workplace. The research suggests that member 
satisfaction is not simply a matter of unions delivering tangible gains at the bargaining 
table but also involves the extent to which the union’s leadership keeps members 
informed, gives them a say in running the union and is responsive to their concerns 
(Fiorito et al, 1988; Jarley et al, 1990; Iverson and Kuruvilla, 1995; Snape and Chan, 
2000).
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More recently, research in this area has also suggested that members’ specific 
attitudes towards the union reflect the degree to which they believe that their union 
leadership values members’ contributions and cares about their well-being (Shore et 
al, 1994). Using data from a survey of a large steelworker local union, two 
researchers found evidence that a strong positive relationship exists between 
members’ perceptions of union support and their levels of commitment to the union 
(Fuller and Hester, 1998). A few studies also indicate that specific union beliefs may 
exert significant influence on the unionisation process of workers in Nigeria 
(Fashoyin, 1987; Warmington, 1960; Cohen, 1974).
Early Union Socialisation
Interaction with established union and organisational members is the primary avenue 
whereby recruits internalise the implicit mores of the organisational or union climate 
and refine their initial expectations concerning the organisation and their roles (Van 
Maanen and Schein, 1979). Early socialisation experiences have been found to be 
consistently and positively correlated with all aspects of commitment to the union. 
Positive socialisation experiences in the first year (e.g. the extent to which the new 
member is supported, encouraged or ignored; whether the goals of the union were 
clearly set out) were positively correlated with all four dimensions of union 
commitment (Gordon et al, 1980).
Building on the general research on socialisation and on the 1980 union study, a 
larger, national study of early socialisation experiences in a union setting was 
conducted in the early 1990s (Clark et al, 1993). In this study, members who had
49
joined the union during the past four months were surveyed in an effort to gather 
information about their early formal and informal socialisation experiences. 
Information was also gathered about their levels of commitment to the union. Among 
this group of new members, formal socialisation experiences were defined as 
organised orientation programmes conducted by union officials and designed to 
introduce the new members to the union. Informal socialisation experiences included 
contacts or experiences with more senior members of the union that were not 
organised by the union but provided information to the new members about the 
organisation, its values, goals and customs as well as its expectations of the 
membership.
The results of the study indicated that simply having a formal socialisation experience 
(an organised new member orientation program in this case) by itself did not lead to 
higher commitment on the part of the new member. Rather, it was the quality of the 
formal socialisation experience that shaped the commitment level. Specifically, the 
study indicated that the range and amount of information presented both verbally and 
in written form, had an influence on members’ commitment. Another aspect of this 
finding was that formal and informal socialisation experiences each made an 
independent contribution to membership commitment.
In other words, formal orientation sessions and subsequent informal socialisation 
experiences each had a separate and unique impact on the members’ commitment to 
the union. This suggests that the union can have the maximum effect on commitment 
by providing both positive formal and informal socialisation experiences (Clark et al,
1993). One study showed that new members with negative attitudes towards the
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union frequently were the same members who complained that they rarely saw their 
union steward or representative. One such new member suggested that his attitudes 
toward the union had been greatly influenced by the fact that it was six months before 
he found out who the union steward was in his part of the plant (Clark and Gallagher,
1992). Research has suggested that a union members’ perception of the steward has a 
significant influence on their perception of the union (Barling et al, 1992).
It has also been found that exposure to unions well before an individual becomes a 
part of a bargaining unit can have a significant effect on attitudes toward unions. This 
study found that children who are made aware of their parents’ activism and 
involvement in unionism are far more likely to feel positive about unions than 
children who had no such exposure (Clark, 2000 p. 64). Two other studies provide 
indirect support for the link between union socialisation and union commitment. 
Fukami and Larson (1984) found that a variable they called “social involvement” 
predicted union loyalty. All four items that made up this social involvement scale 
focussed on the extent to which respondents interacted with fellow workers and hence 
union members. Through such interactions, some socialisation may have occurred 
(Van Maanen and Schein, 1979).
Work Experiences
Previous research has identified a relationship between various features of the job and 
organisational commitment (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990), the argument being that jobs 
richer in autonomy, variety, scope and challenge (Hackman and Oldham, 1980) are 
likely to lead to a more fulfilling experience of work and stronger commitment. 
Research on union commitment has often failed to find such a positive relationship
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(Deery et. Al, 1994; Fukami and Larson, 1984; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1994), although 
Sherer and Morishima (1989) did find a positive relationship between ‘job influence’ 
and union commitment.
Job dissatisfaction
Some studies found that job satisfaction is positively related to union commitment 
(Gordon et al, 1980) whilst others still find a negative relationship (Fullager and 
Barling 1989). Some found it to be a significant predictor of organisational 
commitment but not of union commitment (Deery et al, 1994; Magenau et al, 1988). 
Fullager and Hester (1998) found that the relationship between job satisfaction and 
union commitment is moderated by perceived industrial climate, with more 
adversarial climate being associated with a significantly negative correlation and vice 
versa.
A possible explanation for this is that, in adversarial climates, job satisfaction may 
imply a relative lack of employee grievances and so fail to generate support for the 
union (whilst dissatisfied workers turn to the union). In a more positive climate, job 
satisfaction may be credited to the achievements of the union and thus help build 
union commitment (and some dissatisfied workers may seen the union as ineffective) . 
In a study Gordon et al (1980) found that white-collar workers who were dissatisfied 
with extrinsic aspects of their jobs were more willing to be actively involved in the 
union. Similarly, belief in the philosophy of organised labour was stronger among 
those workers who felt that their extrinsic needs were not being satisfied. Satisfaction 
of intrinsic needs was not associated with either beliefs in organised labour or 
willingness to work for the union.
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Gordon et al (1984) found that although union loyalty was significantly associated 
with extrinsic and intrinsic satisfaction in a sample of technicians, a similar 
association was not found among engineers. Similarly, while job dissatisfaction and 
union commitment were significantly associated in the United States and South Africa, 
this was not necessarily the case in Canada (Barling, Wade and Fullagar, 1990).
This seems to suggest that the relationship between union commitment and extrinsic / 
intrinsic job satisfaction is not moderated by a simple blue-collar vs. white collar 
distinction. Several factors, such as the nature of the membership and the type of 
union under investigation, appear to influence this relationship.
Barling et al (1990) found that while overall work satisfaction predicted company 
commitment, it did not predict union loyalty, and suggested that situational factors 
may account for this. The community college teachers they studied had recently been 
on strike and were legislated back to work. Yet the measure of global dissatisfaction 
used in that study did not include the specific dissatisfactions the union members had 
been experiencing, namely their weekly teaching load. In addition, the source of the 
dissatisfaction was probably viewed as being the board of Regents, rather than work 
per se or direct supervision.
In the study by Kelloway et al (1990), intrinsic and extrinsic dissatisfaction exerted 
somewhat different effects on the four dimensions of union commitment. Intrinsic 
job dissatisfaction exerted a direct influence on union loyalty, willingness to work for 
the union, and belief in unionism. Extrinsic job dissatisfaction exerted no direct 
effects, but did influence these same three commitment dimensions indirectly through
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its effects on the perceived instrumentality of the union in resolving union members’ 
dissatisfaction. As a result, these studies emphasise factors that must be taken into 
account in understanding the relationship between job dissatisfaction and union 
commitment. Barling, Wade and Fullagar’s (1990) findings suggest that the nature of 
the dissatisfaction must be considered. In addition, the likelihood that dissatisfaction 
exerts indirect effects on union commitment is also raised (Kelloway et al, 1990).
A 1980 study looked at why workers become interested in union representation. To 
shed light on that issue, the study used the data from an earlier study in which 
employees who had been involved in a union election were interviewed at two points 
in time. The first interview was conducted immediately after the election was 
announced; the second interview took place following the election. The 1239 
randomly selected employees interviewed in the study were drawn from a wide 
variety of sectors and geographic locations and represented different unions and 
different bargaining unit sizes. The study found that initial interest in voting for a 
union was stimulated by job dissatisfaction. Specifically, the study found that it was 
dissatisfaction with working conditions rather than the nature of the work itself that 
led to an interest in unionisation. A second analysis of the data in this study showed 
that a second factor, perceived job insecurity, also causes workers to vote in favour of 
union representation (Brett, 1980).
Promotion and alternative job opportunities
Better promotion opportunities may contribute to greater organisational commitment 
(Magenau et al, 1988). But they might conceivably undermine union commitment to
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the extent that promotion offers an alternative route to improved pay and conditions in 
contrast to the collectivist approach offered by the union.
Pay equity
Although pay equity is unrelated to union commitment (Fukami and Larson, 1984), 
differential relationships may exist between perceived pay equity and union 
commitment across varying levels of occupational status and differing types of jobs. 
For example, perceived inequity in wages is positively and significantly related to the 
willingness to unionise among blue-collar workers (Kochan, 1979). In the same vein, 
dissatisfaction with wages is significantly related to support of the union (Kochan, 
1979). Thus it could be that the relationship between perceived equity and union 
commitment may not only differ among different types of workers but that the effects 
of objective wage levels and subjective perceptions of pay are also different (Barling,
1990).
Job Alienation
Fullagar and Barling (1987) suggested that workers might be more predisposed to 
become committed to labour organisations if they were in alienating work situations 
which provide the worker with no power or control. This lack of power or control 
may arise due to the place of work being controlled and mechanised or broken down 
to simplify the work process. Other reasons may be because the place of work does 
not provide sufficient information for the worker to plan and predict his or her work 
environment, does not have the potential to satisfy their social needs and does not 
offer the worker the opportunity to self-actualise. The effects of both job 
dissatisfaction and alienation, however are arguably moderated by perceptions of the
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union’s instrumentality in improving conditions of work where the organisation has 
been unresponsive ( DeCotiis and LeLouam, 1981; Kochan, 1980).
Studies showing a relationship between job involvement and union attitudes or 
commitment have been conducted in India (Pestonjee et al, 1981) and South Africa 
(Fullager and Barling, 1989). In empirically investigating the relationship between 
job involvement / alienation and unionisation, Pestonjee et al (1981) found a 
significant negative correlation between job involvement and attitudes towards unions 
(r = - 0.58) in a sample of 200 blue-collar textile workers in Northern India.
In a sample of blue-collar workers in South Africa, Fullagar and Barling (1989) found 
that the relationship between job involvement and union loyalty was moderated by 
race (reflecting different levels of occupational). Affluent, white union members who 
were loyal to the union manifested higher levels of job involvement than black 
workers, for whom job alienation predicted loyalty to the union. Barling et al (1990) 
and Kelloway et al (1990) however, found no relationship between job involvement 
and union commitment and the former attributed this to situational factors. Where the 
relationship between management and labour is poor, job involvement would attain 
less importance than current behavioural concerns as a predictor of union loyalty. 
Furthermore, job involvement would be less important as a predictor of union loyalty 
among workers of lower occupational status who are more alienated from decision­
making processes. A further situational explanation of findings from these studies 
resides in the national context in which these studies were conducted. However, no 
relationship emerges between job involvement and union commitment among 
Canadian samples (Barling et al, 1990; Kelloway et al,1990)
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Life dissatisfaction
It has been argued that market context and socio-political variables are capable of 
affecting commitment to labour organisations (Adams and Krislov, 1974; Roomkin 
and Juris, 1978). Since rates of inflation, unemployment, consumer price index, etc. 
have the capability of influencing the ability of workers to afford decent feeding, 
accommodation, health care and education for themselves or / and their family, there 
could be a relationship between satisfaction with various life and union commitment 
levels.
Table 2.1 Inflation Rate 1995 -  2001 in % (Septem )er figures)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
78.5 37.4 11.6 8.2 9.8 6.5 18.4
Source: Federal Office of Statistics
The Labour Force survey in Nigeria indicated that overall unemployment rate 
amounted to 18.1% in December 2000, rising from 3.6 percent in 19991. Also, 
between December 2000 and December 2001, average consumer price level rose by
16.5 percent; in many centres, prices of household goods, clothing, and transport fares 
rose2. Since late 2000, inflation rose sharply in the country, reaching 18.4% in 
September 2001. The single digit inflation rate attained in Nigeria between 1998 and 
2000 was attributed largely to favourable agricultural harvests and the pursuit of less 
expansionary fiscal monetary policies3. An EIU Country Report4 on Nigeria states 
that it will be difficult to bring inflation back into single digits because of the increase
1 Federal office of Statistics, 16th November 2001.
2 Federal office o f Statistics, 31st January 2002.
3 CBN Annual Report and Statement o f Accounts for the year ended 31st December 2000.
4 The Economic Intelligence Unit Limited 2002.
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in domestic fuel prices in early 2002 and the lack of serious efforts to curtail 
government expenditure.
Structural Characteristics
A number of structural characteristics have been identified as being associated with 
commitment to organisations. These include size, span of control, the extent of 
formalisation, functional dependence and decentralisation o the organisation (Steers, 
1977; Stevens et al, 1978). Certain structural characteristics of the union are argued 
as capable of affecting the extent of union democracy and participation. These include 
not only such factors as size and span of control, but also degree of open admission 
policy, extent of decentralisation of collective bargaining and rank and file 
accessibility to political participation.
Gallagher and Wetzel (1990) suggested that the perceived voluntariness of association 
could affect union commitment. Because the four unions they studied all had a union 
shop agreement, they could not address their hypothesis directly, so they focussed on 
the perceived voluntariness of association, asking individuals whether they would 
have joined on their own volition. Workers who reported being in the union 
involuntarily reported less loyalty, willingness to work for the union or responsibility 
to the union. Even though Gallagher and Wetzel could not contrast the commitment 
of members operating in open vs. closed or union shops directly and problems of 
retrospective recall might have clouded employees’ recollections, the conceptual and 
practical significance of this issue suggests that it certainly is an area warranting 
further investigation.
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Industrial Relations Climate / Environmental Characteristics
The state of relations between management and the union has been identified as an 
antecedent of both organisational and union commitment (Magenau et al, 1988). 
Generally, the expectation is that favourable perceptions of the relationship will be 
reflected in stronger commitment to both due to cognitive consistency between the 
role of employee and union members in workplaces with more co-operative union- 
management relations.
Angle and Perry (1986) and Magenau et al. (1988) found some empirical support for 
this claim in North America, as did Deery and Iverson (1998) in their sample drawn 
from the Australian financial services industry. Interestingly, in their sample of 
Australian public-sector workers, Deery et al (1994) found that industrial relations 
climate was positively related to organisational commitment but negatively linked 
with union commitment, suggesting that the findings on dual loyalty may need to be 
tested more widely.
Market context and social-political variables are also argued as capable of affecting 
commitment to labour organisations. Economic recessions are said to produce labour 
unrest because of retrenchments and a climate that facilitates exploitation of labour 
market conditions. Consequently, a swing in favour of unionisation may occur 
(Adams and Krislov, 1974). Unions thrive during periods of low unemployment or 
rapid employment growth ( Roomkin and Juris, 1978). Although these trends have 
not been supported unequivocally ( Fiorito, 1982; Sheflin et al, 1981), they do suggest 
the probable role of labour market influences on union commitment.
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2.2 Dual commitment
Researchers have long shown an interest in whether or not it is possible for employees 
to be highly committed to both their union and their employer at the same time, a 
phenomenon known as ‘dual allegiance’, dual loyalty or ‘dual commitment’ (Angle 
and Perry, 1986; Stagner 1954). Magenau et al. (1988) provide three possibilities. 
First, employees may perceive the work situation as an integral whole, with 
organisation and union as aspects of this whole rather than as distinct entities (Stagner, 
1954).
Those who perceive their overall work situation favourably will then display dual 
commitment. Several studies have tested for this by examining the distinctiveness of 
the organisational and union commitment constructs, usually by conducting a factor 
analysis of the pooled commitment items (Sherer and Morishima, 1989; Sverke and 
Sjoberg, 1994). The finding that organisational and union commitment are distinct 
constructs with different antecedents contradicts this notion and suggests that there 
are two distinct attitudes in organisational and union commitment.
Secondly, ‘cognitive consistency theory’ suggests that when relations between 
management and union are perceived to be positive, employees will find it possible to 
commit to both organisations and union, but that these commitments become 
inconsistent where relations between the two are perceived as being directly 
antagonistic. The findings of a relationship between positive industrial relations and 
both forms of commitment lend some support to this view (Angle and Perry, 1986).
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Thirdly, exchange theory suggests that commitment to organisation and union are 
largely independent, perhaps with distinct antecedents and are determined by the 
extent to which individuals perceive a beneficial exchange with each. The findings 
that organisational commitment is influenced by favourable perceptions of the job, 
and union commitment by a favourable evaluation of the union’s performance support 
such a view (Magenau et al, 1988). This suggests that organisation and union are not 
necessarily competing for employee commitment, since it may be feasible to have 
rewarding exchange relationship with both.
Some studies have suggested that organisational commitment is a positive predictor of 
union commitment (Bamberger et al, 1999; Iverson and Kuruvilla, 1995). This is 
consistent with a dual loyalty view of the relationship between organisational and 
union commitment and again suggests that union commitment is not an expression of 
negative attitudes towards the organisation. However, while the majority of studies 
do provide evidence of dual loyalty, some studies have found a negative correlation 
between organisational and union commitment (Fullager and Hester, 1998; Reed et al, 
1994; Deery et al, 1994; Guest and Peccei, 1993).
This inconsistency may reflect differences in the institutional and industrial relations 
contexts of the various samples. It may be, for example that in organisations with a 
history of adversarial industrial relations and calculative, low trust union-management 
relationships, employees will express loyalty either to organisation or to union and 
interpret these as conflicting loyalties, in line with cognitive consistency theory. Reed 
et al, (1994) find some support for this at the country level, with Japanese studies 
showing a stronger correlation between organisational and union commitment than
61
that shown in Western studies, perhaps reflecting what has been a less adversarial 
industrial relations climate in Japan.
The experiences with the job and employer could be summarized with variables like 
organizational commitment, job satisfaction (both intrinsic and extrinsic), and 
attitudes towards the supervisor. The labor relations climate is indicated by variables 
such as the perceptions of the employee about the quality of labor-management 
relations and the employee's attitudes towards the grievance procedure. The union 
experiences that affect an employee's union commitment include socialization 
processes, knowledge of the contract, perceptions of the union steward, and previous 
union affiliations.
Previous empirical analyses indicate support for the concept of dual commitment. Job 
satisfaction was found to be positively related to company commitment and extrinsic 
job satisfaction indicated a definite positive relationship with union commitment 
(Gordon et al, 1984) but the relationship between intrinsic job satisfaction and union 
commitment was ambiguous. Empirical support exists for the view that an employee 
with a poor relationship with a supervisor may perceive the union as a protector and 
hence display higher union commitment levels (Martin et al, 1982).
A positive relationship has been found between the perceived quality of labor- 
management relations and union commitment levels, lending further support to the 
concept of dual commitment (Fukami and Larson, 1984; Angle and Perry, 1986). 
Further, it was found that when employees view participation programs as improving 
labor-management relations, their union commitment levels increase. Satisfaction
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with the existing grievance procedure was found to have a positive relationship with 
union commitment (Clark et al, 1988). Irrespective of whether unidimensional 
(Fukami and Larson, 1984) or multidimensional (Gordon et al, 1980) measures of 
commitment were employed, socialization experiences played a significant role in 
determining commitment levels. This relationship is consistent with the theory in 
organizational entry. Knowledge of the contract also had a positive impact on 
commitment levels (Clark et al, 1989; Martin et al, 1982).
2.3 Consequence of Union Commitment: Union Participation
The literature on the consequences of union commitment has focused primarily on 
members’ participation in union activities. In this section, the survey-based research 
is reviewed along with some quantitative studies of the factors influencing union 
participation. Commitment to the union has been identified as a key antecedent of the 
willingness to participate actively in the union (e.g. Bamberger et al, 1999; Fullager 
and Barling, 1989; Fuller and Hester, 1998). Broadly speaking, the literature suggests 
that commitment to the union precedes participation, since commitment is essential in 
providing the necessary motivation to participate (Bamberger et al, 1999; Fullager and 
Barling, 1989; Gallagher and Clark, 1989).
Participation includes formal activities such as attending union meetings, voting in 
elections and holding union office, and also informal activities such as discussing 
union issues with colleagues, reading union literature and helping in union campaigns 
(Kelloway et al, 1995). Participation encourages majority rule at union meetings, acts 
as a check on oligarchic tendencies within the union leadership and provides the 
means of informing union leaders about membership needs (Anderson, 1978).
63
Some forms of participation, for example, attending meetings or discussing with 
colleagues, require little effort or initiative whereas others, for example standing for 
union office, require a great deal of sustained effort and individual initiative. This 
raises the issue of the dimensionality of participation. Thus McShane (1986) 
identifies three dimensions: ‘meeting participation’, which involves attending union 
meeting, ‘voting participation’, consisting of voting in union elections, and 
‘administrative participation’, which involves holding office or sitting on a union 
committee.
Furthermore, each of these dimensions was found to have different antecedents.
Kelly and Kelly (1994), using a different measure, find a two-factor structure, one 
based on routine rank and file forms of participation and the other on more demanding 
‘activist’ behaviours. Others however, find some limited support for a 
unidimensional approach (Kuruvilla et al, 1990) and Kelloway and Barling (1993) 
argue for a sequential approach, with participation moving cumulatively from 
relatively easy to more demanding forms.
Some studies examine actual behaviour, for example with members responding to 
questions on their frequency of participation in various union activities over the 
previous 12 months (Kelloway and Barling, 1993), resulting in a backward-looking 
measure of participation. As an alternative, many have looked at respondents’ 
intention to participate say over the coming year (Kelly and Kelly, 1994). This 
produces a measure of behavioural intent and is forward-looking, which is arguably a 
more meaningful dependent variable in a cross-sectional study; moreover, it may
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reflect opportunity rather than inclination to participate, whereas a behavioural intent 
measure may focus on willingness alone.
Klandermans used a basic rational choice theory -  expectancy-value theory -  to 
develop a model of union activity. According to this approach, union participation is 
a function of the material, social and goal-related costs and benefits of participation 
and the perceived value of the outcomes of participation (Klandermans, 1984,1986). 
When the benefits of union activity are perceived as high, and the costs low, then 
willingness to participate will be high. Klandermans’s findings support research that 
has used similar rational choice theories to predict union-certification voting 
behaviour (Montgomery, 1989; Zalesny, 1985).
Expectancy-value theory, therefore with its emphasis on cognitive factors, has 
considerable utility in explaining not only why individuals vote for unions, offer 
loyalty to their bargaining units, and actively participate in them, but also why they 
choose to decertify them. Expectancy theory also has considerable flexibility in that it 
accounts for differing perceptions and expectations across different types of 
membership, union and situation. Consequently, union membership is seen as 
varying over time and situations rather than being a stable phenomenon.
In a longitudinal study investigating the antecedents and consequences of union 
loyalty, Fullagar and Barling (1989) showed that perceived union instrumentality 
influences union participation in several ways. First, perceived union instrumentality 
affects union participation directly. Second, perceived union instrumentality acts as a 
moderator of the effect of union loyalty on union participation. Thus individuals who
65
are loyal to the union and perceive the union as being instrumental in attaining valued 
outcomes are more likely to participate in formal union activities (such as attending 
meetings, holding a union office, grievance filing) than their counterparts who do not 
see the union as being instrumental in this respect. Third, perceived union 
instrumentality influences union participation indirectly by affecting union 
commitment, which in turns leads to union participation. Thus more specific attitudes 
toward the local union have been found to be important predictors of participation 
(Anderson, 1979; Kuruvilla et al, 1990).
Fishbein andAjzen (1975)’s Theory o f Reasoned Action.
Several studies have used Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action in 
examining the relationship between union commitment and participation (Kelloway 
and Barling, 1993; Sverke and Kuruvilla, 1995; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1995). This 
approach sees attitudes and subjective norms as predicting behavioural intentions, 
which in turn predict actual behaviour. Attitudes have been measured in terms of 
both affective and instrumental commitment.
Thus Kelloway and Barling (1993) include union loyalty with the perceived 
instrumentality of union, while Sverke and Sjoberg (1995) and Sverke and Kuruvilla 
(1995) use their instrument and affective commitment dimensions. Subjective norms 
reflect the extent to which significant others such as family, friends and co-workers 
express support for union participation, and have usually been measured as the 
product of the perceived normative beliefs of others and the individual’s motivation to 
comply with such beliefs (Kelloway and Barling, 1993; Sverke and Kuruvilla, 1995; 
Sverke and Sjoberg, 1995).
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Behavioural intentions have been measured as the willingness to work for the union 
(Kelloway and Barling, 1993), as the declared likelihood of continued membership 
and active participation in the future (Sverke and Kuruvilla, 1995; Sverke and Sjoberg, 
1995), or as voting intentions in union representation elections (Montgomery, 1989). 
Actual membership, participation and voting behaviour have been measured as 
backward-looking self-reports. In some studies, this has been measured at the same 
time as the other variables (e.g. Kelloway and Barling, 1993; Sverke and Kuruvilla, 
1995), but in line with the wider research on the theory of reasoned action, it seems 
more appropriate to measure actual behaviour in subsequent time period to the 
attitudinal variables which are hypothesised to predict it (e.g. Sverke and Sjoberg, 
1995). The findings of these studies provide considerable support for the theory of 
reasoned action. In general, union commitment emerges as a predictor of the 
intention to participate, which in turn predicts actual participation (Kelloway and 
Barling, 1993; Sverke and Kuruvilla, 1995; Sverke and Sjoberg, 995).
Some results suggest that subjective norms directly predict the intention to participate 
(Kelloway and Barling, 1993, their first of two samples). However, Sverke and 
Sjoberg (1995) find no such significant relationship. This may reflect the fact that 
their measure of subjective norms was too general, relating to significant others 
desiring the individual to be a union member rather specifically to participate in union 
activities (Sverke and Sjoberg, 1995), although Kelloway and Barling (1993) also find 
no significant direct relationship between subjective norms and behavioural intention 
in their second sample, using a more specific participation-focussed measure. Thus 
the role of subjective norms as a direct predictor of the intention to participate
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warrants further research. One possibility is that it may have an indirect impact on 
behavioural intentions, mediated by union commitment (Kelloway and Barling, 1993).
The theory of reasoned action assumes that the behaviour in question is volitional, so 
that behavioural intentions provide a sufficient explanation of actual behaviour. In 
fact, many types of behaviour are not necessarily under volitional control, but are also 
affected by such factors as personal skills and abilities and by the availability of 
sufficient time or opportunity. This is explicitly recognised in Ajzen’s revision to the 
theory of reasoned action, known as ‘the theory of planned behaviour’ (Ajzen, 1991). 
This includes an additional predictor of behavioural intentions and of actual 
behaviour, ‘perceived behavioural control’, defined as the degree to which the 
individual’s ability to perform in question is perceived by the individual to be 
volitional.
Newton and Shore’s (1992) Typological Analysis
Newton and Shore (1992) proposed a model of union commitment based on an 
ideological or value-based commitment on the one hand and instrumental 
commitment on the other, with commitment ranging from positive to negative 
attitudes on each. They developed a typology of membership attachment in terms of 
two dimensions, with positive commitment on both dimensions labelled as ‘union 
attachment’ and negative attitudes on both as ‘union opposition’. They suggest that 
those with positive attitudes toward the union on one dimension and negative on the 
other are in a position of cognitive dissonance and would tend to adjust their attitudes 
into a consistently positive or negative set of attitudes in order to avoid the tension of 
dissonance.
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Newton and Shore (1992) suggested that those in the union attachment group can be 
further categorised on the basis of their degree of positive attitude on the two 
dimensions. ‘Identifiers’, with highly positive attitudes on both dimensions are 
expected to show very high levels of union support and activity, while ‘positive free 
agents’ with low levels of commitment on both dimensions are likely to show levels 
of attachment to and participation in the union. Those with high levels of value-based 
commitment alone, the ‘identifiers’, are expected to show quite high levels of support 
and to be active in the union, while the ‘instrumentals’ whose commitment is largely 
instrumental, are likely to participate in the union in a calculative way and so mainly 
in activities which have a clear expected pay-off (e.g. participation in strike action) 
and which involve the expenditure of limited personal time or resources.
Apparently, there is broad support for these hypotheses about the four groups in the 
union attachment quadrant. Heshizer and Lund (1997) find that members with high 
levels of value-based commitment were more willing to participate in those types of 
union activities which involve personal sacrifice and time than were those whose 
commitment was mainly instrumental. Sverke and Sjoberg (1995) find that the four 
groups differ in terms of their intention to participate in union activities, with value- 
based commitment being associated with higher levels of participation and intention 
to remain in membership.
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2.4 Sector and Union Commitment
At this juncture, it is pertinent to investigate whether there is any significant 
difference in the union commitment levels of private and public sector union members. 
So far, from the studies reviewed above, certain predictors of union commitment have 
become apparent. The relevance of sector at this point can be argued using the union 
commitment model (fig. 2.1). The first question relates to the predominance of 
relevant predictors within each sector. For example, to what extent are the effects of 
the factors associated with union attitudes (e.g. instrumentality perception) greater in 
the private sector unions as against the public sector unions? Assuming there are 
significant differences in the pervasiveness of predictors across sector, then one could 
argue that a significant difference in the union commitment of the members might 
also result.
Fig. 2.1 Sector, Antecedent Factors and Union Commitment
Union
commitment
■
■
The next pertinent question to ask is this: is there evidence in the literature which 
suggest the likely existence of significant differences in the level of occurrence of 
significant predictors within the two sectors? Apparently, there are. Some of these 
can be explained against the backdrop of observed differences in terms of union
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efficiency, organisation, union structure and membership growth / decline (Marki and 
Ignace, 1990; Troy, 1989; Moore and Raisian, 1987; Reid et al,1990; McDonald,
1992; Leo, 2001; Hanson, 1998; Bennet, 1991; Gunderson, 1986; Yesufu, 1962; 
Anaba, 1969; Fashoyin, 1980).
It has been argued that the efficiency of a union is capable of influencing the union 
instrumentality perception of its members (Clarke, 2000). Union efficiency may be 
assessed in specific areas such as wage levels, working conditions or in a broad sense 
of the union fighting for workers’ welfare. Marki and Ignace’ s (1990) study based 
on a sample of 4,093 individuals highlight the relative impact of trade unions in the 
two sectors. They studied whether trade unions affected the earnings gap between 
male and female workers in Canada. Looking at the public and private sectors 
separately, results indicated that unions substantially reduced the male-female 
differential only in the public sector.
Based on this study, one may suggest that public sector unions are probably more 
efficient in reducing male-female differential in Canada. In this context, it can be 
argued that union instrumentality perception is probably higher in the public sector 
and this situation may boost the chance of a higher union commitment for members 
there. Admittedly, it might not be sufficient to determine the variation in union 
commitment levels across sector solely on the perceived difference in the influence of 
only one predictor. This thus makes it imperative for a systematic approach to 
comparatively examine all relevant predictors within the two sectors. Apart from 
union instrumentality, variations in the effect of other predictors such as work factors 
(e.g. job dissatisfaction, career opportunities) might also be relevant. In essence, a
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cumulative effect of the variations might be significant enough to result in a 
substantial difference in union commitment across sectors.
The type of union organisation within each sector is also relevant to union 
commitment. In a situation whereby union joining in a particular sector is dominated 
by closed shop agreement as against voluntary joining in the other sector, differences 
in the levels of union commitment may result. This notion is supported by Gallagher 
and Wetzel (1990)’s findings which suggested that perceived voluntariness of 
association could affect union commitment. Steers (1977) and Stevens et al (1978) 
also found that sector differences in structural characteristics resulted in variations in 
union commitment. Structural characteristics such as size, span of control, degree of 
open admission policy, the extent of formalisation, functional dependence and 
decentralisation of the organisation, extent of decentralisation of collective bargaining 
and rank and file accessibility to political participation were reportedly all linked with 
commitment to the union. In Nigeria, these characteristics appear not only to vary 
based on industrial lines, but also according to sector (Ubeku, 1980).
The fortunes of private and public sector unions in Nigeria have fared somewhat 
differently especially since the introduction of the trade union ordinance in 1938.
Prior to 1938, trade unionism flourished mainly in the public sector due to the 
opposition of private employers. The ordinance helped to enforce recognition within 
the private sector and resulted in the unions’ numerical growth and an escalation of 
trade union activity there (Fashoyin, 1980). Ironically, private sector unionism has 
been acknowledged to be more vibrant even though trade unionism started in the
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public sector (Yesufu, 1969; Anaba, 1969; Fashoyin, 1980). Tokunbo (1985) noted a 
significantly higher level of agitation and strike activity within the private sector.
There is apparently no data on the relationship between union growth or decline and 
union commitment across sector. All the same, Otobo (1997:52-54) argued that 
successive military governments engaged in a “systematic destruction of the civil 
service”. This has given rise to a suggestion that in terms of meeting the expectations 
of members, public sector unions were relatively weaker. The public servants’ 
employers - the military - ruled by decrees and their attitude to workers demonstration 
was usually unorthodox. Strike activity or mass demonstration by workers was often 
met with detention for union leaders or / and a dissolution of the union’s executive 
council (Otobo, 1997).
The legacy of military rule is arguably more pronounced in the public sector in terms 
of how members view their unions’ instrumentality although in a broad sense, 
military rule impacted upon unions in both sectors (Adewunmi, 1997). Also related 
to this is the calibre of union leaders within the two sectors. Due to alleged 
interferences by previous governments in union elections (sponsoring pacifists or 
candidates with liberal tendencies) some union leaders in the public sector were 
perceived as compromisers (Akinlaja, 1999). Past studies have suggested that 
members are less likely to participate in union activities if they think their leaders 
have been bought over by management (Smock, 1969). Furthermore, the recent tide 
of privatisation sweeping the nation also raises questions about the future of the 
public sector unions in the country. The public sector unions arguably have more to 
do in demonstrating their relevance to their members in the current situation. It
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remains to be seen how this situation has affected union commitment within both 
sectors, but a guess is that commitment is probably less in the public sector. Based on 
the above arguments, the proposed research will investigate union commitment and 
participation based on an hypothesis that sector will be a significant moderator in the 
model.
Summary
There is a degree of consistency across studies in many of the key findings and the 
longitudinal studies lend some credence to the assumed causal ordering of variables. 
There is also some consistency with the findings of qualitative and case study 
research -  on union participation, for example. At this stage, there is a body of 
findings around which a consensus appear to be emerging. In summary, the research 
findings suggest that:
1. Not all demographic factors are consequential in their impact on union 
commitment. Gender is an influential variable in the union loyalty of 
members: women have stronger union loyalty than men. although they are less 
likely to participate actively in the union; there is an inconclusive relationship 
between age and union commitment.
2. Union attitudes are crucial factors in the unionisation process. Employees’ 
union satisfaction, perception of the instrumentality of the union and 
perceived union support are important factors influencing their union 
commitment; union socialisation is also a positive predictor of union 
commitment. The availability and leadership qualities of union
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representatives may be significant in building members’ commitment and / or 
willingness to participate actively in the union.
3. Research on the influence of work-related factors is inconclusive. 
Dissatisfaction with various aspects of their jobs may or may not lead to union 
commitment, depending on the members’ background (e.g. nationality).
4. Dual commitment exists amongst members; commitment to the employing 
organisation is a positive predictor of union commitment but not always; when 
employees perceive a positive industrial relations climate, they are more likely 
to commit to both employer and union.
5. There is a positive causal ordering between union commitment and 
participation in union activities.
One weakness arising from the above research findings relates to the fact that it might 
not be reasonable to assume that these findings will automatically apply to union 
members in Nigeria without conducting an empirical investigation (Gallagher and 
Clark, 1989). The union members’ peculiar experiences in terms of their socio­
economic, political, geographical and historical background arguably underscore the 
need for a context-specific approach. For instance, the role of ethnicity appears not 
to have been sufficiently explored in the western literature. This situation may be due 
to the predominantly homogeneous nature of western societies.
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The Nigerian studies have their shortcomings too, one of which is that none 
apparently has investigated the subject of union commitment per se. But the studies 
are nonetheless significant in that from them, deductions may still be drawn 
concerning the possible predictors of union commitment for Nigerian union members 
against the backdrop of the factors identified in the western literature. In view of this, 
the next chapter has been devoted to a detailed and comprehensive review of Nigerian 
studies with the objective of identifying hypothetical predictors as well as the studies’ 
weaknesses and how they can be improved upon.
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Chapter 3
Nigeria: Context, Trade Unions and Literature Review 
Introduction
This chapter describes the socio-economic and political scene in Nigeria from its 
conception as a nation state, through its colonial era and up till contemporary times. 
The objective is to assist the reader in appreciating the context within which labour 
and management relations have evolved and how these institutions have directly or 
indirectly affected this relationship. The chapter is also concerned with the review of 
Nigerian studies, which are relevant to the proposed study.
One of Nigeria's most significant and distinctive features is the size of its population. 
The country represents about 20 percent of the total population of sub-Saharan Africa 
and is about twice the size of that of the next largest country in Africa, Egypt. The 
population is estimated to be 123,337,822 (World Fact book, 2001) and the 
population growth rate is 2.67%. The country has a relatively young population with 
only 3% aged 65 years and above (table 3.1). Recent projections have proposed that 
the current population is likely to double before the middle of this century. This 
means that the country could expect to deal with a population of more than 200 
million probably within the next twenty-five years (CIA, 2001). These projections 
suggest that population growth would be an issue of central concern for Nigeria for 
some time to come in the sense that agricultural production, industrial and other 
economic output with provision of health and other social services would need to 
double within this period. This situation is a challenge of historic proportions for 
Nigeria with obvious implications for the supply side of the Nigerian labour market 
and generally for industrial relations.
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Table 3.1. Age Structure according to male and female (CIA, 2001)
Age structure Male Female
0-14 years: 44% 
15-64 years: 53%
65 years and over: 3%
27,181,020
33,495,794
1,729,149
26,872,317)
32,337,193
1,722,349
3.1 Political History
Before the arrival of the British colonial government, Nigeria was made up of many 
nationalities, which were later brought together to constitute the current Nigerian state. 
The British unification process took the form of consolidating all the nationalities into 
one state system, which it divided into three regions suspended over two societies.
The Northern region is predominantly Arabic with little African culture but almost no 
European influence. The two southern regions are predominantly African societies 
with strong European influence (Akinola, 1999).
The country is multi-ethnic with over 250 different ethnic nationalities and languages. 
However, four ethnic groups together account for over 60% of the country’s total 
population: the Fulanis and Hausas live mainly in the north; the Ibos predominate in 
the southeast and the Yorubas in the southwest. The Edos, Ibibios, Kanuris, Nupes, 
Tivs, Chamba, Ekoi and Ijaw are smaller but still important groups. The remaining 
other groups are quite small in comparison (Uma, 1973). English is the official 
language but in many Nigerian cities Standard English is spoken side by side with the 
"pidgin" or a mixture of English and local languages. Nigeria is a secular state 
although two main religions are widely practised in the country: Christianity and
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Islam. Christians are predominantly in the south while a majority of northerners are 
Muslims.
Islam permeates other institutions in Nigerian society, and has contributed 
significantly to Nigerian pluralism. A few isolated mission stations and mission 
bookstores, along with churches serving southern enclaves in the northern cities and 
larger towns can be found in the north. To adapt fully to northern life, non-Muslims 
have to remain in an enclave, living quasi-segregated lives in their churches, then- 
social clubs, and even their work. In contrast, becoming a convert to Islam was the 
doorway to full participation in the society. People from the middle belt (of ethnic 
minority origin), especially those with ambitions in politics and business, generally 
adopted Islam. The main exception to this rule was Plateau State, where the capital, 
Jos, was as much a Christian as a Muslim community, and a greater accommodation 
between the two sets of beliefs and their adherents generally occurs (Clark and Linden, 
1984).
The majority of Christians are found in the south although there are a significant 
number of Islamic adherents as well. Some families have members (extended) from 
both faiths although this is not very common. The Yoruba area traditionally has been 
Protestant and Anglican, whereas Igboland has always been the area of greatest 
activity by the Roman Catholic Church. Other denominations abound as well. 
Presbyterians arrived in the early twentieth century in the Ibibio Niger Delta area and 
had missions in the middle belt as well. There has been a gradual upsurge in the 
number of churches in the south within the last decade. The presence of two or more 
churches on a single street is a common sight in the south of the country most
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especially in states like Lagos and Edo. Generally speaking, Nigerians are very 
religious people (Peel, 1968; Panden, 1973; Kastfelt, 1994).
Religious conflicts have been known to occur mainly in the north of the country but 
are now becoming increasingly common also in the south. Christian-Muslim rivalry 
was a factor in the build-up to the civil war of 1966, with anti-Igbo pogroms in the 
North encouraged in part by radio broadcasts reporting alleged anti-Muslim atrocities 
in the South (Enwerem, 1995). Because religious crises fuel political instability and 
generate a general climate of insecurity, which can be bad for business, would-be 
foreign investors are usually careful about investing in the economy.
The British used a system of running the country known as indirect rule in which the 
country was ruled through local chiefs. This was intended to keep the peace by 
disturbing ordinary Nigerian life as little as possible but even then local people 
sometimes rebelled against the appointed leaders. On Oct. 1, 1960, Nigeria gained 
independence becoming a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and 
joining the United Nations. But the British system of colonialism had done nothing to 
unify Nigeria or prepare it for independence. The historical conflicts between north 
and south, and other inter-regional fighting, made the idea of a unified republic 
unworkable (Balewa, 1994).
Organized as a loose federation of self-governing states at independence, the nation 
faced an overwhelming task of unifying a country with 250 ethnic and linguistic 
language groups. In 1963, three years after independence, Nigeria became a Federal 
Republic, which by implication officially brought to an end British influence on the
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political, economic and social policies of the country. As a result of a series of 
political upheavals and fracas, Nigeria experienced serious political instability by the 
end of 1965. By 1966 the dream of a flourishing democracy was floundering amidst 
a series of massacres, inter-regional hostilities and, finally, a military coup that 
installed the first of a series of military governments.
Many political leaders, including the prime minister and the premiers of the western 
and the Northern regions, were killed during the military take-over. For a few months 
it seemed things had finally returned to normal but things came to a head in the 
following July when another military coup took the place of an earlier one.
Subsequent developments precipitated a bloody civil war between 1967 and 1970, 
amongst which was the attempted secession by the former eastern Region. The war 
left behind nearly 1,000,000 dead. Shortly before the civil war, the four regions of the 
country (West, East, North and the Mid-West) had been replaced by a twelve-state 
structure.
In 1975, a bloodless coup ushered in a new military government. In 1976, the new 
military government created seven more states thereby making the country a nation of 
19 states. The country was eventually returned to civil rule in 1979 after elections 
were held. An oil boom in the 1970’s buoyed the nations’ economy and by the 
1980’s Nigeria was considered an exemplar of African democracy and economic 
well-being. But the military again seized power in 1984, only to be followed by 
another military coup the following year. In September 1987, the total number of 
states increased from 19 to 21 with the addition of two more states. This tally was
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subsequently increased to 30 in September 1991 with the creation of nine new states, 
apparently to ease ethnic tensions prior to the elections.
Serious outcries - both locally and internationally - greeted the cancellation of the 
results of the presidential election held on June 12,1993, by the military regime of 
General Babangida. Intense international pressures and pro-democratic 
demonstrations eventually made the regime abandon its plans of self perpetuation and 
to set up an interim national government consisting of appointed civilians. This 
government was subsequently sacked by another military ruler, Gen. Sanni Abacha, 
who proceeded to dissolve all organs of state and bodies that had been established 
under the transitional process, replaced the state governors with military 
administrators and prohibited political activity. Sanni Abacha died of a heart attack 
on June 8, 1998, and was succeeded by another military ruler, who also pledged to 
step aside for an elected leader by May 1999.
In Feb. 1999 free presidential elections were held and led to a victory for Olusegun 
Obasanjo. But the president acknowledges that his administration faced very 
daunting tasks one of which is poverty. Surveys conducted by Nigeria's Federal 
Office of Statistics show that in a 16 year period that began in 1980 (the year the oil 
boom years of the 1970s began to go bust), the percentage of Nigerians living in 
poverty rose from 28 percent to 66 percent. Numerically, while 17.7 million people 
lived in poverty in 1980, the population living on less than US $1.40 a day rose to 
67.1 million by 1996. Within the same period the percentage of the rural poor 
increased from 29 percent to 70 percent, while the share of the poor in the urban areas 
rose from 18 to 55 percent.
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Those classified as the core poor (the poorest of the poor - living on about US $0.70 a 
day), increased from six percent to 29 percent of the population. Equally telling was 
the geographical distribution of poverty within the country. While the percentage of 
the poor ranged between 55-60 percent in the south, in the north they ranged between 
70-78 percent of the population. "Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria has performed worse, 
in terms of basic social indicators, than sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and much 
worse than other regions of the developing world, such as Asia and Latin America," 
says a Situation Assessment Analysis published in 2001 by Nigeria's National 
Planning Commission and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).
President Olusegun Obasanjo set a goal to reduce the population of Nigerians in 
poverty by half by 2015. But achieving such a target would require an economic 
growth rate of 7-8 percent a year for 15 years. In his first three years in office, he has 
recorded an average growth rate of 2.8 percent yearly1. Perhaps, realising that no dent 
has been made on poverty, Obasanjo's government has developed an Interim Poverty 
Reduction Strategy. Under this plan, he is seeking the assistance of donors to work 
on four key areas, identified as youth empowerment, development of rural 
infrastructure, social welfare services, as well as natural resource development and 
conservation. Overseen by the National Poverty Eradication Programme, chaired by 
the president himself, it has set a target of ending absolute poverty in 10 years.
3.2 The State and Industrial Relations
The government has always played an influential role as far as the conduct of 
industrial relations in the country is concerned. Right from colonial times, the role of
1 Source: UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 11 Jun 2002
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the state has tended to be interventionist in labour-management relations. It was 
alleged that the formation of the first ever trade union in the country in 1912, was 
apparently at the instigation of the colonial authorities (Yesufu, 1962). Also the 
colonial masters saw the need to promulgate the first trade union ordinance in 1938 
with the objective of regularising and ordering the establishment and activities of 
trade unions (Cohen, 1974). Essentially, the model of industrial relations, which has 
evolved in Nigeria, has both elements of voluntarism and elements of state control.
In 1955, the Federal Government confirmed its adherence to the voluntary ethic in 
industrial relations. However, the principle of collective bargaining was not well 
articulated during this period and there was no established procedure for collective 
bargaining.
Government’s failure to encourage procedures for joint negotiations had two major 
consequences. First, the situation was exploited by a number of employers. Thus, in 
spite of the Nigerian Employers Consultative Association (NECA)’s efforts in 
encouraging the collective bargaining process, many employers refused to recognise 
the development of unionism in their organisations and this in turn, discouraged the 
development of collective bargaining as a process of regulating the employment 
relationship. Secondly, because there were no avenues within the civil service by 
which unions could pursue their grievances in respect of conditions of service, they 
resorted to political agitation each time which resulted in the setting up of 
commissions of inquiry (Ubeku, 1983).
The first major shift in government away from voluntarism in industrial relations 
occurred in 1968. Nigeria was going through the traumatic experience of civil war.
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The military administration promulgated the Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) 
decree 1968. This decree banned strike and lockouts and made arbitration 
compulsory (Oluyemi-Kusa, 1992). As regards the settlement of trade disputes, the 
Trade Disputes Act 1976 has elaborate statutory machinery for the settlement of 
disputes. Since 1976, Government guidelines on income policy, productivity and 
prices have been a persistent feature of Nigerian Industrial relations. An obvious 
implication of the policy is that the exercise of free collective bargaining remains 
circumscribed by limits and restrictions. Furthermore, union activity is not allowed in 
organisations classified as essential services. In these industries, the freedom of 
workers to negotiate collectively with their management for the improvement of 
conditions of service is virtually non-existent.
It is pertinent to mention that under military regimes, the element of state control in 
industrial relations was notoriously highhanded. The Babangida (1985 -  1993) and 
the Abacha (1993 -  1998) regimes were military governments which used excessive 
measures leading to the emasculation of trade unions and detention of union leaders 
(Oluyemi-Kusa, 1992:58-59). For example, in 1987, the Nigerian Labour Congress 
(NLC) was banned and several union activists were detained for protesting against 
fuel price hike. One of the worst spells experienced by the unions occurred between 
1993 to 1998 under Gen. Sanni Abacha. In addition to dissolving the NLC, his 
regime also jailed several union activists for their parts in the pro-democracy 
campaign against the military.
Trade unionism ostensibly became a hazardous activity to conduct or engage in. State 
security operatives with the aim of breaking such gatherings often infiltrated trade
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union symposiums, seminars and rallies or arresting suspected “coup plotters”. Such 
was the reign of terror and corruption the regime unleashed on the country that the 
news of his sudden death from a heart attack was greeted with rapturous acclaim all 
over the country. The reaction from the northern part of the country was notably 
sombre and relatively subdued, but there were ecstatic scenes of celebrations down 
south. The development was described by some as an incredible opportunity for 
democracy. It was indeed an opportunity, which the country has since capitalised 
upon and has resulted in the emergence of a new democracy in the country.
3.3 Economy
The nation’ s industries consist of crude oil, coal tin, columbite, palm oil, peanuts, 
rubber, wood, hides and skins, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food 
products, footwear, chemicals, fertilizer, printing, ceramics and steel. The industrial 
production growth rate is 4.1 percent (CIA, 2001). The labour force is 42.84 million 
with agriculture having 54%, industry, 6% and services, 40% and the unemployment 
rate is 28 percent. The largely subsistence agricultural sector failed to keep up with 
rapid population growth and Nigeria, once a large net exporter of food, now imports 
food. The economy continues to be hobbled by political instability, corruption and 
poor macroeconomic management. At the heart of the problem, has been a crisis of 
governance and public management, which has its roots in the competition among 
rival elites and their ethno-regional constituencies for control of the huge rents that 
accrue to the state from the operations of the petroleum industry2.
2 According to a Situation Assessment Analysis published in 2001 by Nigeria's National Planning 
Commission and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).
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The ethno-religious rivalry prevalent in the country right from the early days of 
independence from Britain in 1960 degenerated into three years of civil war when the 
southeast attempted to secede as Biafra. The end of the civil war in 1970 coincided 
with the oil boom years and the country's emergence as a major oil exporter. But in 
the following years dominated by military and civilian rulers from the mainly Muslim 
north, the oil wealth was largely mismanaged. Most of it was dispensed as political 
patronage through fraudulent contracts awarded by those in government to cronies. 
Apparently, most of the country's oil wealth was frittered away and nothing was saved 
for the rainy day. The result was that once the oil boom years ended in the early 
1980s the country was beset with a monumental economic crisis. The worst hit were 
the poor, who got no benefits from the upswing of national income during the boom 
years.
Faced with severe balance of payments problems in the mid 1980s, the then military 
ruler, General Ibrahim Babangida, adopted International Monetary Fund- and World 
Bank- advised Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The key objective of SAP was 
to ensure Nigeria serviced its external debt of US $28 billion and maintained macro- 
economic stability, while cutting back on social spending. While a growth rate of 5.4 
percent a year was achieved between 1987-92 (against 1.8 percent a year between 
1981-86), the proportion of the core poor rose from 12 to 14 percent within the period. 
It continued to grow in the subsequent years. Starved of funds, social service 
institutions began to decay and service delivery in schools and hospitals sharply 
declined. (The World Bank estimates that public spending per capita on health is less 
than $5 and as low as $2 in some parts of Nigeria, contrary to $34 recommended for
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low-income countries by the World Health Organization). Infrastructure and utilities, 
under the weight of mismanagement for years, also began to collapse.
Thus the country’s economic problems have been compounded by rate of inflation, 
monetary and fiscal policy, autonomy and effectiveness of monetary institutions and 
authorities, extra-budgetary expenditures and budget deficits, official housing, health 
and educational policies, elite-generated political crises and tensions, sourcing of raw 
materials, pricing policies of trading and manufacturing industries, activities of 
middlemen and market women and men, etc. (Otobo, 1998:42). Nigeria’s erstwhile 
military rulers failed to make progress in diversifying the economy away from over­
dependence on the capital intensive oil sector which provides 30 percent of GDP, 95 
percent of foreign exchange earnings and about 80 percent of budgetary revenues.
The government’s resistance to initiating greater transparency and accountability in 
managing the country’s multibillion dollar oil earnings limited economic growth and 
prevented an agreement with the IMF and bilateral creditors on a staff-monitored 
program and debt relief.
3.4. Labour law
Labour Decree No. 21 of 1974 calls for a 40-hour workweek, 2 to 4 weeks annual 
leave and overtime and holiday pay; there is no law prohibiting excessive compulsory 
overtime. The law also establishes general health and safety provisions, some of 
which are aimed specifically at young or female workers. It requires that the factory 
division of the Ministry of Labor and Employment inspect factories for compliance 
with health and safety standards. Employers are required to compensate injured 
workers and dependent survivors of those killed in industrial accidents. Employers
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must compensate injured workers and dependent survivors of those killed in industrial 
accidents but enforcement of these laws by the ministry of labor seems to be largely 
ineffective .
All workers, except members of the armed forces and other employees designated as 
essential by the Government, may join trade unions. Essential workers include 
members of the armed forces and government employees in the police, customs, 
immigration, prisons, federal mint, central bank, and telecommunications sectors. 
Nigeria has signed and ratified the International Labor Organization's (ILO) 
convention on freedom of association, but Nigerian law authorizes only a single 
central labor body, the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC). Nigerian labor law controls 
the admission of a union to the NLC, and requires any union to be formally registered 
before commencing operations. Registration is authorized only where the Registrar of 
Trade Unions determines that it is expedient in that no other existing union is 
sufficiently representative of the interests of those workers seeking to be registered.
29 industrial trade unions are registered formally by the Federal Government and a 
minimum of 50 workers is required to form a trade union.
The law provides for both the right to organize and the right to bargain collectively 
between management and trade unions. Collective bargaining occurs throughout the 
public sector and the organized private sector. Complaints of anti-union 
discrimination may be brought to the Ministry of Labor for mediation, conciliation, 
and resolution and the Labor Minister may refer unresolved disputes to the Industrial 
Arbitration Panel (LAP) and the National Industrial Court (NIC). The law protects
3 Newswatch, October 6, 2002.
89
workers from retaliation by employers (i.e. lockouts) for labor activity through an 
independent arm of the judiciary, the Nigerian Industrial Court. Trade unionists have 
complained, however, that the judicial system's slow handling of labor cases 
constitutes a denial of redress. The government retains broad authority over labor 
matters, and often intervenes in disputes it feels challenge its key political or 
economic objectives. However, the era of government appointed "sole administrators" 
of unions is now over, and the labor movement is increasingly active and vocal on 
issues seen to attest the plight of the common worker, such as deregulation, 
privatization, and the government's failure to advance its poverty alleviation program.
A worker under a collective bargaining agreement may not participate in a strike 
unless his union complied with the requirements of the law, which include provisions 
for mandatory mediation and for referral of the dispute to the Government. The law 
allows the Government discretion to refer the matter to a labor conciliator, arbitration 
panel, board of inquiry, or the NIC. Workers have the right to strike; however, certain 
essential workers are required to provide advance notice of a strike. There are no laws 
prohibiting retribution against strikers and strike leaders, but strikers who believe that 
they are victims of unfair retribution may submit their cases to the LAP with the 
approval of the Labor Ministry. The decisions of the IAP are binding on parties but 
may be appealed to the NIC. In practice the decisions of these bodies infrequently 
carry the force of law.
Workers and employers in Export Processing Zones (EPZ) are subject to Decree No. 
63 of 1992, which provide for a 10-year amnesty on trade unions from the startup of 
an enterprise. The law provides that there shall be no strikes or lockouts for a period 
of 10 years following the commencement of operations within a zone. In addition the
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law allows the EPZ Authority to handle the resolution of disputes between employers 
and employees instead of workers' organizations or unions4. Staff of the Authority and 
workers employed by companies operating in the EPZ cannot go on strike. The ILO 
considers the legislation governing its operation as contravening the principles of the 
right to organize and bargain collectively and the incentives for promoting investment 
in the zone therefore limiting the exercise of trade union rights.
Minimum wage is set by law and reviewed infrequently. For example, the National 
Minimum Wage (Amendment) Act 2000 No 1 requires every employer to pay a 
minimum wage of N5,500.00 per month to every worker under his establishment. The 
new wage review has, however, set many state governments and their employees on a 
collision course. While some states claim that they cannot afford the stipulated 
N5,500.00, labor unions and state workers insist their wages should be the same as 
those of federal workers. An employer is barred from granting a general wage 
increase to its workers without prior government approval. However, in practice the 
law does not appear to be enforced effectively; strikes, including in the public sector, 
are widespread and private sector wage increases generally are not submitted to the 
Government for prior approval. The Government retains broad legal authority over 
labor matters and often intervenes in disputes seen to challenge key political or 
economic objectives.
3.5. Grievance Settling Procedure
Procedures exist on how employers and workers (or their representatives) may pursue
mutually acceptable steps for conflict prevention and resolution. Experts regard these
4International Labour Organisation (1995). Sixth Survey on the Effect Given to the Tripartite 
Declaration o f Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. Bureau fo r  Workers' 
Activities
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procedures as “grievance procedures” and they usually form part of a collective 
agreement (Akinlaja, 1999). Their essential property stipulates a step-by-step 
approach to conflict prevention or resolution. Starting with an employee’s 
consciousness of being aggrieved, the procedure recommends that he has to take up 
his point of grievance with his immediate supervisor, thus kicking off a series of steps 
that may be referred to as “in-house grievance procedure”. Should he not be satisfied 
with the solution provided by his supervisor, he takes the matter up with his 
departmental manager. If he is still not satisfied, he reports to the branch of his union 
within his working unit, which is mandated to refer the case to management at the 
immediate local level.
Failure to arrive at an agreeable solution warrants filing a report with the leadership 
of the union at the branch level, which takes up the case with management of the 
company. Unsuccessful negotiation at this point pushes the matter to the national 
union. The National Union Secretariat of the union intervenes by seating both parties 
at a round-table meeting, with view a to resolving the matter. However, when finally 
the National Secretarial of the union fails to also reach an agreement with the 
management, then the trade dispute provisions are supposed to take effect. That 
closes the in-house grievance procedure. The national union and the management, 
subsequently agree to disagree and thereafter subject themselves to the process of 
Legal Trade Dispute Settlement.
In 1976, the government enacted the Trade Disputes Decree to regulate procedures 
applicable to strike situations. The decree dictates that when a dispute arises, an 
individual mutually selected by rivals, steps in to arbitrate between the quarrelling
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parties. According to the 1976 legislation, the two-pronged arbitration structure 
comprises of the IAP and the NIC. Each arbitrating body has a unique structure 
mirroring the tripartite nature of the international Labour Organization. In other 
words, it comprised representatives of workers, employers and government.
Whenever there is a problem which an in-house branch finds impossible to resolve, it 
passes it across to the national union. If at that level they are still unable to resolve the 
problem, the national union and management now have a defined area of 
disagreement. In the process of settling and resolving this defined area they might 
agree to have a mediator whom both parties have confidence in. If the mediator is 
effective, then the matter is regarded as permanently settled. However, if it is 
impossible to resolve the issue, the dissatisfied party may formally raise an objection 
and the next step (which is conciliation) will follow. Such a step falls in line with 
section 4 (1) and Section 2 of the 1976 decree.
The minister then appoints a conciliator usually drawn from the Industrial Relations 
Department of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity, who examines the 
issue in contention but he lacks power of enforcement. His mandate ends with 
assisting both parties to reach a consensus on the sore points. All he is armed with is 
moral authority, entrenched through the confidence, which both parties repose in him. 
But as a conciliator, he wields the power to make recommendations. If both parties 
agree with him, the matter is settled at this level of conciliation. But if one party kicks 
against the conciliator’s recipe, the minister will then refer the matter to the IAP in 
conformity with section 6 (4) and sections 7(1) of the 1976 decree.
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The IAP has at least 10 members of which two must be representatives of employers 
and two representatives of workers. The IAP chairman on reception of a case will 
constitute an arbitration tribunal made up of one arbitrator acting solo or with 
assessors picked by the disputants or multiple arbitrators under the chairman or vice 
chairman. The panel invites both disputing parties to submit memoranda on the day 
of the hearing. They may decide on legal representation or they may present their case 
directly. According to IAP regulations, a case should be dispensed with in the space 
of 42 days, although the period can be extended by the minister. The IAP often 
encourages settlement outside the panel with a view to getting the disputants to 
produce a joint memorandum. If that happens, the panel asks both sides whether they 
are satisfied. Such an agreement becomes a consent award and is seldom disputed by 
either party. But if it happens that a dispute lingers past the LAP stage because one or 
both disputants contest the judgment of the arbitration panel, the minister has no 
choice than to refer the matter to the NIC.
The structure of the NIC mirrors that of the arbitration panel, with a government 
appointee sitting as the president, while NLC and NECA have representatives or 
choose to present their own case. NIC normally is the final appellate court on 
industrial matters but sometimes disputants may go, as far as to the Federal Court of 
Appeal to challenge its judgment, but such are the exceptions. In majority of the 
cases, industrial disputes end with the industrial court. Its judgment merely goes to 
the honorable Minister of Labour and Productivity for final confirmation. His 
confirmation seals the ruling and forecloses the reopening of the decided case (except 
in open court).
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3.6 History of Trade Unionism
The exact origin of the Nigerian labour unions still remains a bone of contention 
amongst industrial relations writers and commentators. Seibal (1973) regarded guilds, 
carpenters, mutual societies, etc. as the originators. These were pre-colonial 
organisations with well-structured form of membership recruitment and 
administration. Fajana (1995) however contests this claim on the grounds that these 
associations were not in wage employment. Diali (1971) suggested that trade 
unionism is an import of colonialism by noting that Nigeria’s pattern of industrial 
relations is based on the British system (being an erstwhile colony and protectorate of 
Britain) with its freedom of association and free collective bargaining.
The British government actively promoted the development of trade unions in most 
former British colonies. A circular dispatch sent out from a colonial office conference, 
for instance, emphasized that it was the duty of colonial governments to “take such 
steps as might be possible to smooth the passages of such organizations as they 
emerge, into constitutional channels” (Roberts, 1964). This colonial influence 
reflected two objectives: firstly, a desire to promote stable and responsible unions and 
secondly, a wish to avoid encouraging political movements that might have adverse 
effects on the economic development and good government of the territories 
concerned. But Fajana (1991) argued that employers and the colonial administration 
both opposed the formation of labour unions on reasoning that trade unions would 
rival the authority already accorded natural rulers. Similar accounts by Akpala 
(1965) and Fruend (1981) also seem to support the allegations that workers were 
usually persecuted for joining trade unions during the colonial era. The source of 
trade unionism in Nigeria thus remains debatable.
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Table 3.2 shows a summary of the major highlights in the history of the unions. 
Between 1930 and 1931, worsening economic situation and dissatisfaction with 
existing service conditions led to the formation of Railway Workers Union (RWU) 
and the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT) in 1931. The former felt the National 
Civil Service Union (NCSU) was not protecting their interests. The latter’ s reasons 
centred on dissatisfaction with existing service conditions, which had deteriorated as 
compared with the early years of the century.
Table 3.2 highlights in the history of the Nigerian Labour Movement
1912 First trade union (Nigerian Civil service Union) formed
1931 Breakaway: Railway Workers Union and the Nigerian Union o f Teachers.
1938 Trade Union Ordinance formally legalising trade union in the country was 
enacted.
1940s- 1970s Complex groupings o f unions and central organisations with allegiances to 
different world centres. Several hundred unions and four competing trade 
union centrals.
1976 The Nigerian Labour Congress was formed (NLC)
1978 Major reorganisation of the over 1000 unions into 42 affiliated industry based 
unions.
14, July 1994 NLC declared a nation-wide strike in support o f the president-elect o f June 12, 
1993 whose victory was annulled by the military.
18, August 1994 NLC executive committee dissolved by military; trade union leaders detained; 
administrators appointed to head unions.
5, September, 1994 Workers forced to go back to work; strike effectively ended.
12th February, 1996. Further trade union amendments; trade unions restructured from 41 Industrial 
Unions to 29.
June, 1998 Executive committee o f NLC reinstated; policy o f non-interference in trade 
union affairs adopted by military government; detained union leaders released.
27 January, 1999. A new NLC executive elected with Adams Oshiomole as president.
Later on, the Trade Union Ordinance -  conferring the legal rights for unions to 
negotiate and strike -  was passed in 1938. The Nigerian trade union ordinance laid
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down the mode of registration of trade unions and prescribed the rights and 
obligations of unions in the employer-employee relationships. This gave impetus to 
trade union development in the country. Within two years of passing the law, 
registered trade unions had increased to fourteen with a membership of over 4000. 
Nigerian trade unions have a history of divisions and disagreements on the basis of 
ideological issues. Between the 1940s and 1960s, complex groupings of unions and 
central organisations with allegiances to different world centres dominated the 
Nigerian industrial relations landscape.
The post-war period saw the emergence of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) whose 
sole purpose was to improve wages. By the end of 1949, factions arose in the TUC 
resulting in the Nigerian National Federation of Labour (NNFL) and the TUC proper. 
In 1950, the first Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) was formed and affiliated with the 
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in 1951. Between 1953 and 1959, more 
factions -  All Nigeria Trade Union Federation (ANTUF), National Council of Trade 
Unions of Nigeria (NCTUN) and a second Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUC) -  
emerged. The post independence period witnessed more confusion within the 
industrial relations landscape. Between 1960 and the civil war years, political and 
ideological considerations further led to the balkanisation of the Nigerian labour 
movement. By 1973, there were four competing labour centres: the Labour Unity 
Front (LUF), the Nigerian Workers Council (NWC), the Nigerian Trade Union 
Congress (NTUC), and the United Labour Congress (ULC). The government finally 
created a single central labour organisation in 1976. In 1978, after several failed 
attempts at uniting the various factions within the labour movement, the government 
finally reformed and reorganised the labour movement on the basis of what it
97
described as “limited intervention and guided democracy”. The role of the 
government since then became increasingly interventionist.
Table 3.3 The strength of the Nigerian Trade Unions as at 1976 
_______________(Tayo Fashoyin 1981)_______________
No. of Unions Membership
1 50,000 -  over
6 20,000-50,000
1 10,000-20,000
15 5,000-10,000
76 1,000-5,000
280 250-1,000
426 5 0 -2 5 0
105 1 - 5 0
Table 3.4. Observed changes in the structure of unions 
__________ since 1978 (Trade unions of the world, 2001).
Year Number of unions
1978 42
1986 42
1988 41
1990 41
1995 41
1996 29
Before 1978, there were a lot of registered trade unions that were ineffective. An 
illustration of the union’s explosive growth in the wake of the promulgation of the 
trade union ordinance in 1938 is shown in table 3.3. The reorganisation of 1978 
however served to strengthen the unions by merging and organising them based on
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industrial lines (table 3.4). In 1995, there were around three million members and 41 
registered industrial unions, (Otobo, 1995). In 1996, due to unions contesting and 
disputing areas of jurisdiction, the federal government carried out a further 
reconstruction of the labour movement resulting in a further merging of industrial 
unions thus reducing the total number of the unions to 29. Meanwhile, the union 
leadership of the NLC had been disbanded (the union was run by a sole administrator) 
for their role in calling for a general strike to protest the annulment of the 1993 
presidential election by the military dictatorship of Babangida. Increased 
international pressure and internal unrests engendered by the activities of democracy 
campaigners eventually compelled the military rulers to release political detainees 
(amongst whom were union leaders), organise elections and return the country to civil 
rule. The NLC leadership was subsequently restored by which time it was time for a 
new executive to be elected. Elections were held and Mr. Oshiomole emerged as the 
NLC president in 1999 with a four year mandate.
3.7. Trade Union Structure and Organisation
Union organisation is based on industrial sectors and may cut across different 
occupations. Thus for example, the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Workers (NUPENG) represents all workers below the management level in the Oil 
and Gas sector in the country. Workers include technicians, administrative staff, etc. 
Similarly, the Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria (MHWUN) represents 
all Para-medical staff in the health sector including technicians, medical record 
officers, catering officers, dispensing assistants, orderlies, x-ray assistants cleaners, 
and others in this category.
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Fig. 3.1 Structure of union organisation
National level
State level
Company/branch level
Regional/Zonal/Local Government level
Union organisation occurs at various levels including branch/company level, regional, 
zonal or local government level, state level and national level. The structure of union 
organisation is similar across industrial sectors (fig. 3.1). At the branch or company 
level, workers are usually organised by representatives from the national union. For 
instance, if workers in a particular company are non-unionised, the national union 
under whose jurisdiction the company falls under may decide to organised a branch in 
that company. The regional or zonal Organising Secretary then undertakes the task of 
organising the workers. The process usually culminates in an election to elect union 
officers. The criteria for contesting for any post depends on the constitution of the 
union. Most constitutions require that a potential candidate must be a member in good 
financial standing in the affairs of the union for some months (usually six) preceding 
their nomination and election. Typically, a branch executive committee comprises of 
a chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, etc.
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Any member of a branch executive may decide to contest for a position within a zonal 
or Local Government Area Council. The councils meet periodically (e.g. every three 
months) but elects new officers every three years or four years depending on the 
particular union. Similarly, zonal officers can contest for posts at the state executive 
council and officers at the latter may vie for positions within the national executive 
council. The criteria of eligibility may vary slightly from union to union but it is 
generally a precondition that contestants are consistent due-paying members over a 
relatively long period of time prior to election period (Akinlaja, 1999).
3.7 Research: Literature Review
Even though several studies have investigated union-related issues in Nigeria, none 
seem to have addressed the possible causes and consequences of union commitment 
per se. In particular, while existing research operationalises union commitment as a 
distinct construct capable of predicting union participation (Barling et al, 1992), this 
link has yet to be acknowledged within the Nigerian industrial relations literature.
This is probably a consequence of the lack of a model, which describes the union 
commitment-participation link within the Nigerian context. Most of the studies 
reviewed in this section are quite old, the most recent being Fashoyin (1987). Efforts 
aimed at finding more recent Nigerian studies on the subject proved abortive. A 
search of major journals and periodicals (both Nigerian-based as well as international 
journals) for any current Nigerian study on the subject all had negative results. The 
author while in the field in Nigeria, personally searched relevant databases in 
institutions such as University of Lagos, Institute of Labour research, the NLC’ s 
department of education and research to mention a few. This situation further 
reinforces the rationale for this research and aptly underscores the reason why this
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study is so urgently needed. The Nigerian studies may be grouped into three 
categories: historical studies, historical / case studies, and case studies5.
What is known about the administration of Nigerian unions - and in particular, 
membership participation - has been mainly based on general observation or historical 
research. Examples of these studies include those by Yesufu (1969), Kilby (1967), 
Remy (1975), Ananaba (1969), Peace (1979), Ubeku (1983), Tokunbo, (1985); 
Diejomah, (1979), Etukudo, (1977), and Otobo, (1987). Studies that have combined 
historical and observational research with the survey of attitudes of people in specific 
unions include those by Warmington (1960), Melson 1973), Smock (1969), Cohen 
(1974) and Lubeck (1975). These studies were mainly directed towards an analysis 
of ideology or class movements and where the attitudes of the workers were assessed, 
the general attention has been focussed on the extent of knowledge or familiarity with 
union activities.
Examples of case studies include the studies of Remy (1975) and Fashoyin (1987). 
Remy’ s research attempted to demonstrate that the behaviour of industrial workers is 
strongly influenced by the type of industry in which they are employed and by the 
nature of the wider urban environment in which they live. Fashoyin (1987)’s study of 
the internal dynamics within Nigerian trade unions tried to provide a broad 
assessment of the attitudes of the rank and file towards their unions and the extent of 
members’ involvement in policy-making functions of their unions. These studies, 
shed some light concerning union activity in Nigeria and from the review of a few 
pertinent ones done below, conclusions can be drawn on the general outlook of
5 The list presented here is by no means exhaustive; only those that are relevant to the study have been 
selected.
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labour-management relations, union attitudes of members and relations between 
unions and their members in the country. Since none of the studies was particularly 
concerned with a methodical investigation of questions relating to the causes and 
consequences of union commitment, direct evidence on this is not obvious from the 
review. Most of the studies understandably gave insufficient information about the 
wider dimensions of members’ attitudes towards their unions due to the nature of their 
enquiry.
Warmington (1960)’s study of the Cameroons Development Corporation6 union and 
its members, was conducted in 1954 and involved a survey of 661 employees (all 
men). The study had its origin in a series of sociological and economic investigations 
of some of the problems connected with plantation labour during that period. The 
author employed questionnaire methods in investigating the attitudes of the plantation 
workers towards their union. The questions were open-ended, so the respondents 
were able to provide their own answers in their own words. Most of the workers 
expressed favourable union attitudes.
It is apparent from the study that the workers had certain expectations of their unions
and were willing to embrace the union as long as it had a good record of achieving
results. Although Warmington observed that some workers did not understand the
traditional concept of trade unionism, their experience in their various tribal
associations probably helped them to relate the union to an organisation, which should
provide some benefits, and as such most of them expected this from their union. The
union leaders usually considered more educated (“book men” as they were referred to
6 The Southern Cameroons, the territory in which the C.D.C Workers’ Union operated was a part o f the 
Federation o f Nigeria (south o f the country). The unions’ development took place within a framework 
o f law and administration shared by all Nigerian trade unions.
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by the workers) commanded respect because they could approach the white “oga ” 
(master) whom they usually held in trepidation. But the workers were not afraid to go 
on strike on the orders of their leaders. The perceived superiority of the white 
managers must have also encouraged or discouraged workers from getting involved 
with the unions (e.g. the author noted that “such is the prestige of the European that 
many of the men doubt whether the union leaders have any power to put forward their 
points with any chance of success” (pg. 119).
Some methodological lapses need highlighting. Firstly, the absence of female 
workers on the plantation leading to the sample being exclusively male meant that it 
was not possible to compare the influence of gender on the variability of responses. 
Secondly, no attempt was made to explore the relationships between the responses. 
This situation suggests that Warmington’s picture of the ordinary members’ general 
outlook may be inadequate. For instance, the assertion about skilled or more educated 
workers being more enthusiastic and militant (pg. 121) appears to border on mere 
speculations since there was no supporting empirical data.
Thirdly, the open-ended format of the questionnaire items meant that the author had to 
use his discretion to decide which categories each response belonged to. Considering 
the weight of the sample used (over 600), analysing the responses must have involved 
a considerable degree of complication; also there is the chance that some degree of 
author’s subjectivity might have come into play. Related to this is the admission by 
the author that many of the respondents were not very articulate in the medium used 
for the interviews (pidgin English) and their comments and explanations were often 
briefer than the respondents desired (pg. 98). The process of analysis would have
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been more reliable if the author had employed a multiple choice format thus ensuring 
uniformity in standard.Lastly, the conditions under which the workers lived at the 
time were very different and unique. The study was conducted when Nigeria was a 
colony of Britain before attaining her independence in 1960 and it seems difficult to 
conceive of labour-management relations of that era and workers’ general attitudes 
towards organised labour as being divorced from the dynamics of colonialism 
(Cookery, 1978).
Cohen (1974)’s survey was carried out in 1968, a period of relative labour quiescence 
induced largely by the appeals of the Federal government not to ‘rock the boat’ during 
the conduct of war operations in the East7. The purpose of the survey was to examine 
the background and investigate the attitudes of a small group of workers towards their 
union, their fellow workers and their position in society. The sample comprised 
seventy members of the Ibadan University Workers’ Union (whose secretary claimed 
a committed membership of 280 persons), who were stratified by skill and then more 
or less randomly selected. By local standards, the sample was a very well educated 
labour force, about 40% having attained high primary (Standard VI) and 21% 
Secondary education.
7
As a result o f a series o f political upheavals and fracas, Nigeria experienced serious political 
instability by the end o f 1965. By 1966 the dream of a flourishing democracy was floundering amidst 
a series o f massacres, inter-regional hostilities and, finally, a military coup that installed the first o f a 
series o f military governments. Many political leaders, including the prime minister and the premiers 
of the western and the Northern regions, were killed during the military take-over. For a few months it 
seemed things had finally returned to normal but things came to a head in the following July when 
another military coup took the place o f an earlier one. Subsequent developments precipitated a bloody 
civil war between 1967 and 1970, amongst which was the attempted secession by the former eastern 
Region. The war left behind nearly 1,000,000 dead. Shortly before the civil war, the four regions of  
the country (West, East, North and the Mid-West), had been replaced by a twelve-state structure.
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The study showed that union members expected the union to provide a highly 
circumscribed set of services. When the union fulfils these expectations, the members 
are prepared to demonstrate their support by joining the union, paying dues and going 
out on strike. Also observed within the union membership was the formation of a 
self-conscious identity, an element of consciousness, and a measure of understanding 
of the group interests, and a critical awareness of the workings and failures of the 
organisations that represents workers. Furthermore, the workers had an unexpected 
high measure of political sophistication in understanding political issues and were 
also prepared to adopt political stances of a fairly radical nature. But as is seen later, 
this has been shown not to necessarily translate into continued support for a labour 
party.
Interestingly, in Cohen’s study, very few members expected social benefits from their 
unions (2%), a sharp contrast to Warmington’s (1960) finding in which most 
respondents expected unions to provide benefits (40%). The reason for this apparent 
discrepancy could lie in the samples’ understanding of the philosophy of trade 
unionism in relation to the existence of tribal organisations providing social benefits. 
In the latter, the workers’ idea of modem trade unionism was inaccurate and because 
they thought the union not to be any different from the tribal associations with which 
they were already accustomed, most joined expecting benefits while others joined 
because of external pressures (friends, supervisors). But in the former, workers 
demonstrated union instrumentality perception in relation to workplace issues thus 
demonstrating a classical understanding of the purpose of trade unions (Webb and 
Webb, 1920). The difference thus lay in the ability of the workers to differentiate the 
roles of their trade unions from the roles of their tribal unions or organisations, which
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provided social benefits. Methodological weaknesses in the study are identical to the 
one cited in reference to Warmington’s. In addition to these, Cohen’s sample was 
arguably too small. Also, the lack of the use of statistical tests to verify the presence 
of relationships between the responses also makes it difficult to make deductions 
about causal inferences amongst the study’s variables.
A sophisticated analysis of the political attitudes of Nigerian workers was provided by 
Melson (1971) who views workers’ political attitudes as being governed by the 
‘cross-pressures’ of ethnicity and class. These inconsistencies were divided into 
‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ inconsistents. The former claimed to support a labour 
and an ethnic party simultaneously, the latter claim to support a labour party but in 
practice support an ethnic party. The sample surveys was carried out largely during 
the last six months of 1964, when at the beginning of the period the author was able to 
assess the support for a labour party immediately after the stirring events of the June 
1964 General Strike and at the end of the period when he could examine what support 
remained as the Federal elections of December 1964 drew near.
The results showed that (a) the 88% who indicated some support for a labour party 
had dropped to 41% in October-December; (b) the 5% who had indicated in July that 
they would support an ethnic party (only) had increased to 41% later in the year; (c) 
the percentage which was cross-pressured in July (69%) had dropped to 19% by the 
time the elections were due. In a four-month period, the labour party apparently lost 
up to half its support thus suggesting that the large number of ‘inconsistents’ belied 
the real strength of the support for a labour party and gave an illusory picture to those 
who were trying to organise workers politically on the basis of class solidarity. One of
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the difficulties in evaluating the continuing relevance of the findings is that the 
declining support for a workers’ political party in 1964 might have been a function of 
the particular character of the labour parties then existing and the circumstances 
surrounding the December election. The significant changes which have occurred 
within the labour, political and geographical landscapes puts in doubt the study’s 
continuing relevance.
Smock (1969)’s study of a fifty-five randomly selected rank and file members of the 
Nigerian Coal Miners Union (NCMU) was part of an extensive investigation into the 
activities of the union leadership. The study took place between 1962 and 1963 
shortly after the country regained its independence from the British in 1960. The 
emphasis was placed on members’ attitudes concerning the distribution of power 
within the union. Results showed a widespread dissatisfaction with the way the union 
was being run and suggests that trade union members have certain expectations 
concerning how they expect their union to be run by their leaders. The members were 
dissatisfied with the status quo and preferred to exercise more influence over the 
decision-making processing.
The attempt by Smock to proffer explanatory variables for the various responses (test 
of correlations) is an improvement on the earlier studies, which have appeared to be 
mainly concerned with just identifying the workers’ attitudes only. The preferences 
of the workers with regards to the style of their union leadership were found to differ 
based on the members’ demographic characteristics (education, skill, urban/rural 
experience). The shortcomings of the study include the fact that firstly, the sample 
was too small. Secondly, no attempt was made to relate the union leadership attitudes
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with union participation. This would have afforded the opportunity to appreciate how 
this affected members’ interest and involvement in union activities. Thirdly, the study 
is too limited in scope. For instance, other factors capable of influencing union 
leadership attitudes (e.g. union instrumentality perception) were not investigated. The 
variables of demography alone are arguably not sufficient to explain the members’ 
responses.
The case material used by Remy (1975) was obtained from a multinational 
corporation in a non-industrial city: the Nigerian Tobacco Company (NTC) Zaria, 
Northern Nigeria in 1969-1971. Personal and employment histories were obtained 
from the NTC personnel department files of a random sample of 100 employees. The 
author also observed workplace interaction on the factory for four to five hours daily 
over a six-month period and later interviewed a sample of twenty-four production 
workers in their homes. The author argued that the behaviour of industrial workers is 
strongly influenced by the type of industry in which they are employed and by the 
nature of the wider urban environment in which they live.
Three types of industries were identified on the basis of their wages in total costs, 
local intermediate goods in their final product, ownership, capital intensity and 
management attitude towards workers. The first type labelled subsidiaries o f  
multinational corporations is foreign-owned, a second category, international 
corporations, produces and markets a single product in several countries while 
Nigerian-owned processing industries constitute the last category. The author’s study 
seem to lend some credence to the view that economic and social setting of industrial 
unions in Nigeria varies along two axis -  type of industry and urban context.
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However, more empirical work exploring the relationship between workers and their 
environment is needed to give precision to this notion. Nevertheless, the study does 
highlight the importance of the urban environment as an influence on worker 
behaviour and trade union action. A few reservations may be expressed about the 
continuing relevance of certain aspects of the study. For instance, the grouping of the 
industries in the country into three types might be considered inaccurate in the current 
era. Political events, technological advancement and globalisation have arguably 
impacted upon the industrial landscape resulting in different patterns of alignments, 
fusions and conglomerations between multinationals, international corporations and 
Nigerian-owned industries. Consequently, it might not be possible to fit every 
industry in the country exclusively into one particular category as the author 
suggested.
Lubeck (1975)’s study focussed on the relationship between leaders and members of 
factory trade unions from the perspective of the inarticulate yet experienced unskilled 
factory worker. The study, conducted in Kano (Northern Nigeria), an area second 
only to Lagos in industrial development in the country, provided an empirical 
evaluation of the experience of an emerging social category as it struggles to deal with 
the inequalities associated with urban industrial labour. The study which involved a 
total of 140 workers, demonstrates that bad corrupt leadership - be it political or union 
leadership - militates against union organisation in the country. The author singled 
out job security as being the predominant issue for the workers.
The methodology employed in the investigation, especially the data analysis aspect, 
appears not to be adequate or robust enough for one to make reliable casual inferences
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from the study. Also the influence of other factors such as the personal and 
demographic characteristics of respondents were not explored in order to find out 
whether for instance women differ in their union attitudes. Furthermore, it can be 
observed that the attitudes of the respondents towards their job were not measured in 
the survey. Thus the conclusions by the author about job security being the most 
influential issue in determining the loyalty of members appear to be based on general 
observations and lacked any empirical support. Nevertheless, the study represents a 
fair analysis of the reasons for the demise of unions in Kano during the period.
Fashoyin (1987)’s investigation into the internal dynamics within Nigerian trade 
unions was concerned with providing a broader assessment of the attitudes of the rank 
and file towards their unions and to determine the extent of the former’s involvement 
in policy making functions of unions. Consequently, an attempt was made to explain 
the relationship between unions and their members viewed from the perspective of the 
latter. Involved in the study were six hundred union members randomly selected 
from a stratified list of 36 industrial unions based in the Lagos metropolitan area.
The study’s findings indicate that the workers have shown considerable interest in 
union affairs and purposefully join unions on the expectation that through the unions 
they would enjoy improved wages and conditions of service, a preservation of their 
rights as workers as well as job security. Education had no influence on regularity at 
meetings, reading union notices or participating at union proceedings or meetings. 
Many workers appeared to meet only their minimum obligation by paying dues, but 
remained inactive while those who attended meetings levy charges of autocracy 
against leaders. Those who did not show interest in unions and failed to attend
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meetings regularly were often denied access to vital information or disallowed 
adequate participation at meetings. According to the author, this showed the 
reluctance of leaders to follow basic democratic process -  respect for constitutional 
procedures and individual rights, acceptance of objective criticisms and lack of 
service to their constituents. A few criticisms of the study are indicated below.
Firstly, the verdict reached on the nature of the relationship between union 
participation and demographic variables (e.g. union tenure and propensity to contest 
elections; education and regularity at meetings) may not be regarded as conclusive as 
the statistical method of analysis used can hardly be described as rigorous (cross 
tabulations only). More advanced methods of analysis such as correlation and 
regression may need to be employed. Secondly, there was no attempt to link union 
participation with likely explanatory variables of job satisfaction, union socialisation 
experiences, union beliefs and life satisfaction. These factors have also been known 
to impact on union participation (Barling et al, 1992).
Thirdly, there was very little or no information given about the individual settings of 
the sample investigated with respect to their companies, union history, organisational 
structure, industrial relations climate, etc. This information is vital in explaining the 
attitudes of the workers to their unions. Fourthly, opinion and attitudes of union 
members may well have changed since this study was conducted especially 
considering the significant changes that have occurred in the industrial relations 
framework in the country since then. For example, the unions have been restructured 
twice, first from 42 to 41 in 1986 then from 41 to 29 in 19968. Also the NLC has
8 Federal Republic o f Nigeria Official Gazette, No. 74, Vol. 83, 1996.
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been proscribed and de-proscribed and union leaders detained on more than one 
occasion by successive military juntas, the last of such episodes occurring under the 
military dictatorship of Abacha (1996 -  1999). Normality was restored (de­
proscription and release of detained union leaders) towards the end of 1999 in the run 
up to the presidential elections which ushered in the current democratic dispensation.
Fifthly, the study employed no particular model or framework in its investigation (e.g. 
no flow chart or diagram setting out the variables and pattern of relationships) so its 
conclusions were rather general and sketchy. For example, in his conclusion the 
author stated that “the main source of apathy among members is therefore neither the 
lack of education nor because workers do not appreciate the important role a union 
plays but it may be sometimes that many union members are not naturally disposed to 
involve themselves in union affairs because they believe that elected leaders have this 
responsibility” (pg. 30).
3.8. Conclusion
All the studies reviewed give prominence to an array of problems facing Nigerian 
unions. Workers are said to purposefully join unions and expect the latter to engage in 
fighting for better wages and working conditions, job security and other issues. All 
the studies seem to express the view that there is general apathy within the union 
membership with members performing poorly in terms of attending meetings, voting 
and speaking regularly or in the actual running of the unions. A few discrepancies 
exist in findings between the studies (e.g. the influence of education on union 
participation of members). These differences may be partly a reflection of the 
differences in the time period (i.e. colonial and post-colonial era), geography (e.g.
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east, west, south of the country), politics (e.g. military rule, civilian rule), economy 
(e.g. high inflation, economic prosperity) and industrial setting (e.g. management- 
labour relations) of the studies.
For example, Fashoyin’s sample had a higher level of educated respondents than the 
rest as well as the respondents displaying a higher level of awareness about the 
purpose of organised trade unionism. This situation is most likely related to the 
significant societal changes of post-independent Nigeria. In the same vein, due to 
their locations, Lubeck (1975) and Remy (1975) had predominantly ethnic 
Northerners in their sample, Smock (1960) had predominantly Easterners while 
Warmington (1960), had predominantly southerners. It has been suggested that there 
are more uneducated people in the north in comparison with other parts of the country 
(Wali, 1991).
Kano state for example is predominantly Muslim and according to Wali (1991), 99
percent of women in Kano are illiterate females and this is typical for most of
northern Nigeria. She noted that although females represent 70% of the population,
less than 2% of them are educated enough to care properly for their home and
children. The author states that:
“Suspicious o f western education, Islamic 
tradition in this part o f  Nigeria has given its girls 
very little opportunity to be educated beyond 
Arabic fo r  religious purposes. They do, however, 
often engage in street hawking as early as age 
four. By the time they reach age twelve, they are 
usually married and are confined to their marital 
homes. By the time they are thirty they are likely
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to be discarded and left alone with four or five  
children to support”.
Thus it can be argued that these factors may have contributed to the differences in 
findings between the studies. This notwithstanding, certain factors might be relevant 
in our consideration of possible influences on members involvement in union 
participation: union instrumentality perception, union leadership attitudes, job 
dissatisfaction (e.g. wages, working conditions) union beliefs, political orientation, 
educational background, ethnic origin, industrial setting or environment, and union 
tenure (fig. 2.1). It could be hypothesised that these factors possess the capacity to 
affect members’ involvement within the unions.
The connection between explanatory variables identified in the studies was largely 
ignored or insufficiently examined. Most of the studies were preoccupied with a 
description of the problems the unions were facing such that little or no effort was 
spent on a thorough empirical analysis of the interrelations between the explanatory 
variables. Also none of the studies reviewed operationalised union commitment nor 
distinguished it from union participation (fig. 3.1). It will be recalled from the 
previous chapter that the relationship between commitment and member participation 
has received particular attention in other literatures (Gordon et al, 1980; Gallagher 
and Clark, 1989). This research has found that commitment is closely tied to 
participation in union activities (Fullagar and Barling, 1989; Kelloway and Barling, 
1993; Sverke, 1997).
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Fig. 3.1. A diagrammatic Representation o f Preliminary Assumptions from  
Nigerian Studies.
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The proposed study thus represents an attempt to improve on these deficiencies. In 
the first instance, the relationships between all explanatory (independent) variables 
and their effects on union participation will be investigated. Also, the other variables, 
which have been somewhat implicated but not empirically investigated, will be 
assessed. Furthermore, by measuring the union commitment of Nigerian union
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members with a view to exploring its relationship with union participation and other 
factors, the author will not only be bridging the gap observed within the Nigerian 
literature, but will be testing an assumption that the union commitment-participation 
(UC-P) link is not restricted to western environments but is also applicable in the 
Nigerian context. It will be recalled that some researchers in developing countries are 
of the view that models developed in western countries will be dysfunctional in 
developing contexts (Fashoyin, 1995). The next chapter is concerned with the 
methodology employed in the research. It includes a discussion of the research 
hypotheses, definition of the activity of research and a description of the model used 
for investigation.
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CHAPTER 4 
Research Methodology
Introduction
This chapter sets out the procedure involved in the quantitative and qualitative 
research reported in subsequent chapters. The model for investigating the study’s 
propositions which have emanated from previous discussions in chapters 2 and 3 is 
first described. This is followed by a description of the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the research which includes how access for research purposes was sought 
and obtained and how the research instrument was compiled, tested and implemented. 
The characteristics of the survey samples are also presented with a description of the 
techniques used to analyse the data obtained from the research.
4.1 Model for Investigation
Gordon and colleagues (1980) took the initial steps toward the development of a 
formal model of union commitment (see chapter 1). Since then, other authors have 
made attempts to incorporate these antecedents into a single, comprehensive model. 
These models typically include union participation as a key consequence of union 
commitment (Sverke & Kuruvilla, 1995). For the proposed research, the model (fig. 
4.1) relies on an identification of relevant antecedents from western studies reviewed 
in chapter 2 and the Nigerian studies reviewed in chapter 3. This approach hinges on 
the view that not all antecedents advanced in western-based models will necessarily 
apply in the Nigerian context. Conversely, factors, which may be significant in the 
Nigerian context, could turn out to be of no significant consequence in settings 
outside Nigeria. As pointed out in chapter 1, there is variation in the relative impact 
of antecedents in different countries (Fullager and Barling, 1989; Barling et al, 1989).
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Fig. 4.1 Model for Investigation.
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The model (fig. 4.1) takes the view that factors associated with union characteristics 
and perception (union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leaders, 
early union socialisation experience), work or life experiences (job satisfaction, 
satisfaction with life, attitudes towards management), union beliefs (ideological 
beliefs and union-politics orientation) and demographic variables (gender, ethnicity, 
education, membership tenure, sector and age) all exert an indirect effect on union 
participation via union commitment. Alternatively, the union commitment 
antecedents exert a direct effect on union participation. This latter view is supported 
by Fullager and Barling (1989)’s study which indicated a direct causal path from
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union instrumentality perception to union participation. Barling et al’s (1992) model 
only presents union participation as the direct consequence of union commitment 
while omitting the alternative independent link of the antecedents to union 
participation.
Fig. 4.2 Union Characteristics as Moderators
Union
participation
Union
commitment
Union 
characteristics 
and perceptions
Also pro-union attitudes are expected to moderate the relationship between union 
commitment and union participation (fig. 4.2). Newton and Shore (1992) argued that 
prounion attitudes that are themselves causally preceded by union instrumentality 
perceptions shape union commitments thus suggesting that the link between union 
instrumentality and union commitment, rather than being direct, is mediated by 
prounion attitudes. Also, in Fullager and Barling’s (1989) study, it was found out that 
union instrumentality perception moderated the relationship between union loyalty 
and its antecedents of early socialisation experience, life satisfaction and work ethic 
beliefs. This means that high levels of perceived union instrumentality strenghtened 
the relationship between the predictor variables and union loyalty.
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This study intends to investigate the extent to which prounion attitudes will moderate 
the union instrumentality-commitment link for the Nigerian sample. Hypothetically, 
the attitudes of the members towards their union leaders will moderate the extent to 
which the former’s instrumentality perception predicts their commitment to the union. 
This moderation effect may be stronger in unions where leaders are perceived 
positively by their members. It is possible that as Fullager and Barling (1989) found 
out, union instrumentality perception would moderate the union commitment- 
participation link for the Nigerian sample
Fig. 4.3. Internal Union Dynamics, Union Commitment, Union Participation and 
Union Characteristics.
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4.2 Internal Union Dynamics and Union Commitment (fig. 4.3)
At this juncture, it is necessary to discuss the relevance of the impact of what the 
author has labelled “internal union dynamics ” on the union commitment process for 
the Nigeria sample. These factors were identified in the course of the literature 
review. However, in order to understand how the concept fits into the overall model, 
a discussion of the rationale for their inclusion is necessary.
The term dynamics refer to a pattern or process of change, growth, or activity while 
group dynamics is described as the interacting forces within a small human group1. 
The term Internal Union Dynamics thus simply refer to an interactive system or 
process taking place between union members, union leaders and management within 
the unions’ local environment (workplace). Most of the studies on this interactive 
process by Nigerian authors seem to revolve round the issues of union joining, union- 
management relations and union democracy. Highlighted are the nature of the union 
leaders’ interaction with management, extent to which the leaders are willing to share 
information with their members as well as involve them in the decision-making 
process. Related issues concern the process of union membership such as how 
workers joined the unions or who influenced them to join and what their motives were 
for joining (Fashoyin, 1987; Smock, 1969; Cohen, 1974; Lubeck, 1975).
Investigating the relationship between these dynamics and the existing models of 
union commitment is necessary as there is sufficient evidence to suggest that there 
could be a connection between the two. This is now explained below.
1 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary & Thesaurus.
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Influencing Agents (IA) and UC.
Influencing agent(s) are those individuals through whose persuasion, insistence or 
encouragement workers decided to become members of the union. Some workers 
however join the union on their own volition while others seemingly have to be 
persuaded by friends, union leaders or in some cases management. Fashoyin (1987) 
found that of a total of 588 respondents, 72% said they joined on their own, 11% said 
they were persuaded by union leaders, 9% by friends while 8% claimed that 
management made them to join. The study found a relationship between knowledge 
about union meetings and source of motivation for joining the union. In particular, 
those who willingly joined the union or were persuaded by union leaders tended to 
know when a meeting was going to be held more often than those who joined through 
other sources. Furthermore those who willingly joined the union or were persuaded 
by co-workers were more likely to depend on the latter for information about union 
meetings. Also those who were persuaded to join by union leaders were more than 
anybody else likely to depend on the latter for information about union meeting.
These relationships were significant (sig. P < .0001). These results suggest that there 
could be a relationship between the members’ source of union joining and their 
participation in union activities.
Furthermore, an elaboration of the results indicated that more males joined on their 
own volition and through union leaders while more females joined though friends and 
management (sig. p  < .001). The implication of this to union commitment is such that 
it raises some relevant questions concerning some of the existing findings on union 
commitment. For example Gordon (1980) suggested that female members are more 
committed to their unions than male members. Assuming this holds true for the
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Nigeria sample, one may ask: to what extent can this situation be explained by 
Fashoyin (1987)’s finding above? One possible scenario is that the female members’ 
commitment to the union may be partly a function of a sense of loyalty or obligation 
towards their persuasive agents (friends and management). In other words, it is 
possible that their participation in union activities is influenced by an unconscious 
/conscious effort to live up to the expectations of their respective persuasive agents 
(Okoronkwo, 1985; Olajunmoke, 1985). Okoronkwo (1985) and Olajunmoke (1985) 
both suggested that female union members in Nigeria require more support and 
encouragement to facilitate their increased participation in union activities. On the 
other hand, if men turned out to be more committed than women, one may arguably 
explain this within the context of men being more independent and assertive than 
women. Other pertinent questions may be asked: are those who join on their own 
volition likely to have a higher instrumentality perception than others? Does this 
mean they are more likely to be more committed to the union? If the answer to the 
latter is yes, to what extent can their commitment be attributed to the fact that they 
joined on their own?
Union Joining Motive (UJM) and UC
The question of motive or underlying reasons for joining the union is related to the 
expectations which the workers may have of the union when joining. Fashoyin 
(1987) investigated some motives which included “to win more wages and better 
working conditions; to get protection from being sacked; to enjoy social benefits from 
the union; because union is capable of fighting for workers; because most people join; 
and the union has more time / resources to deal with management ”. His result 
showed that of 600 respondents, 81% cited instrumental reasons (win wages =28%;
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fight for workers= 53%). Those that joined based on the last two reasons (because 
most people join; and the union has more time / resources to deal with management) 
were 2% and 7% respectively.
This raises some pertinent questions in relation to the present study: to what extent are 
instrumentally motivated joiners committed to the union compared to others? Can 
their motive for joining be of any relevance to the union commitment-participation 
link in the sense that it may strengthen or weaken it? These questions are more 
relevant when considered that there are workers with no apparent instrumental reasons 
for joining (admittedly they are very few but arguably could be significantly higher in 
a different sample). Can it be assumed that this category of members will be less 
committed than their instrumental counterparts? How do they eventually become 
committed based on instrumental considerations if and when they do?
Perception o f Union-Management Relations (P-UMR) and UC
This refers to how members perceive the relationship between their unions and their 
employer / management in the workplace. The state of relations between 
management and the union has been identified as an antecedent of both organisational 
and union commitment (Magenau et al. 1988; Angle and Perry, 1986; Deery and 
Iverson, 1998). It can be argued that the link between satisfaction with union leaders 
and union commitment is mediated by perceptions of union / management relations.
In other words, a positive view of the union-management relations may either exert a 
negative or positive impact on the attitudes towards union leaders. This is in a sense 
analogous to the manner in which prounion attitudes have been argued to mediate the 
link between union instrumentality and union commitment (Newton and Shore, 1992).
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Smock (1969)’s and Warmington (1960)’s studies suggested that the attitudes of the 
members of the Nigerian coal workers union and the Cameroons Development 
Corporation union respectively, to their leaders, were often influenced by the 
members’ perception of the latter’s relationship with their unions. Similarly,
Akinlaja, (1999) described a situation whereby some workers often interpret a 
perceived friendly / good union-management relations as signifying compromise or 
betray of members by union leaders. Some studies have equally shown that 
members’ commitment to the union is predicted by a perceived negative relationship 
between unions and management (Deery et al, 1994). Thus the satisfaction with 
leadership factor in the model may be strengthened or weakened depending on the 
state of union-management relations in the workplace and how it is perceived by 
members. This situation in turn impacts on union commitment according to the 
model.
Perception o f Decision-Making Process (P-DMP), perception o f Information 
Dissemination (P-ID) and UC
Decision-making and effective dissemination of information within the union are both 
important aspects of a union government. A participatory style of leadership has been 
argued to lead to increase in membership interest and participation (Darlington, 1994; 
Fairbrother, 1989; Fosh, 1993). Information dissemination is vital in the sense that 
without it, members will arguably find it difficult to display an up-to-date knowledge 
of important developments within the union. The calibre of information varies and so 
does the seriousness with which members may view its lack or restriction. For 
example, workers may be not be happy about insufficient information concerning 
meeting times and venues but may be incensed at misinformation over wage or related
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issues. Avenues through which members are informed about meetings include notice 
boards, fellow-co-workers or union leaders. According to Fashoyin (1987), 61% of 
respondents said they were adequately informed about when a meeting was to take 
place and the most popular source of information was the union notice board.
The rationale for investigating members’ perception of the decision-making process 
and information dissemination as separate factors from the variable of satisfaction 
with union leadership can be represented by a pertinent question: would members be 
willing to accommodate or tolerate leaders seen to be obtaining results and getting the 
job done even if the leaders may be perceived as being autocratic in their styles of 
leadership? This scenario has been played out in the wider societal context when 
military coups toppling democratically elected governments in the country during the 
first and second republic were greeted with relief and cautious optimism in the 
country. The toppled politicians were so corrupt and inept to the extent that it seemed 
that military rule was welcomed as a viable alternative by Nigerians. Some political 
commentators even argue that the best government ever enjoyed by the country was 
the one headed by Murtala Mohammed2, a military head of state. Thus it is possible 
that for the Nigerian sample, some members may not be too bothered about being left 
out of the democratic process provided the unions are effective and dynamic in terms 
of winning higher wages, promotions, allowances, etc.. Conversely, union democracy
2
Murtala Mohammed, (1975-76)’s policies won him broad popular support and his decisiveness 
elevated him to the status o f a national hero. More than 10,000 public officials and employees were 
dismissed without benefits, on account o f age, health, incompetence, or malpractice. The purge affected 
the civil service, judiciary, police and armed forces, diplomatic service, public corporations, and 
universities. Some officials were brought to trial on charges o f corruption. Singling out inflation as the 
greatest danger to the economy, he was determined to reduce the money supply that had been swollen 
by government expenditures on public works. He was assassinated by a fellow soldier in 1976.
127
could become an issue if the leaders are perceived to be failing generally in their 
responsibilities and not meeting with workers’ expectations.
Related to the above argument is the apparent discrepancy in findings concerning 
members’ perception of the decision-making process as it affects commitment. As 
mentioned earlier, existing findings suggest that democratic style of leadership 
generally tend to lead to increase in union participation. However Fashoyin (1987)’s 
study of the Nigerian union members seem to negate this concept. The study found 
that although majority of respondents (47%) claimed that decisions on union matters 
were taken at meetings of all workers (an acceptance of democratic process within the 
union), attendance at meetings was low and involvement such as speaking even lower. 
Further investigation revealed that when asked to identify the problems perceived to 
be facing their unions, most of the respondents (50%) mentioned leadership 
incompetence and personality conflicts between leaders. This suggests that the union 
officials’ democratic style of leadership by itself was apparently insufficient to 
guarantee the members participation. Failure in other areas of leadership has the 
potential of negatively affecting membership participation. Thus it would be 
interesting to know the extent to which perception of the decision-making process and 
information dissemination would moderate the impact of satisfaction with union 
leadership on the union commitment of members.
In conclusion, a better understanding of the union commitment process for the 
Nigerian sample would arguably necessitate the union commitment-participation link 
being further explored within the context of the union dynamics described above.
This study argues that there is a relationship between the union dynamics and the
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union commitment process or in other words, internal union dynamics exert 
significant influence on the process of union commitment. Sector is expected to 
moderate the effect of these union dynamics (fig. 4.4). This is based on the view that 
differences in union settings in terms of structure, organisation, leadership factors, etc. 
across the public and private sector is expected to engender a significant difference in 
the dynamics being explored.
Figure 4.4 Sector as a moderating variable in the relationship between IUDs,
Union Commitment, Union Participation and their Antecedents.
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Summary o f Hypotheses
(1) Attitudes towards management, extrinsic job satisfaction and satisfaction with life 
will have a direct effect on union commitment level and union participation;
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(2) Demographic characteristics will have a direct effect on union commitment levels 
as well as union participation;
(3) Perceptions about the instrumentality of the union, union socialization experiences, 
and attitudes towards union leaders will have a direct influence on the union 
commitment levels and union participation;
(4) Marxist beliefs and union-politics orientation will have a direct effect on union 
commitment levels and union participation.
(5) Pro-union attitudes will act as moderators within the model; union commitment 
will predict union participation.
(6) Internal Union Dynamics will exert a significant impact on the predictors of union 
commitment and the union commitment.
(7) The influence of the internal union dynamics will vary across the private and the 
public sector i.e. sector will be a moderator in the model.
4.3 The Research
The research had quantitative and qualitative aspects. There were two quantitative 
surveys: the first one took place between November 1999 and January 2000 while the 
second was conducted concurrently with the qualitative research between February 
and April 2002. The two quantitative surveys are described below, but first a word on 
the pilot study.
(a) Quantitative Research 
Pilot Study
A pilot study was first conducted to determine the appropriateness of research 
questions and how well they are understood by the respondents. Thirty questionnaires
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were randomly distributed to the union members through the assistance of one of the 
union officers within the company. Twenty questionnaires were returned in all 
(66.67% response rate) and it was observed that the items were well understood.
First Survey
Random sampling was used in selecting the sample. Practice has been in favour of 
randomisation as a method for selecting a sample (Tryfos, 1996). Four Industrial 
Unions based in the South of the country participated in the study. The unions 
organise workers within the petroleum, health, and manufacturing sectors of the 
economy. The selection procedure was based on the criteria of accessibility and cost 
effectiveness. With regards the former, it has been rightly noted that one of the main 
problems confronting researchers in Nigeria is of a bureaucratic nature (Matanmi, 
1992). Many employers view researchers with suspicion and often decline to assist 
them with their enquiry and it was thus necessary to have a strategy to cope with this 
exigency.
By working through a list of contact addresses of the 29 industrial unions in Nigeria, 
the author was reliably advised about the relative accessibility of some unions and 
also provided some useful contacts. On the issue of cost effectiveness, Tryfos 
(1996:60) noted that “.. .the practical solution to the sample problem is often to simply 
select as many elements as the budget and other resources permit”. Aware of the 
limitations imposed by time restriction and financial availability, the branch unions 
eventually selected were within commuting distances and mainly based within 
townships and industrial areas with easy and affordable commuting access.
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The private sector unions selected are affiliated to the National Union of Petroleum 
and Natural gas workers (NUPENG) and National Union of Food, Beverage and 
Tobacco Employees (NUFBTE) while the public sector unions are affiliated to the 
Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria (MHWUN) and the Steel and 
Engineering Workers Union of Nigeria (SEWUN). All the unions, which participated 
in the study, are house or branch unions and situated in the south of the country. A 
description of the settings of the unions is briefly given below.
(i) NUPENG: African Petroleum pic. AP commenced business in 1954 
when BP bought over Atlantic Richfield. BP became AP in 1978 when 
40% of the shares were sold to Nigerians following the indigenisation 
decree of 1977. The company is involved in the refining, distribution and 
marketing of natural gas and petroleum products such as chemicals, 
lubricants and insecticides. The company, situated in the south of the 
country and formed in the 1960s has established and consolidated its 
position as a leading marketer of petroleum and related products in 
Nigeria.
(ii) NUFBTE. FoodTech pic is the administrative headquarters of one of the 
country’s foremost food companies engaged in the manufacture of dairy 
products, sea foods, cocoa, sugar and non-alcoholic beverages, etc. and of 
related products such as distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits, wine 
etc. The company was established in the 1930s.
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(iii) MWUHN. Two General hospitals, and one Health Management Board. 
There are three branch unions represented in almost every health 
institution in the country: one catering for doctors, one for nurses and 
another for Para-medical staff. The latter took part in this study and 
comprises mainly technicians, medical record officers, catering officers, 
dispensing assistants, orderlies, x-ray assistants cleaners, and others in this 
category.
(iv) SEWUN. SteelTech is a government-owned metal manufacturing 
company. The company was founded in the late 1970s, located in the 
south of the country and basically manufactures steel products. The house 
union, which took part from this company, represents all categories of 
workers below the management cadre including plant workers and those 
involved in administration.
Research Instrument
A self-administered questionnaire was used. A questionnaire offers a cost effective 
way of reaching a large enough sample of trade union members to gather sufficient 
information on which to establish statistical relationships. The anonymity offered by 
a self-administered questionnaire allowed respondents privacy and the opportunity to 
express their views in a non-judgemental atmosphere. Most items used in the 
questionnaire were selected on the basis that they had already appeared in published 
work, and that they were potentially applicable to the Nigerian trade union 
environment. Demographic information was first required such as state of origin, 
gender, educational qualification, age, and tenure as a union member. The research
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instrument was also designed to assess the variables introduced in the research 
propositions. The dependent variables are union commitment and union participation. 
The independent variables are union instrumentality perception, job satisfaction, early 
union socialisation experiences, life satisfaction, Marxist beliefs, union-politics 
orientation, management satisfaction and union leadership satisfaction.
Union Commitment.
Scales from Gordon et al’s (1980) factor analytical studies were employed to assess 
union commitment. There were five questionnaire items (questions 6-10), which were 
meant to reflect a sense of pride in the union, the union’s achievements, perception of 
other members’ reliability and trustworthiness. The variable was scored on a 5 point 
scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Formal Union participation.
This was measured using scales that assess attitudes about participation in and 
knowledge of union activities. They are union meeting attendance, voting in union 
elections, speaking at meetings, contributing at meetings and campaigning for 
candidates. There were four questionnaire items (questions 22-27). The variable was 
scored on a 3-point scale (e.g. attend very often - very rarely; contribute very often -  
rarely contribute).
Union Instrumentality Perception.
This was measured using scales, which assess the possible benefits that the union 
could achieve for its members in the areas of job security, fair labour practices, 
working conditions and overall benefits (Gordon et al, 1980; Fashoyin, 1987). There
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were six questionnaire items (questions 11-16). This was scored on a 5-point scale 
from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Job Satisfaction.
Warr et al’s (1980) job satisfaction scale was employed here. Three questionnaire 
items were used to measure extrinsic satisfaction such as satisfaction with salary Jo b  
conditions and standard of living (questions 34-36). This was scored on a 7-point 
scale from extremely satisfied to extremely dissatisfied.
Early Union Socialisation.
Early union socialisation experiences were assessed using Gordon et al’s (1980) 
scales. Respondents were asked to what extent they understood their union’s goals 
(scale from very good understanding to very little understanding) and the support and 
encouragement they received from other union members (very great amount to very 
little amount). Two questionnaire items were used (questions 20-21). The variable 
was scored on a 4-point scale.
Life Satisfaction.
Warr et al’s (1980) scale, which assesses satisfaction with various aspects of 
individual life, was used. One questionnaire item was used to assess this variable, 
(question 37).The variable was scored on a 7-point scale from extremely satisfied to 
extremely dissatisfied.
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Marxist Beliefs.
Buchholz’s (1978a, 1978b) scales were used to assess the belief that the manner in 
which work is currently organised entails exploitation by the ruling class. Two 
questionnaire items were used from this scale (28-29). The variable was scored on a 
5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Union-politics orientation.
Grounded measures were adopted to assess the orientation of the respondents. 
Workers responded to one questionnaire item concerning whether unions should form 
their own political party or not (question 27). The variable was scored on a 5-point 
scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Management Satisfaction.
Grounded measures were also employed to measure the attitudes of the workers 
towards management. There were three questionnaire items concerning whether 
management are fair, can be trusted and doing their best for workers (17-19). The 
variable was scored on a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Union Leadership Satisfaction.
Grounded measures were employed here to reflect the way in which respondents 
perceive union leaders (responsible, democratic, united). There were three 
questionnaire items (questions 28-30). The variable was scored on a 5-point scale.
The questionnaires were randomly distributed to union members in the four 
establishments. In each case, the author was assisted by the contacts in distributing
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the questionnaires. Typically, the researcher explained the purpose of the survey and 
that it was totally confidential. Completed questionnaires were then returned to the 
shop stewards and were usually collected by the researcher about two days later. 700 
questionnaires were randomly distributed and three hundred and forty nine (349) 
questionnaires were returned. Preliminary examination of the data for completeness 
of response, legibility and other signs of the care with which the items were answered 
resulted in the elimination of unusable questionnaires. A total of three hundred and 
seventeen (317) usable questionnaires remained in the sample, corresponding to forty 
five percent (45%) of respondents from the four branch unions (this compares 
favourably with results cited by Nicholson et al., 1981, Hartley et al., 1983).
Sample Characteristics
Table 4.1 shows an overview of the demographic information concerning the subjects 
that took part in the survey. Most of the respondents have had some education, the 
great majority (75.4%) claiming to have attained some post secondary school 
qualification. There was a higher response rate in the private sector (75.1 %) than in 
the public sector (apparently there were more willing participants from the private 
sector). The table also shows that the sample was predominantly male (77.2%). This 
seems to be a fair representation considering that the ratio of women to men within 
the working population in general is small and bearing in mind a suggestion that 
female representation in the labour movement in Nigeria is relatively insignificant 
(Fashoyin, 1987). The age distribution indicates that the average worker in the 
branches sampled is relatively young the majority of respondents being less than 40 
years old. Nigeria’s labour force has been argued to be between dominated by 
workers who are less than 35 years old (Fashoyin 1987). There were more
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southerners (86.1%) than northerners in the sample most likely as a result of the fact 
that all the respondents from the two ethnic divisions live in the south of the country. 
The study was restricted to the south of the country mainly because of ethnic tension 
and skirmishes which made it practically unsafe and an unviable proposition to draw 
any sample from there at the time.
The author was unable to statistically determine the comparability of the research 
sample to the original population for the simple reason that reliable data on the 
number of union members in each participating firm could not be obtained. This 
situation is arguably an indication of a general lukewarm approach to book-keeping 
by the union officials concerned. The union officials were unable to supply current 
estimates of their membership due to reasons ranging from organisational 
restructuring and on-going redundancies (African Petroleum) to unreliability of the 
automatic dues check-off system (the membership figure is supposedly calculated 
based on the number of workers regularly paying their dues). An alternative option 
explored by the author was to get the information from personnel (which hopefully 
would have demographic details on employees). However, attempts were only 
partially successful . A recent estimate for African Petroleum was given as 89 semor 
staff, 84 junior staff (no information was available on contract staff workers). 
Unfortunately this information was not available according to gender, age, etc. which 
would have made it possible to conduct some statistical analysis.
3 In the case o f African Petroleum largely due to the fact that the author was a former employee and 
still has contacts within the company
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The 1996 edition of “trade unions of the world”4 puts NUPENG membership at 
200,000; NUBFE, 32,000; MHWUN 100,000; (no figure was provided for SEWUN). 
The 2001 edition incidentally had no information on membership strengths, save that 
the total union membership in Nigeria is about 4 million. During a visit to the Trade 
Union Registry, the Assistant Registrar of Trade Unions (National) whom the author 
spoke to confirmed that there are no current reliable data on the unions as far as 
membership is concerned. When asked his views on the figures above, the registrar 
expressed cynicism. He blamed the current situation on union officials who allegedly 
fail to comply with the rule stipulating regular updates of their membership and when 
they do, some provide wrong information in order to make their figures add up for 
auditors investigating union accounts. He declined the author’s request for any latest 
figures claiming it would be unprofessional of him to supply “unreliable information”.
Nevertheless, there are indications which suggest that the sample may not be all that 
dissimilar to the original population in terms of certain parameters. This is evident 
from comparisons with Fashoyin (1987)’s sample5 whose respondents apparently 
share similar characteristics in terms of age distribution, gender, education and 
membership tenure. Pertinently, both samples were randomly selected from branch 
unions based mainly within Lagos metropolis and affiliated to national industrial 
unions within the country. Based on his sample, Fashoyin (1987) described a typical 
trade union membership in Nigeria as young, reasonably educated and significantly 
consisting of more men than women. It would be fair to argue that this description is 
still applicable today as reflected by the author’s sample. Table 4.2 shows the
4 published by Cartermill International ltd.
Consisting o f six hundred union (600) members randomly selected from a stratified list o f 36 
industrial unions based in the Lagos metropolitan area.
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summary of the valid and missing responses on biographical information of the 
respondents. With the exception of age, where 7 responses are missing, all other 
responses are valid. Missing responses on age is probably due to oversight on the part 
of respondents or a reluctance to disclose their ages. But the survey was anonymously 
conducted so it may be may assumed that it was an oversight.
Table 4.1 Characteristics of the Survey Sample (N=317)
Characteristic Frequency %
Gender
Male 245 77.2
Female 72 22.7
Education
Primary School 17 2.8
Secondary School 79 21.8
Higher Education 217 75.4
Membership Tenure
1 —5 yrs 101 31.9
6 — 10 yrs 96 30.3
11 — 15 yrs 63 19.9
16 — 34 yrs 57 18.0
Sector
Public 79 24.9
Private 238 75.1
Age
21 -  29yrs 30 9.5
30 — 39yrs 182 57.4
40 -  49yrs 84 26.5
50 and above. 14 4.4
Ethic Group
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Northerners 44 13.9%
Southerners 273 86.1%
Table 4.2 Summary of Missing Data
ETHNIC GROUP GENDER AGE EDUCATIONAL
BACKGROUND
MEMBERSHIP
TENURE
SECTOR
N Valid 317 317 310 317 317 317
Missing 0 0 7 0 0 0
Second Survey
A second quantitative survey was carried out because after analysing the first survey 
and interviewing people, the author realised that there was the need to know more 
about the internal dynamics of the unions involved. The questionnaire used in the 
second survey had items on the dependent variables (union participation and union 
commitment), the main significant predictors (instrumentality perception, satisfaction 
with union leadership and early socialisation experience) and the internal union 
dynamics items. The survey took place in the same unions where the qualitative 
research was conducted, namely NUPENG and MHWUN. These two were used for 
the second quantitative survey (instead of the four used in the first survey) because 
they were the only ‘accessible’ unions for the qualitative research both of which were 
conducted concurrently. Consequently, these two unions formed the focus of the 
analysis of the internal union dynamics presented in chapter 7.
Three hundred (300) questionnaires were randomly distributed across the branch 
unions. One hundred and forty (140) questionnaires were distributed in African
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Petroleum (AP) and 160 across 5 branch unions of MHWUN. There are three 
separate branches in AP: NUPENG organises junior staff and contract / casual staff 
separately while PENGASSAN organises the senor staff. MHWUN branches were 
randomly selected from across the Lagos metropolis. The branches are HMB (Health 
Management Board), RD (Radiology Dept), HRD (Health Records Dept), ALG 
(Apapa Local government) and PHY (Psychiatric Hospital Yaba). After the data had 
been treated for unusable questionnaires and incomplete responses, around 195, 
useable materials remained corresponding to 65% response rate overall (AP=59.2 %; 
MH WUN=7 0%).
Sample Characteristics
The respondents characteristics (table 4.3) in this survey appear to be similar to those 
in the first survey (table 4.1). This may be because some members who took part in 
the first survey probably also participated in the second survey6. There were more 
respondents in the public sector (57.4%) this time although the difference is marginal 
compared to the first survey. This is most likely due to the relatively higher number 
of MHWUN branches surveyed. Also with the introduction of the third category of 
“easterners” in the ethnicity variable, the proportions of northerners to southerners 
seemed to have changed considerably in comparison with the first survey suggesting 
that some respondents may have decided on a “more appropriate label”.
6 The survey involved two o f the four unions involved in the first survey. 
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Table 4.3 Characteristics of the Sample (N=195)
Characteristic
Frequency % valid Missing
Gender
Male 136 69.7 194 1
Female 58 29.7
Education
Primary School 24 12.3
Secondary 87 44.6
School 72 39.9 193 2
BSc/BA 10 5.1
MSc.
Union Tenure
Less than 1 year 24 12.3
1 -  5 yrs 51 26.2
6 -  10 yrs 67 34.4 191 4
11 -1 5  yrs 24 12.3
1 6 -3 4  yrs 25 12.8
Job Tenure
Less than 1 year 9 4.6
1 -  5 yrs 28 14.4
6 - 1 0  yrs 63 32.3 195 0
11 -1 5  yrs 48 24.6
16 -  34 yrs 47 24.1
Sector
Private 83 42.6 195 0
Public 112 57.4
Age
Less than 18 2 1
19-24yrs 8 4.1 194 1
25 -  34yrs 84 43.1
35 -  44yrs 73 37.6
45 and above. 27 13.9
Ethic Group
Northerners 11 5.6
Southerners 141 72.3 184 11
Easterners 32 16.4
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Marital status
Single
Married
42
136
21.5
69.7
Separated
Widowed
8
9
4.1
4.6
195 0
Staff category
Junior 87 44.6
Senior 85 43.6 194 1
Other 22 11.3
Union office
Yes 54 27.7 195 0
No 141 72.3
Family responsibility 
Yes 167 85.6 188 8
No 20 9.8
Table 4. 4 Response rate
No. distributed No. Used Response rate
Private 140 83 59.2%
Public 160 112 70%
Total 300 195 65%
Table 4.5 sectors by staff category
Staff category Total
Junior staff Senior staff Other
Sector Private 31 30 21 82
Public 57 55 112
Total 88 85 21 194
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Questionnaire
The questions in respect of union commitment, union participation, union 
instrumentality, satisfaction with union leadership and socialisation experiences in the 
first survey were replicated for the second survey. The number of questionnaires 
given out and the response rate is shown in table 4.4. The additional items included in 
the second survey questionnaire were adapted from Fashoyin (1987)’s study:
1. How did you become a member of your union? This is a 4-point scale item.
2. Why did you join your union? This is a six-point scale item.
3. Relations between managers and the union are very good. This is a 5-point 
scale.
4. How are decisions made in your union? (this has a 4-point scale format).
5. How well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the 
union? This has a 4-point scale format.
Additional demographic variables were investigated and include marital status, family 
responsibility, job tenure and office holding. The rationale for including marital 
status is based on the premise that married people may have lesser degree of freedom 
to participate in union activities due to their commitment. The same rationale is 
applicable to members with one form of family responsibility or the other e.g. 
sheltering extended or close relatives, sponsoring their education, etc. This category 
may also include single members. The relevance of staff category is underscored by 
the variation in the staff typology inherent in the two sectors (table 4.5). In African 
Petroleum, three categories of workers -  senior staff, junior staff and contract or
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casual workers -  exist whereas in the MHWUN branches, there are mainly junior and 
senior staffs.
What is more, in African Petroleum, the senior staff workers are represented by 
PENGASSAN7 (Petroleum and Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria) while the 
contract / casual staff also has their own union although this union is part of 
NUPENG8. In contrast, MHWUN organises both senior and junior workers 
irrespective of their grades and positions. In all the MHWUN branches where this 
study was conducted, both senior and junior staff belong to the same union. In the 
first survey, there were only 2 categories represented in the variable of ethnicity, but 
this was modified in the second survey to include easterners in order to distinguish 
them from the southerners since this was not accounted for in the first survey.
Statistical Techniques for Data Analysis
The statistical methods usually employed for verification of the hypotheses are 
regression, correlation, or path analytic techniques. Though additional methods exist 
like Manova, logit analysis and so on, such special methods are applicable for 
investigating only certain research questions (and only when the data are available in 
certain form). Given the range of available methods, a natural question that arises is 
whether the choice of the research method affects the conclusions or the implications 
inferred. Conclusions drawn from correlation and regression analysis have been 
conducted for issues like bargaining outcomes (Anderson 1979a), local union
7 The relevance o f this union has been questioned by NUPENG who viewed it as an artifical dichotomy 
(Akinlaja, 1999).
8Against the backdrop o f NUPENG’s struggle against the use o f contract/casual workers in the oil and 
gas industry, the decision was made by the national leaders to organise these workers under a separate 
union so that they can have a more effective platform in negotiating with management. At the time of 
the study, the union had been in existence for about a year meeting separately from the main NUPENG 
branch union and having their own elected union officials.
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participation (Anderson 1979b), local union democracy (Anderson 1978), and 
arbitrator acceptability (Briggs and Anderson 1980). In particular, Viswesvaran, et al 
(1993) examined the determinants of union commitment using correlation, regression, 
and path analysis. For the particular model and data analysed by the authors, 
differences in inferences from the alternative methods were found to be relatively 
minor when comparing the regression and path analysis results, but these two methods 
yielded results substantially different from those generated by correlational methods.
Taking note of the observations made above, the three methods of correlation, 
multiple regression and path analysis were employed in analysing the results.
Although the use of multiple regression would probably suffice, the inclusion of path 
analysis was informed by the need to prove beyond doubt the validity of the study’s 
findings. Furthermore, factor analysis was used to ascertain the factorial validity of 
the research instrument. Reliability tests and descriptive statistics (e.g. t tests, tests for 
mean differences and standard deviations) were initially carried out. Details 
regarding these tests are also dealt with in subsequent chapters.
4.4 Qualitative Research
The main purpose of the research was to investigate in detail the specific context of 
the branch unions in terms of their history, background, structure, union government, 
etc. This information is arguably necessary in order to fully elaborate on the 
quantitative findings with the aim of proffering explanations for the quantitative 
results. The study involved mainly NUPENG and MHWUN unions. The NUFBT and 
SEWUN branch unions were not included mainly because the author was only able to 
succeed in securing access in African Petroleum and the MHWUN branch unions.
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The author had the rare privilege of accessing pertinent union records (logbook) and 
documents of which their analysis helped to elaborate on the quantitative findings.
The qualitative study included interviews with randomly selected ordinary members 
and general secretaries from both national and branch levels as well as content 
analysis of union records / logbooks.
Personal Interviews and Content analysis.
In both African Petroleum and the MHWUN branches, personal interview sessions 
were held with union officials and randomly selected members (table 4.6). The level 
of union leaders targeted was based on the understanding that they are the custodians 
of their union’s records and also have more insight into what goes on within their 
unions. African Petroleum has two main branches in Lagos state: its head office 
(mainly administrative) and a depot at Ijora which also has an administrative complex. 
This research took place in the latter where there are three separate branch unions 
(NUPENG (contract staff), NUPENG (junior staff) and PENGASSAN (senior staff) ). 
In NUPENG (contract staff), there are 8 union officials: chairman, vice chairman, 
secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and three ex-officio members. The assistant 
secretary claims they represent 90 members. In NUPENG (junior staff), there are 8 
union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, vice-secretary, treasurer, financial 
secretary and two ex-officio members. The secretary claimed they represent between 
90 and 100 members (however personnel records has junior staff workers as 84). 
PENGASSAN (senior staff) has 7 union officials: chairman, vice chairman, secretary, 
assistant secretary, treasurer and two ex-officio members. The chairman claims they 
represent between 90 and 100 (personnel record however has senior staff members at 
89).
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MHWUN has 23 branches scattered all over Lagos state. Some of these unions often 
share buildings or locations with other unions e.g. National Union of Local 
Government Employees. The officers interviewed were based at the five branches 
which took part in the second survey. HMB has 10 union officials: chairman, vice- 
chairman, secretary, financial secretary, treasurer, auditor and 4 ex officio members. 
The secretary claim they represent between 250 and 300 members. In RD, there are 
10 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, auditor, ex-officio, 
financial secretary and 4 ex-officio members. The secretary claimed they represent 30 
members. In HRD there are 8 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, 
financial secretary, treasurer, auditor and 2 ex officio members. The secretary claim 
they represent 50 members. In ALG, there are 7 union officials: chairman, vice- 
chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and auditor. The secretary claims 
they represent between 175 and 180 members. In PHY, there are 10 union officials: 
chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, auditor, public 
relations officer, and financial secretary. The chairman claims they represent 300 
members.
The main method of interview used is the structured interview method, a method 
which permit comparability between responses (Patton, 1987). The questionnaire was 
designed with the sole objective of obtaining as much accurate information as 
possible concerning the unions’ settings. The demographic information on the 
interviewees is shown in table 4.6. Questionnaires used to interview members and 
leaders were designed differently but in each case intended to obtain information 
which could help to explain the findings in the quantitative section of the research
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(see appendix for the questionnaires). The sessions lasted between 20 to 40 minutes 
and were tape-recorded. In addition, the unions’ log books and other relevant union 
documents (e.g. constitution, newsletters, bulletins, etc.) were content analysed. It 
should be noted that when reporting on the outcome of the qualitative research, the 
author employed pertinent data from the second quantitative to enhance the points 
being made.
Table 4.6 Demographic information on interviewees
NUPENG (junior staff) MHWUN
1. Assistant General Secretary 1. General Secretary (national)
(branch) 2. General Secretary (HMB)
2. Chairman (branch) 3. General Secretary (RD)
3. Senior Organising Secretary 4. General Secretary (HRD)
(National) 5. Chairman (ALG)
4. Member 6. Chairman (PHY)
5. Member 7. Head, women’s wing (National)
8. Research and Statistics Unit
PENGASSAN (senior staff) Secretary (zonal)
6. Chairman (branch / national) 9. Member (HMB)
7. Member 10. Member (RD)
11. Member (HRD)
NUPENG (Contract/casual staff)
8. Chairman
9. Member
Summary
Attempts have been made in this chapter to describe the methods employed in the 
study. The theoretical framework upon which the investigation is predicated has been 
adapted from Barling et al (1992)’s model of union commitment and the research 
propositions advanced have been based on empirical findings as well as suggestions 
from Nigerian authors. Preceding the main study was a pilot study, which was first 
carried out in order to ascertain the appropriateness of research tools and techniques.
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Three hundred and seventeen respondents participated in the main study drawn from 
four branch unions - two public and two private sector unions - located in the southern 
part of the country. A second survey investigating internal union dynamics was 
conducted and involved 195 respondents. The main statistical method of data analysis 
employed in the study is correlation and multiple regressions. The qualitative 
research involved interviews of union officials and a few randomly selected ordinary 
union members.
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CHAPTER 5 
Results: Exploratory and Descriptive Analysis
Introduction.
The next two chapters are concerned with multivariate analysis of research data aimed 
at testing the hypotheses advanced in chapter 4. All statistical analysis was done 
using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). This chapter entails a 
description of the preliminary tests done to treat missing data and to establish the 
reliability and factorial validity of the questionnaire items used in the study. This is 
followed by correlation analysis and descriptive statistics used in the initial testing of 
the study’s hypotheses. Multiple regression and path analysis were subsequently 
dealt with in chapter 6. Firstly, the procedure for dealing with missing data is 
explained.
5.1. Missing Data
Where data are missing for some individuals, the sum of the responses as an index 
was not used since the total score will not reflect the number of responses. In this 
situation, the mean score of the non-missing values was used (Cramer and Bryman, 
2001).
5.2 Reliability Analysis Scale (alpha).
The reliability of a measure refers to its consistency. This notion is often taken to 
entail two separate aspects: external and internal reliability. External reliability is the 
more common of the two meanings and refers to the degree of consistency of a 
measure over time. Internal reliability is particularly important in connection with 
multiple-item scales. It raises the question of whether each scale is measuring a
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single idea and hence whether the items that make up the scale are internally 
consistent. It is this aspect of reliability that we are concerned with.
A number of procedures for estimating internal reliability exists two of which can 
readily be computed in SPSS. First, with split-half reliability, the items in a scale are 
divided into two groups and the relationships between respondent’s scores for the two 
halves are computed. A correlation coefficient is then generated which varies 
between 0 and 1 and the nearer the result is to 1 -  and preferably at or over 0.8 -  the 
more internally reliable is the scale. The second and widely used one is called 
Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha essentially calculates the average of all 
possible split-half reliability coefficients. The rule of thumb is that the result should 
be 0.8 or above. Both split-halves and alpha estimates can be readily calculated with 
SPSS and since it is the most currently widely used, Cronbach ’s alpha was employed. 
The results are presented in table 5.1..
Table 5.1 Reliability coefficients
Variable N  of Items N of Cases Alpha
Union Participation 4 316 .7909
Union Commitment 3 311 .8314
Union Instrumentality 6 314 .8405
Satisfaction with management 3 314 .7847
Socialisation experience 2 315 .5506
Satisfaction with union 3 314 .7195
leadership 
Marxist beliefs 2 315 .5516
Job satisfaction 3 309 .7478
As can be seen from the table, the results suggest that all measures (with the exception 
of the ones for socialisation experience and Marxist beliefs) demonstrate internal
reliability. Initially there were five items constituting the union commitment scale, 
but one item was removed in order to boost its reliability. The reliability coefficient 
for union commitment was initially .6015, but deleting the said item increased its 
reliability to .8314. Thus one advantage of using the SPSS for reliability tests is its 
ability to spot ‘rogue’ items thereby improving overall scale reliability.
The low alphas recorded by socialisation experience and Marxist beliefs might not be 
unconnected with the small number of items. But this situation does not necessarily 
call for a discarding of the scales in question, but rather for an exercise of caution in 
interpreting eventual outcomes in the final analysis. It will be recalled that at the 
methodology stage, a trade off was done between obtaining a good response rate and 
having a lengthy questionnaire since it was generally observed that Nigerian 
respondents do not respond very well to lengthy questionnaires (Matanmi, 1992). .
5.3. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis is primarily concerned with describing the variation or variance which 
is shared by the scores of people on three or more items. Items which go together 
constitute a factor and factor analysis refers to a number of related statistical 
techniques which helps us to determine them. They assess the degree to which items 
are tapping the same concept. If people respond in similar ways to questions 
concerning two different concepts, this may imply that the two concepts are not seen 
as being conceptually distinct. If however their answers are unrelated, this could 
suggest that two concepts can be distinguished.
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In other words, factor analysis makes it possible to assess the factorial validity of the 
questions which make up our scales by telling us the extent to which they seem to be 
measuring the same concepts or variables. Factor analysis has been aimed at trying to 
make sense of the bewildering complexity of social behavior by reducing it to a more 
limited number of factors. A good example of this is the factor analytic approach to 
the description of personality by Psychologists such as Eysenck and Cattell (Eysenck 
and Eysenck, 1969; Cattell, 1973).
The initial step in conducting a factor analysis using SPSS is to compute a correlation 
matrix for all the items which make up the scales of all the variables under 
investigation. If there are no significant correlations between these items, then this 
means that they are unrelated and that we would not expect them to form one or more 
factors. In other words, it would not be worthwhile to go on to conduct a factor 
analysis. Consequently this is the first stage in deciding whether to carry one out.
The correlation matrix for the items used in the study shows that all but very few of 
the items are significantly correlated, either positively or negatively, which suggests 
that they may constitute one or more factors.
The reliability of the factors emerging from a factor analysis depends on the size of 
the sample although there is no consensus on what the size of the sample should be. 
There is agreement, however, that there should be more participants than variables. 
Gorsuch (1983) proposed an absolute minimum of five participants per variable and 
no fewer than 100 participants per analysis. It has also been suggested that if the 
main purpose of the study is to find out what factors underlie a group of variables, it is
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essential that the sample should be sufficiently large to enable this to be done reliably 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2001). The sample size (n =317) is considerably large enough.
The difference between principal-components analysis and principal-axis factoring 
lies essentially in how they handle unique variance. In principal components analysis, 
all the variance of a score or variable is analyzed, including its unique variance. In 
other words, it is assumed that the test used to assess the variable is perfectly reliable 
and without error. In principal-axis factoring, only the variance which is common to 
or shared by the tests is analyzed -  that is an attempt is made to exclude unique 
variance from the analysis.
The first factors extracted from an analysis are those which account for the maximum 
amount of variance. To increase the interpretability of factors, they are rotated to 
maximize the loadings of some of the items. These items can then be used to identify 
the meaning of the factor. In general the meaning of a factor is determined by the 
items which load most highly on it. Which item to ignore when interpreting a factor 
is arguable. Conventionally, items or variables which correlate less than 0.3 with a 
factor are omitted from consideration since they account for less than 9 per cent of the 
variance and so are not very important. Many researchers emphasize all loadings in 
excess of 0.3 regardless of whether any variables are thereby implicated in more than 
one factor (Bryman and Cramer, 2001, pg. 268).
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Tab e 5.2 Total Variance Explained
Initial
Eigenvalues
Extraction 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings
Factor Total % of Cumulative Total % of Cumulative Total
Variance % Variance %
1 7.690 27.465 27.465 7.259 25.926 25.926 5.219
2 2.595 9.269 36.735 2.153 7.690 33.617 2.892
3 1.965 7.017 43.752 1.504 5.372 38.989 2.486
4 1.613 5.759 49.511 1.147 4.098 43.087 4.048
5 1.590 5.678 55.189 1.005 3.590 46.677 1.246
6 1.320 4.715 59.903 .871 3.109 49.786 4.862
7 1.132 4.043 63.946 .681 2.433 52.220 2.632
8 .908 3.244 67.190
9 .845 3.018 70.208
10 .755 2.697 72.906
11 .699 2.496 75.402
12 .643 2.297 77.699
13 .627 2.241 79.939
14 .572 2.044 81.984
15 .543 1.940 83.924
16 .510 1.823 85.747
17 .473 1.688 87.435
18 .450 1.609 89.044
19 .421 1.505 90.549
20 .386 1.378 91.927
21 .367 1.310 93.237
22 .327 1.169 94.406
23 .307 1.095 95.500
24 .293 1.047 96.547
25 .267 .955 97.502
26 .257 .917 98.419
27 .229 .816 99.235
28 .214 .765 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
The initial factors produced by a principal-components analysis of all the 
questionnaire items and the amount of the variance they account for (their 
eigenvalue) are presented in tables 5.2. The variance accounted for by the first factor 
is 7.690 or 27.5 per cent of the total variance. The total variance explained by the 
seven factors is 7 (i.e. the sum of their eigenvalues). To work out the proportion 
accounted for by any one factor, we divide its eigenvalue by the sum of the 
eigenvalues and multiply by 100 to covert it to a percentage. Thus the proportion of
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variance accounted for by the second factor is 9.26/28 multiplied by 100 equals 9.2
percent.
T able 5.3 Structure M atrix Factor
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Union commitment4
Union commitmentl
Union commitmnent2
Union commitment3
Job satisfactions
Life Satisfaction
Job Satisfaction 1
Job Satisfaction 2
Satisfaction with management2
Satisfaction with management 1
Satisfaction with management 3
Union participation 1
Union participation 3
Union participation 2
Union participation4
Socialization experience 2
Socialization experience 1
Marxist beliefs2
Marxist beliefsl
Union-Politics orientation
Union instrumentality3
Union instrumentality2
Union instrumentality4
Union instrumentalityl
Union instrumentality5
Satisfaction with union Ieadership2
Satisfaction with union leadership 1
Satisfaction with union leadership 3
.834
.776
.764
.665
.801
.755
.677
.598
.756
.735
.729
.831
.697
.655
.588
.486
.373
.669
.560
.424
.846
.781
.762
.705
.654
.698
.628
.533
In interpreting the loadings, cognizance is first taken of the structure of the loadings 
which is indicative of the pattern of responses to the various individual items. The 
table (5.3) shows the oblique rotation produced by the oblimum method and the 
unique variance each factor contributes to a variable. All items above 0.3 have been 
emphasized in keeping with research traditions (Bryman and Cramer, 2001). Union 
commitment items appear to contribute to most of the variance overall, followed by
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job and life satisfaction items, satisfaction with management items, union 
participation items, Marxist beliefs and union-politics orientation items, union 
instrumentality items, and satisfaction with union leadership items, in that order. All 
the items load under different factors thus suggesting that they are factorially distinct 
hence we can be reasonably confident about the factorial validity of the items.
5.4. Correlation
The idea of correlation is one of the most important and basic in the elaboration of 
bivariate relationships. Measures of correlation indicate both the strength and the 
direction of the relationship between a pair of variables. Correlation entails the 
provision of a yardstick whereby the intensity or strength of a relationship can be 
gauged. To provide such estimates, correlation coefficients are calculated. These 
provide succinct assessments of the closeness of a relationship among pairs of 
variables. When variables are interval/ratio, by far the most common measure of 
correlation is Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient often referred to as 
Pearson’s r. This measure of correlation presumes that interval variables are being 
used so that even ordinal variables are not supposed to be employed, although some 
have debated this (O’Brien, 1979).
Pearson’s r allows the strength and direction of linear relationships between variables 
to be gauged. Pearson’s r varies between -1 and +1. A relationship o f-1 or +1 
would indicate a perfect relationship, negative or positive respectively, between 
variables. The complete absence of a relationship would engender a computed r of 
zero. The closer r is to 1 (whether positive or negative), the stronger the relationship 
between two variables. The nearer r is to zero (and hence the further it is from +1 or -
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1), the weaker the relationship. The test of significance of r indicates whether a 
correlation could have arisen by chance (that is sampling error) or whether it is likely 
to exist in the population from which the sample was selected. It gives an idea how 
likely it is that we might conclude from sample data that there is a relationship 
between two variables when there is no relationship between them in the population. 
Before proceeding to describe the correlation results, it should be noted that 
correlation is not the same as cause. It cannot be determined from an estimate of 
correlation that one estimate causes the other, since correlation only provides 
estimates of covariance, that is, that two variables are related.
Table 5.4 C orrelations
Kfl
UI
SM .255**
.000
SUL
SOEXP
.455**
.000
.321**
.000
.349**
.000
.149**
.008
.389**
.000
MAXBEL .128*
.023
.041**
.472
.085
.129
.033
.556
JOBSAT .245**
.000
.313**
.000
.183**
.001
.262**
.000
-.024
.667
UP .416**
.000
.136*
.015
**o 
o
ir-) 
O
 
 ^
O .349**
.000
.080
.157
.176**
.002
UC .735**
.000
.266**
.000
.744**
.000
.438**
.000
.061
.275
.204**
.000
.438**
.000
UPO .245**
.000
.050
.381
.193**
.001
.232**
.000
.285**
.000
.140*
.013
.262**
.000
.186**
.001
SATLIFE .099
.080
0.74
.191
0.51
.367
.177**
.002
.057
.315
.606**
.000
.113**
.045
.097
.085
.099
.080
MEAN 
STD DEV.
29.87
4.98
8.49
2.92
10.02
2.81
5.47
1.66
7.90
1.74
10.88
3.82
7.72
2.38
10.53
3.25
2.67
1.37
3.18
1.52
Upper figure = correlation coefficient; lower figure = significance 
"""Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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Definition o f  Labels
UI = Union instrumentality
SM  = Satisfaction with management
SUL = Satisfaction with union leadership
SOEXP = Early union socialization experience
MAXBEL = Marxist beliefs
JOBS AT  = Job satisfaction
UP = Union Participation
UC = Union commitment
UPO = Union-politics orientation
SATLIFE = Satisfaction with life
In Table 5.4 Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the variables are presented. It was 
hypothesized in chapter 4 that there will be significant relationship between the 
dependent variables and the independent variables in the model. From the correlation 
results, the process of verifying the extent to which the assertions have been supported 
is embarked upon. In determining when a correlation can be regarded as large,
Cohen and Holiday (1982) suggest the following: 0.19 and below is very low; 0.20 to 
0.39 is low; 0.40 to 0.69 is modest; 0.70 to 0.89 is high. However these are rules of 
thumb and should not be regarded as definite indications, since there are hardly any 
guidelines for interpretation over which there is substantial consensus (Bryman and 
Cramer, 2001). The results are presented under the dependent variables of union 
commitment and union participation.
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Union Commitment
There is a significant positive correlation between job satisfaction and union 
commitment (r = 0.20, p < .000). This suggests that if members are dissatisfied with 
their working conditions (e.g. salary), this may not necessarily mean the situation will 
lead to members becoming loyal or committed towards their unions. Similarly, the 
relationship between union commitment and satisfaction with management is 
significant and positive (r = .27, p < .000). But there is no significant relationship 
between life satisfaction and union commitment (.097, p <. 085).
Union instrumentality correlates significantly with union commitment (r = 0.73, p < 
.000). This result indicates that members who have a positive instrumental notion of 
their unions or feel that their unions are capable of achieving desired objectives are 
more likely to express positive feelings of loyalty or take pride in their unions. The 
extent to which members understood the goals of the unions and the amount of 
support and encouragement they received from members when they first joined the 
unions is significantly related to their union commitment (r = 0.43, p < .000). Thus, 
the early social influences that the members received from other union members seem 
capable of influencing the formers’ sense of commitment to the union.
Union leadership attitude (satisfaction with union leadership) is significantly related 
to union commitment thus suggesting that the extent to which members perceive their 
leaders to be responsible, united and democratic is significantly related to the former’s 
expression of loyalty (r = 0.74, p <. 000) thus suggesting that members’ leadership 
attitudes are capable of influencing members commitment to their unions. Union- 
politics orientation has a significant correlation coefficient of .18 (p < 0.01). By
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implication, members’ preference with regards to their unions’ forming or not 
forming a political party appear to be related to their union commitment. Conversely, 
members’ Marxist beliefs and their loyalty to the union appear not to be related (r =. 
06, p < .15).
Union Participation
The correlation between union participation and job satisfaction was positive and 
statistically significant (r =0.18, p < .002) suggesting that involvement in union 
activities may not necessarily be associated with workers ‘discontent. But this could 
also mean that when members are satisfied with their unions’ ability to secure 
improved wages and better working conditions, they are encouraged to participate in 
union activities.
There is a significant correlation between satisfaction with management and union 
participation (0.14, p < .01). There is thus a suggestion that the notion that workers 
who are not pleased with management will tend to become involved in union 
activities may not hold true for the Nigerian sample. It could well be that members 
are committed to both their unions as well as their organisations (dual commitment). 
However this is a suggestion rather than a conclusion.
The correlation coefficient of perception of union instrumentality and union 
participation is significant (r = 0.41 ,P <  .000). This suggests that members who 
perceive the unions as capable of fighting for their rights are also the ones more likely 
to participate in union activities. Similarly, early union socialization experience is 
significantly related to union participation (r = 0.34, p < .000). This implies that
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members who had good early socialisation experience with their unions are also more 
likely to engage in union activities. In other words, members’ union participation 
may be enhanced if new members are exposed to the unions at the early stage of their 
joining.
There is a significant positive correlation between the way members perceive their 
leaders (satisfaction with union leadership) and the extent of the latter’s involvement 
in their union activities (r = 0.45, p < .000). Thus, pro-leadership attitudes may 
induce the tendency to be involved in union activities. The correlation coefficients 
for union-politics orientation and Marxist beliefs are 0.26 (p < .000) and 0.08 (p <.
15) respectively. This means that there could be an association between membership 
participation in union activities and member’s orientation or preference with regards 
to whether they would want their unions to form a political party or not but no 
association between the former and Marxist beliefs.
Lastly, the hypothesis linking the two dependent variables within the model was 
considered. It can be seen that the correlation coefficient for union commitment and 
union participation is 0.44 and this relationship is significant at the .000 level. This 
suggests that there is a positive relationship between the two variables in the model. 
Thus feelings of commitment to the union are related to participation in union 
activities for the Nigerian sample; members who express feelings of pride towards 
their unions and are proud of its achievements are also more likely to participate in 
their unions’ activities. At this stage, it is apparent that some of the hypothesised 
relationships are very strong judging from a relative comparison of the size of the 
correlation coefficients. Starting with the dependent variable of union commitment,
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they include union instrumentality perception (.66), satisfaction with union leadership 
(.55) and early union socialisation experiences (.44). In the case of union 
participation, a similar pattern appears to emerge: union instrumentality perception 
(.42), satisfaction with union leadership (.45), early union socialisation experiences 
(.35). There is also a confirmation of the hypothesis of union attitudes acting as 
moderators within the model.
5.5. Moderated Relationships: Union Attitudes
Partial correlation co-efficients were computed to test for the hypothesis that union 
attitudes will moderate the relationships between union commitment and participation 
as well as the relationship between the former and other antecedent variables within 
the model (tables A5.1 to 5.3). Partial correlation coefficient tests for spuriousness, 
intervening variables, multiple causation and moderated relationships (Bryman and 
Cramer, 2001 p. 247). A summary of the results of the analysis are presented in table
5.5. The role of union attitudes in straightening the union commitment-union 
participation link is demonstrated. When all factors were controlled, the original 
correlation coefficient between union commitment and union participation (.43) was 
significantly weakened (.07). Similarly, controlling for the individual factors exerted a 
significant reduction effect on the relationships with union participation and union 
commitment. The only exception being union socialization experience of which its 
control did not appear to have any major impact.
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Table 5.5 Union attitude factors as moderators in the model
Variables Correlation/? 
(Table 5.4)
Partial Correlation Coefficients controlling for
UT, SUL, SOEXP UI SUL SOEXP
UC/UP .43 .07
UC/UI .73 .45 .69
UC/SUL .74 .47 .71
UC/SOEXP .43 .16 .22
UI/SOEXP .34 .20
SUL/SOEXP .38 .07
SUL/UI .45 .66
5.6. Preliminary Analysis on Demographic Variables
In this section, the assumptions relating to demographic variables are tested by first 
using T statistics (independent samples t test) and F statistics (one-way analysis of 
variance). These data analysis aim to show if there is any significant difference in 
mean union commitment and mean union participation between males and females, 
northerners and southerners, public sector and private sector union members. F test 
(one-way ANOVA) is used to check for significant group differences in mean union 
loyalty and mean union participation for membership tenure, age and educational 
status for the respondents.
Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics for demographic variables (gender and sector)
Union Participation Means Standard Deviation Statistics
Male 8.40 2.45 T= 2.84 (P <.01)
Female 7.51 2.30
Private sector 8.75 2.27 T= 2.92 (P <.01)
Public sector 7.70 2.39
Union Commitment
Means Standard Deviation Statistics
Private 13.9563 4.71866 T = 1.95 (P <.04)
Public 14.8735 4.80776
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The results indicate that although there are variations across groups on union 
commitment, the only one that appears to be significant is sector; no significant 
differences emerged for the remaining demographic variables (tables A5.4 and A5.5). 
This suggests a partial support for the hypothesis that union participation will be 
influenced by demographic variables. Descriptive analysis carried out to explore 
mean score differences on gender and sector for the two dependent variables in the 
model show that males participate more in union activities than females and members 
in the private sector had significantly higher scores than their public sector 
counterparts on union participation but the latter did significantly better on union 
commitment (table 5.6).
Summary
In this chapter an exploration of research data was done including the validating of the 
study’s hypotheses, which were advanced in chapter 4 using correlation analysis and 
descriptive statistics. The exploration procedure entailed the use of reliability and 
factor analysis and the outcomes indicate that the research instrument used for the 
study can be relied upon. The results of correlation analysis suggest that there are 
significant relationships between the dependent variables and most of the independent 
variables. However, strong relationships were found mainly between the dependent 
variables and union characteristics variables namely union instrumentality perception, 
satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialisation experiences.
The significant correlation between union participation and union commitment also 
means that the study’s hypothesis in this respect has some support. Furthermore, 
partial correlations tests suggest that union attitudes moderate the relationship 
between union commitment and union participation as well the relationship between
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union commitment and the former. Descriptive statistics involving the demographic 
variables suggest that for union commitment, none of the variables is significant 
except for sector. The mean score of public sector members was significantly higher 
than for public sector members. Gender and sector provided a significant source of 
variance to union participation. Males scored significantly higher than females while 
private sector union members scored significantly higher than their public sector 
counterparts. Overall, there is partial support for the study’s hypotheses concerning 
union commitment and union participation.
168
CHAPTER 6 
Results: Multiple Regression Analysis
Introduction.
Regression is one of the most widely used techniques in the analysis of data in the 
social sciences and has been described as a powerful tool for summarizing the nature 
of the relationships between variables and for making predictions of likely values of 
the dependent variable. Standardized regression coefficients are compared to 
determine the relative importance of independent variables. They essentially indicate 
how many standard deviation units the dependent variable will change for one 
standard deviation change in the independent variable.
The idea of regression is to summarize the relationship between two variables by 
producing the line of best fit i.e. a line that fits the data closely. Once the line of best 
fit is known, predictions can be made about likely values of the dependent variable, 
for particular values of the independent variable. Multiple regression is used 
particularly when more than three variables are involved. Its analysis is eminently 
suited for analyzing the collective and separate effects of two or more independent 
variables on a dependent variable.
In this section, the main task was to conduct multiple regression analysis for the two 
dependent variables in the model using mainly the optimal scaling regression 
procedure. Optimal scaling method of regression was used because of the arbitrary 
nature of category coding of demographic variables within the sample (e.g. gender, 
sector, ethnic group). Regression with optimal scaling transforms categorical data by
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assigning numerical values to all the categories, resulting in an optimal linear 
regression equation for the transformed variables (Meulman and Heiser, 1999). The 
method offers three scaling levels for each variable and using non-linear 
transformations allow variables to be analyzed at a variety of levels to find the best- 
fitting model. Union commitment was first regressed on all the independent variables 
and the procedure was repeated for union participation.
Table 6.1 Regression Models
Union Participation Union Commitment
Variables P F Std error P F Std error
Union commitment .206* 16.618 .051 - - -
Union Instrumentality .381 53.168 .052 .466* 145.6 .039
Satisfaction with Management -9.304E-02 3.802 .048 1.630E-02 .184 .037
Satisfaction with Union leaders .341* 58.020 .049 .348* 77.10 .040
Socialization Experience .155 11.102 .049 .129* 10.114 .040
Marxist Beliefs 022E-02 1.506 .046 7.033E-02 3.335 .039
Job Satisfaction -7.756 2.794 .054 -6.004E-02 2.284 .040
Ethnicity 2.726E-02 .346 .046 -6.575E-03 3.075E-02 .037
Gender .148* 7.399 .046 1.531E-02 .174 .037
Educational Background 6.504E-02 1.987 .046 -5.068E-02 1.909 .037
Age -4.51E-02 .831 .050 9.730E-03 7.016E-02 .037
Membership Tenure -7.756E-02 2.611 .048 3.244E-02 .040 .040
Sector 2.78* 10.849 .046 .157* 14.941 .041
Satisfaction with Life 6.285e-03 1.462E-02 .052 -6.118E-02 3.370E-02 .038
Union-Politics Orientation 4.105e-02 .777 .047 6.507E-02 2.808 .039
Multiple R .668 .803
R square .445 .645
Adjusted R square .417 .627
Sum of squares 297.0 297.00
df 14 14
Mean square 9.43 13.68
F 16.119 36.57
Significance .000 .000
6.1 Multiple Regression Results
The results of the multiple regression for the model (union participation and union 
commitment) on all the hypothesised antecedents are presented in table 6.1. In line 
with the correlation results from the previous chapter, union instrumentality, 
satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialisation experiences seemed to
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be of greater consequence in the model. Other factors such as Marxist beliefs, life 
satisfaction, job satisfaction, and union-politics orientation were not statistically 
significant. For union participation, around 44 percent of the variation in union 
participation was due to the transformed predictors and the main significant predictors 
are union commitment (20 percent), union instrumentality (38 percent), satisfaction 
with union leadership (34 percent), and early union socialization experiences (15 
percent). Gender (J3= .15) and sector (J3 = .27) were the only significant demographic 
variables. The same union-related factors emerged as predictors for union 
commitment with around 62 percent adjusted (R ) of the variance being explained by 
union instrumentality (J3=46%), satisfaction with union leadership (34%), early union 
socialisation experiences (J3= 12%) and sector (/?= 15%). it can be seen that around 63 
percent adjusted (R2) of the variance in union commitment was explained by union 
instrumentality (UI), satisfaction with union leadership (SUL), early union 
socialisation experiences (SOEXP) and sector. The F statisitics indicate that the result 
is significant. None of the remaining demographic variables emerged as statistically 
significant (tables A6.1 and A6.2).
The multiple regression procedure was repeated using the linear method (table A6.3). 
The reason for this is because one strong feature of the linear method of regression is 
that unlike the optimal scaling regression procedure where all variables are entered 
into the analysis, linear regression’s stepwise procedure ensures that only the 
variables which meet the program’s statistical criteria, are included in the final 
analysis. Eliminating insignificant predictors helps to improve the overall fit of our 
regression equations (Flood, 1987). However, to use this procedure, categorical 
variables had to be excluded from the analysis in order to comply with the rule that
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the relationship between the variables must be linear and the distance between them 
interval (Norusis, 2000). The results indicate that union instrumentality perception 
contributed the most variance followed by satisfaction with union leadership and early 
union socialisation experience. This result confirms the optimal scaling regression 
outcome in relation to the predictive status of the three variables in the model.
To identify the variables that are predictive of the different dimensions of union 
participation, individual items measuring the different dimensions of participation 
were regressed1 on the independent variables within the model. The dimensions of 
participation include attendance at union meetings, speaking or contributing at union 
meetings, voting at union elections and campaigning for candidates during union 
elections.
Table 6.2 Multiple regression: Union Participation scale items
Items Predictors Multiple
R
R
square
Adjusted 
Rsquare
Sun o f 
square 
s
d f Mean
square
Sig.
5. Attendance at union 
meetings
UI=.30, SUL=.30 .504 .254 .249 45.58 2 22.79 .000
6. Contribution (speaking) 
at union meetings
UI=.23, SUL=.20, 
SOEXP=. 12
.438 .192 .184 30.91 3 10.30 .042
7. Voting at union elections UI=.21,SOEXP=. 19, 
SUL=. 12
.418 .175 .167 32.90 3 10.96 .047
8. Campaigning for 
candidates during union 
elections
UI=.25, UPCK21 .366 .134 .128 22.70 2 11.35 .000
1 Demographic variables were excluded at this stage o f the analysis because they were not significant 
in the basic (combined items) multiple regression with the exception o f sector and gender (these were 
subsequently explored further). Since the initial multiple regression showed demographic factors not 
to be o f any predictive significance, the author decided to use the general linear regression (step-wise 
method) for the individual items analysis. In this method, all non significant factors are automatically 
removed from the final equation and only significant predictors are entered in the final analysis. 
Demographic factors are not best suited for this method because o f their non-linear qualities (Bryman 
and crammer, 2000). As a rule, the relationship between the variables must be linear and the distance 
between them interval (Norusis, 2000).
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A summary of the results showed that these dimensions were similarly predicted by 
union attitude factors (table 6.2). Union instrumentality perception and satisfaction 
with union leadership appear to be the main sources of variance for attendance at 
union meetings. They both contributed 30 percent to the variance in union meeting 
whose adjusted R2 is 0.25 (p < 0.000) (tables A6.4). In the case of ‘speaking or 
contributing at union meetings’ (table A6.5), the significant determinants are union 
instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union 
socialization experience, each contributing 23 percent, 20 percent and 12 percent 
respectively. A low overall fit (R2 = .18) is observed (p < .000). Voting at union 
elections (table A6 ) is shown to be mainly influenced by union instrumentality 
perception (2 1 %), satisfaction with union leadership (19%) and early union 
socialization experience (12%). Adjusted R2 is around 17 percent and result is 
significant (p < .0 0 0 ).
As far as ‘campaigning for candidates during union elections’ is concerned (table A7), 
the significant determinants are suggested as being union instrumentality (25%) 
experience and union-politics orientation (21%) (p < .000). There is a low overall fit 
(adjusted R2 = 0.13) and the possibility of multicollinearity is suggested due to the 
high tolerance figure (.95). The occurrence of union politics orientation as one of the 
determinants of ‘campaigning for candidates during union elections’ may be 
explained by the apparent association between the two variables since campaigning 
behavior may be perceived as representing some sort of ‘ political activity’. A 
significant correlation was found between union-politics orientation and members’ 
view on whether unions should form their own political party (Chi-square = 35.26; p 
< .000;N = 314) (table A6 .8 ).
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6.2. Testing for Moderated Relationships: Sector
Moderated Regression analysis was performed for sector on union commitment and 
the results are presented in table 6.3. The results indicate that in both sectors, 
instrumentality perception and union leadership satisfaction were the main predictors, 
accounting for around 70 percent (adjusted R square) of total variance in the public 
sector as against 58 per cent in the private sector (table A6.9 and A10). The 
connection between union commitment and instrumentality appeared to be stronger in 
the public sector judging from the size of the coefficients.
Table 6.3 Moderated regression: Sector and UC
Union Commitment Predictors Multiple
R
R
square
Adjusted 
Rsquare
Sig.
Private sector UI= .27, SUL=.54 .768 .590 .580 .01
Public sector UI=. .55, SUL=.36 .8 4 3 .710 .705 .00
To examine whether the relationship between union commitment and the antecedent 
variables of instrumentality perception and union leadership satisfaction differed 
across sector, contingency tables were generated, holding sector constant. Before 
doing this, the non-categorical variables were first dichotomised using a median split. 
The results (tables A6.11 and A6.12) indicate that sector is not a moderator in the 
relationship between union commitment and the antecedents of union instrumentality 
and union leadership satisfaction. In both sectors, low instrumentality and low 
positive leadership attitudes tended to be associated with low commitment and vice- 
versa and the chi square results indicate that the results are significant.
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6.3. Testing for moderated Relationships: Gender
This section includes T test, Chi square analysis and moderated multiple regressions 
for males and females on the dimensions of union participation. Table 6 . 6  shows that 
men perform significantly better than females with respect to overall union 
participation and the result is significant.
Table 6.6 T test for gender on union participation
___ 1 gender _NJ Mean
. . . .  t  j
Std. Deviation. Std. Error Mean
UP male : 244! 5.40 ___2.838__ j ___2.454___|____ .147 !
1 female , 73 | 4.51 I _________!__ 2.301___ .147____ |
(P < 0.005)
Cross tabulations of gender and dimensions of union participation (tables A6.13 to 
A6.16) indicate that men are more likely to attend union meetings (p < .02) contribute 
at union meetings (p <. 006) as well as campaign for candidates at union elections (p 
< .09). Men also seem more likely to vote than women during union elections 
although the chi-square value is not significant. Men perform significantly better than 
women on all the dimensions of union participation except for voting in union 
elections.
To find out whether men and women will be significantly different in terms of the 
antecedents of the different dimensions of union participation, moderated regression 
analysis was carried out (tables A6.17 to A6.24). Males and females had similar 
predictor variables for attendance at union meetings. In both cases, union 
instrumentality perception and satisfaction with union leadership were the significant 
predictors although there were differences in their adjusted R2s (males = .32, female
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= .22) indicating that males had the better fit. Predictor variables for contributing at 
union meetings for males and females were different; for males, the predictors were 
satisfaction with union leadership (2 2 %), early union socialisation experience (2 0 %) 
and union instrumentality perception (20%). Female members on the other hand had 
early union socialization experience as the sole predictor. The adjusted R for 
females is less than 1 0  percent compared to 2 2  percent for males and a high tolerance 
level is observed for the former suggesting the presence of multicollinearity.
Voting at union elections, for females, is predicted by satisfaction with union 
leadership (35%) and union instrumentality perception (26%) (adjusted R = .272). 
Males on the other hand have union instrumentality perception (20%), early union 
socialisation experience (17%) and satisfaction with union leadership (.16%) as 
predictors (adjusted R = .16). For men, campaigning for candidates during union 
elections is determined by satisfaction with union leadership (2 2 %) and union-politics 
orientation (2 2 %) while for women, the predictor is satisfaction with union leadership 
(42%). There is low overall fit for both sexes (male, R2= .11; female, R2 = 17). In 
essence, the moderated multiple regression results suggest that the antecedents for the 
different dimensions of participation appear to vary modestly across gender.
6.4. Testing for moderated Relationships: Sector and Gender
To find out whether sector moderates the relationship between union participation and 
gender, a contingency table was generated showing the interaction between gender, 
sector and union participation, holding sector constant (table A6.25). The result 
indicate that in both sectors, the majority of males were in the high level bracket of 
overall union participation while the majority of females were in the low level bracket.
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This result suggests that sector did not moderate the relationship between union 
participation and gender. Chi square results however show that that this result is only 
significant in the public sector.
6.5 Path Analysis
Path analysis is the final statistical method of data analysis used in the study and is 
basically an extension of the multiple regression procedure (Bryman and Cramer, 
2001). Path analysis was developed as a method for studying the direct and indirect 
effects of variables hypothesized as causes of variables treated as effects. The aim of 
path analysis is to provide quantitative estimates of the causal connections between 
sets of variables. It is not a method for discovering causes, but a method applied to a 
causal model formulated by the researcher on the basis of knowledge and theoretical 
considerations. The method of path coefficients is intended to combine the 
quantitative information given by the correlations with such qualitative information as 
may be at hand to give a quantitative interpretation (Pedhazur, 1982).
Path analysis is an important analytic tool for testing causal models. Through its 
application it is possible to test whether a specific causal model is consistent with the 
pattern of the intercorrelations among the variables (Pedhazur, 1982:614). In cases in 
which the causal relations are uncertain, the method can be used to find the logical 
consequences of any particular hypothesis in regard to them. The methods of testing 
causal models are eminently suitable for the purpose of testing alternative hypotheses 
or engaging in “strong inference” (Platt, 1964).
In using path analysis, the focus is on the three variables (union instrumentality 
perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialization
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experience) revealed by the multiple regression analysis earlier. In determining the 
causal estimates of these variables in relation with union commitment and union 
participation within the model, the author intends to elaborate on earlier findings.
Assumptions o f path analysis
Pedhazur (1982:582) identified a number of assumptions that underlie the application 
of path analysis which are as follows:
1. The relations among the variables in the model are linear, additive and causal. 
Consequently, curvilinear, multiplicative or interaction relations are excluded.
2. There is a one-way causal flow in the system. That is reciprocal causation 
between variables is ruled out.
3. The variables are measured on an interval scale. True interval variables are 
variables whose categories are rank ordered as with ordinal variable but the 
distances between the categories are equal. The other types of interval scale 
are strictly speaking ordinal, but have a large number of categories such as 
multiple-item questionnaire measures. These variables are assumed to have 
similar properties to ‘true’ interval variables.
Path Diagrams
The path diagram is a useful device for displaying graphically the pattern of casual 
relations among a set of variables; it makes explicit the likely causal connections 
between variables. Figure 6 .1 first illustrates how the causal estimates will be 
determined using union instrumentality (UI) and satisfaction with union leadership 
(SUL) as examples (the arrows indicate expected causal connections between the
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variables). The actual determination of the coefficients for the three variables (UI, 
SUL and SOEXP) was subsequently carried out as shown in fig. 6.2.
Fig. 6.1 Path diagram for Union Participation
* U I
e1 e2
P7
r1
An exogenous (independent) variable is a variable whose variability is assumed to be
determined by causes outside the causal model. Consequently, the determination of 
an exogenous variable is not under consideration in the model. An endogenous 
(dependent) variable on the other hand is one whose variation is explained by 
exogenous or endogenous variables in the system. Variables of Union Loyalty and 
Union Participation are endogenous while variables of Union Instrumentality 
Perception and Satisfaction with Union Leadership are exogenous. The correlation 
between exogenous variables is depicted by a curved line with arrow heads thus 
indicating that one variable is not conceived as being the cause of the other. 
Consequently, a relation between exogenous variables (e.g. union instrumentality and 
satisfaction with union leadership) remains unanalyzed in the system.
Paths in the form of unidirectional arrows are drawn from the variables taken as 
causes (independent) to the variables taken as effects (dependent). The two paths
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leading from UI and SUL to UL indicate that UC is dependent on UI and SUL. This 
model is unidirectional, meaning that at a given point in time a variable cannot be 
both a cause and an effect of another variable. An endogenous variable treated as 
dependent in one set of variables may also be conceived as independent in relation to 
other variables.
Thus UC is taken as dependent on UI and SUL and as one of the independent 
variables in relation to UP. Since it is almost never impossible to account for the total 
variance of a variable, residual variables (e1 and e2) are introduced to indicate the 
effect of variables not included in the model. The connection proceeds in one 
direction are viewed as making up distinct paths and path coefficients are computed 
by setting up structural equations, that is equations which stipulate the structure of 
hypothesized relationships in a model. The symbol of a path coefficient is a p. The 
essence of the computed path coefficients is now explained.
Path Coefficients
Wright (1934:162) defines a path coefficient as: the fraction of the standard deviation 
of the dependent variable for which the designated factor is directly responsible, in the 
sense of the fraction which would be found if this factor varies to the same extent as 
in the observed data while all others (including the residual factors) are constant. In 
other words, the path coefficient indicates the direct effect of a variable hypothesized 
as a cause of a variable taken as effect. When variables in a casual model are 
expressed in standardized form (z scores) and the assumptions discussed above are 
reasonably met, the coefficients turn out to be standardized regression coefficients 
(fi’s) obtained in a regression analysis. But there is an important difference between 
the two analytical approaches. In ordinary regression analysis a dependent variable is
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regressed in a single analysis on all the independent variables under consideration. In 
path analysis, on the other hand, more than one regression analysis may be called for 
(Pedhazur, 1975:587). At each stage a variable taken as dependent is regressed on 
the variables upon which it is assumed to depend.
The calculated (3's are the path coefficients for the paths leading from the particular 
set of independent variables to the dependent variable under consideration.
It has been argued that in computing path analysis with the SPSS, the critical issues to 
search for are the standardized regression coefficient for each variable (0) and the R2 
(for the error term paths). Since the path coefficients are standardized, it is possible to 
compare them directly. The postulated paths are shown in figure 6.2 below.
Figure 6.2. Path diagram for Union participation
P8
UC UP
SUL
SOEXP
In order to provide coefficient estimates of each of the postulated paths shown in 
figure 6.2, we first need to conduct standardized regressions from two equations. The 
equations are shown below:
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1. UC — a + jciUI + *2 SUL + X3SOEXP + e\
2. UP = a + *iUI + *2SUL + x3SOEXP + X4UC + ei
Subsequent to this, we compare the total causal effects of union instrumentality 
perception, union leadership satisfaction, early union socialization experience and 
union loyalty. The reason for this is to be able to identify the variable that is 
relatively speaking, the most influential for union participation. In essence, the aim is 
to be able to advance the most likely causes of union loyalty and union participation. 
The total effect will be made up of the direct effect plus the total indirect effect. Thus 
the total effect of each of the four variables (from fig.7.2 ) on union participation 
would be as follows:
Total effect of Union instrumentality perception (UI) = (pi) + (p2)(p3)
Total effect of Satisfaction with Union leadership (SUL) = (ps) + (p4 )(p3)
Total effect of Early Union Socialization Experience (SOEXP) = (p7) + (p6)(p3)
Total effect of Union Loyalty (UC) = P3
These four total effects will afterwards be compared to establish which has the 
greatest overall effect on union participation.
Equation 1
UC = a + xiUI + X2 SUL + X3SOEXP + e\
Equation 2.
UP — a + jcjUI + X2 SUL + X3 SOEXP + X4UC + € 2
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Subsequent regression analysis (tables A6.26 and 6.27) show that the standardised 
coefficients for UI, SUL and SOEXP are .419, .246 and .150 respectively and the R2 
is .425. Thus for P2 ,P 4 ,P 6 , and pg in the path diagram (fig. 6.3) we 
substitute .42, .25, .15 and 0.76 (the latter being the square root of 1 -  0.425). This is 
the amount of error arising from the variance in union loyalty not explained by union 
instrumentality, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialization 
experience. The standardised coefficients for UI, SUL, SOEXP and UC 
are .294, .182, .069, and .152 respectively and the R2 is .298 (table A6.27). Again we 
substitute in the path diagram (fig. 6.3) pj, ps, p?, p 3  andpg for 0.29, 0.18, 0.07, 0.15 
and 0.84 (the latter being the square root of 1 -  0.298). This is the amount of error 
arising from the variance in union participation not explained by union 
instrumentality, satisfaction with union leadership, early union socialization 
experience and union loyalty.
Figure 6.3 Path diagrams for union participation with coefficients
0.76 32
0.84
0.42 0.29
UC UP0.32
0.34
0.25
.18
SUL
0.3S 0 . 0 '
0.15>
SOEXP
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From the path diagram (fig. 6.3), there is a suggestion that the pattern in which the 
independent variables are related to the two dependent variables is similar. That is to 
say that UI, SUL and SOEXP all have higher causal estimates to UC than they do to 
Union participation. The R for UC is higher than the one for UP, conversely, the 
error estimate for union participation is higher than the one for UC. SOEXP appears 
not be very effective in influencing UP, but it does exert an indirect effect via its 
association with SUL (0.39) and UI (0.34) and its direct effect on UC (0.15). The 
variable that seems to have the greatest effect on UC is UI (0.42). The result suggests 
that 42 percent of the variance in the former is accounted for by UI. SUL is next most 
influential variable in influencing UC, accounting for around 25 percent of total 
variance.
For UP, UI is again the most influential independent variable accounting for 29% of 
total variance. SUL is also next with 18% of total variance; followed by UC with 
15% and SOEXP with 7%. UI and SUL also exert indirect effects on union 
participation through their significant relationships with each other as well their 
relationship with SOEXP. The next stage is now to sum up the total effect of each 
independent variable in the model in order to find out which has the most effect on 
Union Participation. The fact that we have other variables impacting on UP and UC, 
but which were not included in the path diagram is denoted by the unexplained 
variance of 0.84 and 0.76 for Up and UC respectively. The total effect exerted by 
union instrumentality perception (UI) in the model can be summed up as follows:
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UI = (pi) + (P2XP3)
= 0.29 + (.42)(.15)
= 0.29 + .063 
= 0.35
The total effect of Satisfaction with Union Leadership (SUL) is as follows:
SUL = (p5) + (p4)(p3>
= 0.18 + (0.25)(0.15)
= 0.18+ .0375 
=  0.22
The total effect of early union socialization experience can be summed up as follows:
SOEXP = (p7) + (p6)(p3)
= 0.07 + (0.15)(0.15)
= 0.07 + 0.023 
= 0.09
The total effect of UC in the model is 
UC = 0.15
According to the path analysis results, perception of union instrumentality has the 
greatest overall effect on union participation (0.35) followed by satisfaction with 
union leadership (0.22) and union loyalty (0.15). Early union socialization experience
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exerts the least effect on union participation (0.09). This result is consistent with the 
multiple regression procedures, which shows a similar hierarchical pattern of 
influence.
Limitations o f path analysis (Bryman and Cramer, 2001 p. 214).
Although path analysis is very useful, certain limitations inherent in the technique 
needs mentioning. Basically, path analysis cannot confirm the underlying causal 
structure. It informs us of the relative impact of the variables upon each other but 
unfortunately cannot validate that causal structure. Since a cause must precede an 
effect, the time order of variables must be established in the construction of a path 
diagram. Invariably, our commonsense notions about the likely sequence of the 
variables in the real world are inevitably reliant on theoretical ideas. And sometimes 
these conceptions of time ordering of variables will be faulty and the ensuing path 
diagram may consequently be misleading. Furthermore, the possible confounding 
influence of other variables not included in the model (residual estimates) makes it 
necessary to tread cautiously when interpreting these results.
6.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, multiple regression analysis was used to investigate the validity of this 
study’s hypotheses. The multiple regression procedures suggest that union attitudes 
exert the most influence over the union commitment process. Specifically, union 
instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership, and early union 
socialisation experiences predicted union commitment and union participation for the 
Nigerian sample. The results support existing findings which suggest that when 
members have a positive perception of the instrumentality of their unions, they are
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also more likely to express feelings of loyalty towards their union ( Fullgar and 
Barling, 1989; Kelloway et al, 1990). Also members who have positive attitudes 
towards their union leaders are also more likely to be committed to their unions 
(Kuruvilla, 1995; Snape and Chan, 2000) while those exposed to their union’s goals 
and objectives and are assisted by older members at the early stages of their 
membership are more likely to become committed to their unions (Van Maanen and 
Schein, 1979; Gordon et al, 1980).
Union commitment differed significantly across the two sectors with members in the 
public sector expressing higher level of union commitment compared to their private 
sector counterparts. In both sectors, high levels of instrumentality and positive 
leadership attitudes were associated with high levels of union commitment while low 
levels of the variables were associated with low levels of union commitment. This 
result seems to support the argument that differences in effectiveness of unions across 
sector (Marki and Ignace, 1990) could influence members’ level of commitment in 
these sectors.
The significant influence of gender on union participation supports Gordon et al, 
(1980) and Gallagher and Clark, (1989). Males were more likely to participate in 
union activities than females; males were more likely to attend meetings, speak at 
meetings, and campaign for candidates during election periods. There is however no 
support for any suggestion that males perform better than females when it comes to 
voting in union elections. Males and females’ attendance at meetings appear to be 
fuelled by their instrumental perception of their unions as well as their pro-union 
leadership attitudes. For male members, speaking or contributing at union meetings
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seemed to be influenced by these same considerations, except that their early 
socialisation experience also contributed significantly to this tendency. In the case of 
female members, contributing at meetings was influenced mainly by their early union 
socialisation experiences. The tendency to vote in union elections -  for both sexes - 
was arguably predicated on the kind of attitudes or opinion the members have of 
union leaders as well as the former’ s perception of the instrumentality of their unions. 
In addition - for men in particular - early union socialisation experiences is a 
significant contributory factor.
Majority of both males and females had never campaigned for candidates during 
union elections suggesting that only a few ‘politically oriented’ members engage in 
this activity; men were more likely to be in this category. For both male and female 
union members, attitudes towards union leaders are a determinant of the decision to 
campaign for candidates at union elections. Gender appeared to moderate the 
relationship between the antecedents of the different dimensions of participation and 
union participation although this moderation may be regarded as modest.
The results found no significant relationship between union commitment and 
education thus supporting Fukami and Larson (1984) and Magenau et al, 1988). 
Similarly, no significant association was found between union commitment and age 
which corroborates earlier findings (Bemmels, 1995; Deery et al, 1994). The non­
significance of job satisfaction supports the findings of Barling et al (1990) and Deery 
et al, (1994). The result concerning Marxist beliefs contradicts the findings of 
Fullager and Barling (1989) which purport that Marxist-related work beliefs are 
stronger predictors of union commitment among black disenfranchised workers.
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The hypothesised relationship between union commitment and union participation 
was confirmed and supports Bamberger et al. (1999) and Fullager and Barling’s 
(1989) findings that commitment to the union is a key antecedent of the willingness to 
participate actively in the union. Union commitment, occupying the role of an 
intervening variable in the model predicted union participation for the Nigerian 
sample. Multiple regression outcomes for the dimensions of union participation 
revealed the determinants to include union instrumentality perception, satisfaction 
with union leadership, and early union socialisation experiences. Only campaigning 
behaviour was predicted by union-politics orientation. Union instrumentality 
perception exerted the strongest influence, producing the best prediction for overall 
union participation.
Results of tests for moderated relationships suggest that gender moderated the 
relationship between union participation and its significant antecedents. This supports 
earlier studies (Newton and Shore, 1992; Fullager and Barling, 1989). However, the 
interaction between gender and union participation appeared not to be moderated by 
sector. Although public sector union members displayed a higher means scores on 
union commitment than their private sector counterparts, analysis on union 
participation indicate that the latter performed significantly better in union 
participation. In both sectors, most members attend meetings more frequently than 
they contribute at the meetings, vote in union elections or campaign for candidates 
during elections. The path analysis results which also indicate that union 
instrumentality perception has the most overall effect on union participation, followed 
by satisfaction with union leadership and then union commitment and that these three
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factors exert both direct and indirect influence on union participation, confirms the 
multiple regression findings.
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Chapter 7 
Results: Internal Union Dynamics Analysis
Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to test the hypotheses which states that
(1) Internal union dynamics will exert a significant impact on the predictors of union 
commitment and union participation (fig. 4.3);
(2) The influence of the internal union dynamics will vary across the private and 
public sector i.e. sector will be a moderator in the model (fig. 4.4).
As fig 4.4 indicates, the predictors of UC and UP are union instrumentality (UI), 
satisfaction with union leadership (SUL) and early union socialization experience 
(SOEXP). The internal union dynamics (IUD) are represented by five items: why did 
you join your union? = Union Joining Motive (UJM); how did you become a 
member? = Influencing Agents (IA); relations between managers and the union are 
very good = Perception of Union-Management Relations (P-UMR); how are decisions 
made in your union? = Perception of Decision-Making Process (P-DMP); how well 
informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the union? = Perception 
of Information Dissemination (P-ID).
The data used in the analysis relates to the second survey (see chapter 4 under section 
4.3 for details). The rationale for this enquiry and how it relates to existing literature 
and the reason for focusing on two unions instead of the four from the first survey has 
already been explained in chapter 4 (under section 4.2). To verify the hypotheses, 
regression analysis was conducted involving the internal union dynamics, union 
commitment, union participation, union instrumentality, satisfaction with union
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leadership and early union socialisation experience (SOEXP). To test the first 
hypothesis, multiple regression was done across sector while separate multiple 
regressions were performed for private sector and public sector respondents to test for 
the second hypothesis. As this chapter is essentially concerned with verifying the two 
hypothesis mentioned above, all other statistical information and analysis which may 
be relevant but not directly essential to this objective (e.g. reliability tests, comparisons 
of correlation results of the first and second survey, analysis of raw frequencies involving 
demographic variables and IUD, etc.) can be found in the appendix section. This is to 
limit the amount of complications thereby enhancing an understanding of the chapter 
as a whole.
7.1. Results: Multiple Regression
A summary of the multiple regression results (tables A7.1 to A7.5) is shown in table
7.1. In relation to the first hypothesis, Perception of information dissemination 
contributed the most variance to union commitment (30%) and this result is 
significant. Similarly, perception of information dissemination was also the most 
influential factor for union participation, contributing around 30% of the total 
variance followed by influencing agents (19%). The level of tolerance for both 
factors however suggested the likely presence of multicollinearity (see tables A7.1 
and A7.2).
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Table 7.1 Multiple regression
Factors Predictors Multiple
R
Rsquare Adjusted 
Rsquare
Sig.
UC P-ID (.305) 
P-UMR (.117)
.330 .109 .098 .01
UP P-ID (.308) 
IA (.194)
.364 .113 .122 .00
UI P-ID (.283) 
P-UMR (.236)
.336 .113 .103 .00
SUL P-UMR (.345) 
P-ID (.280)
.411 .169 .159 .00
SOEXP P-ID (.395) 
UJM (.199)
.465 .216 .207 .00
Perceptions of union-management relations also appeared to be influential on union 
commitment although its contribution to the total variance is around 17 percent. In 
the case of union instrumentality perception, perception of information dissemination 
again appeared to be the most influencing factor (28%), followed by perception of 
union-management relations (19%). Union leadership satisfaction was influenced the 
most by members’ perception of the union-management relations (34%) followed by 
perception of information dissemination (28%). Lastly, early union socialization 
experience was mostly influenced by perception of information dissemination (39%) 
and union joining motive (19%).
Because not all the internal dynamics were of significant influence, the hypothesis 
that the internal union dynamics will be related to the main variables of the research is 
partially supported. Perception of Information Dissemination and Perception of 
Union-Management Relations contributed the most variance to union commitment 
across sectors, Perception of Information Dissemination and Influencing Agents 
contributed the most variance to Union Participation, Perception of Information 
Dissemination and Union-Management Relations contributed the most variance to
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union instrumentality perception, Perception of Union-Management Relations and 
Perception of Information Dissemination contributed the most variance to union 
leadership satisfaction while perception of Information Dissemination and Union 
Joining Motive contributed the most variance to early union socialisation experience.
Table 7.2 moderated regression results.
Both Sectors Private Sector Public Sector
R R2 Predictors R R2 Predictors R R2 Predictors
UC .330 .109
P-ID (.305), 
P-UMR 
(.177)
.443 .197 P-ID (.443) .301 .090 P-ID (.213), 
IA (.206)
UP .364 .133 P-ID (.308), 
IA (.194)
.270 .073 P-ID (.270) .376 .141 P-ID (.312), 
IA (.210)
UI .336 .113 P-ID (.304),
P-UMR
(.195)
.474 .225 P-ID (.474) .256 .066 P-ID (.214)
SUL .411 .169 P-UMR
(.345),
P-ID (.280)
.446 .199 P-ID (.334), 
P-UMR(.269)
.419 .176 P-UMR
(.367),
P-ID (.308)
SOEXP .465 .216 P-ID (.395), 
UJM(.199).
.540 .292 P-ID (.333), 
UJM (.292), 
P-UMR 
(.217).
.472 .223 P-ID (.364),
P-UMR
(.225)
To test for the second hypothesis, moderated multiple regression was conducted. A 
summary of the results (table A7.6 to A7.15) presented in table 7.2 indicate that sector 
seems to moderate the relationship between internal union dynamics and union 
commitment, union participation, union instrumentality, satisfaction with union 
leadership and early union socialization experience. In both sectors, combined 
regression showed that Perception of Information Dissemination featuring 
consistently as a predictor often combining with other internal union dynamics. But 
when regressed separately, there appears to be differences in predictors across the 
sectors both in terms of type of internal union dynamics and their relative beta values.
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For example, predictors of union commitment in the public sector included 
Influencing Agents while private sector only had Perception of Information 
Dissemination although the general multiple regression results indicate that 
Perception of Information Dissemination and Perception of union Management 
Relations were the predictors for union commitment. Similarly, the predictors in 
both sectors for union leadership satisfaction were Perception of Information 
Dissemination and Perception of union Management Relations, but while the latter 
had the higher beta value in the public sector, it was vice versa for the former. The 
results suggest that sector moderates the relationship between the Internal Union 
Dynamics and the other variables under investigation thereby confirming the second 
hypothesis.
A further comparison of the public and private sector trade unions on their internal 
union dynamics confirms that there are significant differences across sector. ‘Fighting 
for workers’ rights’ and ‘increased wages’ were the main considerations for the 
workers joining the unions in the two sectors (table A7.16). The results indicate that 
the majority of union members irrespective of sector had instrumental reasons for 
joining the union thereby confirming earlier findings which have demonstrated that 
Nigerian workers expect their unions to help fight for worker’s welfare especially in 
areas concerning wages and working conditions (Fashoyin, 1987; Cohen, 1974). The 
results also indicate that relatively fewer people joined on the basis of enjoying social 
benefits thus supporting Fashoyin (1987)’s finding but negating Warmington 
(1960)’s.
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More respondents from the public sector joined the union to get protection from 
dismissal. In the public sector, a higher percentage of respondents joined the unions 
based on the influence of friends and union leaders whereas in the private sector, 
more members appeared to have joined on their own volition (table A7.17). although 
Perception of union-management relations seems to be similar across sectors (table 
A7.18), it is stronger in the public sector than in the private sector. Most respondents 
across sectors opined that decisions are made in a meeting of all workers (table 7.19). 
This confirms Fashoyin’ s (1987) findings which suggests that in a general sense, 
there is an acceptance of a democratic procedure within the unions. However, 
respondents who believed that union leaders were undemocratic in their decision­
making were more in the public sector than in the private sector and also the influence 
of committees in decision-making appeared to be more pronounced in the public 
sector than in the private sector (table A7.20).
The significant relationship between perception of information dissemination and 
union commitment and participation across sector confirms earlier studies which have 
suggested that union leaders perform poorly in terms of communicating with their 
members (Fashoyin, 1987; Smock, 1969). Perception of information dissemination 
seems to be of more influence in the private sector given that it impacted upon the 
dependent variables and their antecedents (satisfaction with union leadership, union 
instrumentality and early socialization experience) there than it did in the public 
sector (table 7.2). This may be partly attributed to the existence of three distinct 
unions within the private sector union investigated thus bringing about variations in 
the level of union achievement, type of leadership styles and nature of union- 
management relationships (three distinct branch unions exist in the privates sector).
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Statistical analysis aimed at investigating the influence of typology of staff 
representation seem to support this view (tables 7.3 and 7.4).
Table 7.3 ANOVA results of staff category and IUDs in Private sector.
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Square
F Sig.
1. Why did you join your union Between 
Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
20.085
288.522
308.608
10.043
3.796
2.645 .078
2. How well informed does your 
leaders keep you on what is 
happening in the union
Between
Groups
Within Groups 
Total
5.149
38.607
43.756
2.574
.489
5.268 .007
3. how are decisions made in 
your union
Between 
Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
.754
70.426
71.179
.377
.939
.401 .671
4. How did you become a 
member
Between 
Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
2.427
146.338
148.765
1.214
1.876
.647 .526
5. Relations between managers 
and the union are very good
Between 
Groups 
Within Groups
1.977
60.344
.989
.774
1.278 .284
Total 62.321
Table 7.4 ANOVA results of staff category and IUDs in Public sector.
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Square
F Sig.
1 .Why did you join your union Between 
Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
9.948
323.770
333.718
4.974
3.026
1.644 .198
2. How well informed does your 
leaders keep you on what is 
happening in the union
Between
Groups
Within Groups 
Total
.723
97.650
98.373
.362
.913
.396 .674
3. how are decisions made in 
your union
Between 
Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
2.291
145.923
148.214
1.145
1.459
.785 .459
4. How did you become a 
member
Between 
Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
2.802
164.297
167.099
1.401
1.521
.921 .401
5. Relations between managers 
and the union are very good
Between 
Groups 
Within Groups
.898
137.414
.449
1.296
.346 .708
Total 138.312
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In the private sector, members’ scores on Union Joining Motive and Perception of 
Information Dissemination significantly varied in accordance with staff typology 
(table 7.3). This finding suggests that union dynamics engendered when one single 
union represents all workers in a particular establishment irrespective of cadre (junior 
or senior staff) differ from those engendered when separate unions exist within the 
same establishment. However, there was no significant difference between senior and 
junior members of staff on all the IUD items in the public Sector. Descriptive 
statistics of staff category and the union dynamics items in the public sector indicate 
that none of the results was significant (table 7.4).
Table 7.5 how well informed does your leaders keep
you on what is happening in the union (private sector)
N Mean Std.
Deviation
Std. Error
Senior staff 31 3.6129 .55842 .10029
Junior staff 30 3.0333 .71840 .13116
Other 21 3.2857 .84515 .18443
Total 82 3.3171 .73498 .08117
Sig. 0.007
Table 7.6 why did you join your union * staff category crosstabulation (private sector)
staff categon/ Total
Junior staff senior staff Contract staff
To win more wages and 
better working conditions
11
37.9%
6
20.7%
13
61.9%
30
38.0%
To get protection from being 
sacked
1
3.4%
1
1.3%
To enjoy social benefits 
from the union
4
13.8%
4
5.1%
Because most people join 1
3.4%
3
10.3%
4
5.1%
the union is capable of 
fighting for workers
15
51.7%
11
37.9%
7
33.3%
33
41.8%
the union has more time 
and resources to deal with 
mgt
2
6.9%
4
13.8%
1
4.8%
7
8.9%
29
100.0%
29
100.0%
21
100.0%
79
100.0%
Chi-square = 19.348 (sig.= .03)
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Information gap was perceived to be greatest in the junior staff union judging from 
their mean score which is the lowest of the three groups (table 7.5). This result 
however should be viewed in the overall context of the apparent communication gap 
within the unions in general. Results for union joining motives across the three staff 
categories indicate that ‘fighting for workers’ rights’ was the appeal for the majority 
of junior and senior staff whereas ‘winning higher wages’ was the most cited reason 
in the case of the contract / casual staff (table 7.6). The situation described above may 
have played some role concerning variations in the impact of internal union dynamics 
(i.e. being significantly larger in the public sector (union participation) and lower in 
the public sector (union commitment).
It would be recalled that the study’s two quantitative surveys showed that union 
commitment was significantly greater in the public sector whereas union participation 
was significantly lesser there. Ideally the union commitment-participation model 
assumes a positive causal relationship between the two variables which means that a 
significantly higher commitment level in the public sector arguably should have 
resulted in a higher participation level there. The relative impact of internal union 
dynamics within the two sectors may help to explain this apparent discrepancy (figure 
7.2). The first two columns (upper half of the grid) indicate how union commitment 
is greater in the public sector (>) / lower in the private sector (<). In connection with 
this finding, IUD impact appears to be significantly less influential in the public sector 
(<) / greater influence in the private sector (>). In the last two columns (lower half of 
the grid), union participation is significantly lower in the public sector (<) / higher in 
the private sector (>). In connection with this finding, internal union dynamics impact
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appears to be significantly more influential in the public sector (>) / lower in the 
private sector (<).
Figure 7.2 Union Commitment, Union Dynamics and Sector
Public sector Private sector
Union Commitment > Union Commitment <
IUDs < IUDs >
Union Participation < Union Participation >
IUDs > IUDs <
In essence, a case is made for a possible interaction between the influence of internal 
union dynamics on union commitment and union participation within the public 
sector and private sector. Thus on the one hand, union commitment of members in 
the public sector was significantly higher than their counterparts in the private sector 
while union participation was significantly higher in the latter. On the other hand, the 
influence of internal union dynamics on union commitment was significantly lower in 
the public sector than in the private sector while in the case of union participation, the 
influence of internal union dynamics was higher in the public sector than in the 
private sector.
Thus in the case of Perception of Information Dissemination for example, the 
significantly higher level of union commitment exhibited by the public sector unions
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may be explained as being partly due to the situation whereby members in this sector 
were less affected (.213) by the problem related to information dissemination in 
comparison to their counterparts in the private sector (.443). Raw frequencies 
indicate that just a slightly higher percentage of public sector members (46.4%) 
compared to the private sector( 45.85%) reported dissatisfaction with the level of 
information dissemination within the unions. However when it comes to union 
participation, the situation seems to be the opposite in the sense that Perception of 
Information Dissemination appear to exert a more significant influence in the public 
sector (.312) compared to the private sector (.270).
But there is another plausible explanation for the significant difference in 
participation between the two sectors. This relates to the members viewing their 
participation as a function of the goal-related costs and benefits of participation and 
the perceived value of the outcomes of participation. In all the interviews, union 
leaders were keen to emphasize the point that branch meetings usually received a high 
turn out only when there are financial or economic matters to be discussed most 
especially the ones involving wage increases and allowances. From this premise, one 
can deduce that that workers in the private sector who may not have expressed 
affective commitment to the union still participated in union activities nonetheless 
because they perceived the benefits as high, and the costs low. This is also known as 
a rational choice theory (Klandermans, 1984, 1986). Thus the significantly higher 
level of union participation in the private sector may not only be due to the influence 
of the internal union dynamics only but also a reflection of a relatively higher 
incidence of union activity perceived by members as involving high benefits and low 
risks. What these results suggest essentially is that the union commitment-
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participation link cannot always be taken for granted and may have to be viewed 
within the context of other union dynamics present at any given time within a union.
Summary
In this chapter, the study’s last two hypotheses were tested. Based on the hypothesis 
that internal union dynamics will significantly influence the union commitment 
process, regression analysis was done in relation to union commitment, union 
participation, union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and 
early union socialization experience. Results indicate that the hypotheses that internal 
union dynamics will exert a significant impact on the predictors of union commitment 
and union participation was partially supported as perception of information 
dissemination was the only dynamic that was significant in the model. But the 
hypothesis that the influence of the internal union dynamics will vary across the 
private and the public sector was supported.
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Chapter 8 
Qualitative Research: Results
Introduction
This chapter aims to build on the quantitative findings by facilitating an understanding 
of the reasons why factors associated with union characteristics and perception were 
the most significant predictors for the Nigerian sample. These reasons cannot be 
taken for granted based on findings in existing literature since most studies were 
conducted in different settings, situations or circumstances. The questions this study 
hopes to answer include the following:
(1) To what extent has the structure and organisation of the unions contributed to 
their commitment levels and participation in union activities?
(2) Judging from the significant role played by union instrumentality as revealed 
in the quantitative surveys, how has the unions fared in this respect ?
(3) Since evidence from the surveys indicate that leadership satisfaction also 
occupied a central role in the union commitment process, to what extent can it 
be said that the leaders enjoyed their members’ loyalty and trust?
(4) What sort of union socialisation programme exists in these unions?
The study’s methodology embraced a descriptive analysis of the unions’ settings and 
experiences using information obtained from personal interviews of randomly 
selected union leaders and members (see chapter 4) and analysis of union 
constitutions, logbooks, newsletters and other relevant documents pertaining to the 
unions. Pertinent data from the second quantitative survey was also used where
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deemed necessary . The study involved unions based in African Petroleum company 
(private sector) and a government health institution (public sector). The rationale for 
this approach hinges on the need to draw useful comparisons between the two sectors 
since the quantitative surveys has shown sector to be a moderator in the model. 
However, this process of analysis is not intended to investigate whether a particular 
sector union is more effective than the other although suggestions along this my arise 
at some stage. The central objective is to shed more light on the quantitative findings 
by examining the various circumstances under which the unions have functioned and 
how these could have influenced the union commitment process of union members. 
The research settings are first described followed by analysis of the results which are 
discussed under union structure and organisation, union actions, union leadership and 
union socialisation experience.
8.1 Description of Settings
The African Petroleum pic is located in a densely populated and mainly industrialised 
area in the heart of Lagos and surrounded by several local and international 
companies. It has two large office complexes, each serving the administrative and 
production needs of the company and both within walking distance of each other. The 
administrative block include human resources, accounts / finance, administrative, 
training and personnel staff while the production block is the loading depot but also 
has offices and factories. These are where occasional or casual and contract workers 
and their supervisors are based. Oil tankers, oil dealers, middlemen and contractors 
can often be seen milling around in this part of the company after completing the 
necessary paper work in the administrative complex. The company has three in-house 
unions each representing different categories of staff. NUPENG represents the junior
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staff and the casual/contract workers while PENGASSAN represents the senior staff. 
In NUPENG (contract staff), there are 8 union officials: chairman, vice chairman, 
secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and three ex-officio members representing 90 
members. NUPENG (junior staff), has 8 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, 
secretary, vice-secretary, treasurer, financial secretary and two ex-officio members 
representing between 90 and 100 members. PENGASSAN (senior staff) has 7 union 
officials: chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and two ex- 
officio members representing between 90 and 100.
In the public sector where MHWUN oversees the branches studeid, five departments 
from a federal government health institution - a sprawling hospital complex located in 
the centre of Lagos - took part in the research. They include Radiology (RD), Human 
Resources (HRD), Physiotherapy (PHY), Management Board (HMB) and Local 
Government (ALG). These departments have their own unions representing them 
even though some share buildings or within the same vicinity with the exception of 
HMB and ALG both of which have their own separate buildings in different parts of 
the city but within walking or commuting distance.. HMB has 10 union officials: 
chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, financial secretary, treasurer, auditor and 4 ex 
officio members, representing between 250 and 300 members. In RD, there are 10 
union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, auditor, ex-officio, 
financial secretary and 4 ex-officio members, representing 30 members. In HRD 
there are 8 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, financial secretary, 
treasurer, auditor and 2 ex officio members, representing 50 members. In ALG, there 
are 7 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer 
and auditor, representing between 175 and 180 members. In PHY, there are 10 union
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officials: chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, auditor, 
public relations officer, and financial secretary, representing 300 members.
8.2 Union Structure and Organisation
Fairbrother (1989) and Terry (1993) argued that the way in which many workplace 
unions became increasingly bureaucratised, routinized and centralised during the 
1970s contributed to the divergence in the objectives of members and union leaders.
In other words, the more professional a union’s apparatus becomes, the greater the 
likelihood of a disparity between the outlook of the leaders and that of the rank-and- 
file (Lane and Roberts, 1971). This has implication for the commitment and union 
participation of members in the sense that the situation could engender a gulf between 
the two thereby affecting the ability of members to form positive attitudes towards 
their leaders. And as already seen from previous chapters, satisfaction with union 
leadership is a significant predictor of union commitment. Against this backdrop, the 
structure and organisation of the two unions are first examined.
NUPENG
The government of the union is vested in the national delegates conference, national 
executive council, central working committee, zonal council and branch executive 
committee (figure 8.1). The supreme authority of the union is vested in the National 
Delegates Conference which is composed of national officers, zonal chairmen and 
secretaries and branch delegates. The union is administered in between national 
delegates conference by the 'National Executive Council which comprises all national 
officers, chairmen and secretaries of zonal councils, the general secretary and other 
officers from the rank of deputy general secretaries / heads of department and zones.
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The Central Working Committee consists of the president, deputy president, 4 vice 
presidents, national treasurer, national trustee, auditor and general secretary, deputy 
general secretary, senior assistant general secretaries / head of department / zones.
Fig. 8.1 Structure of Union Government in NUPENG
Zonal Council
National Delegates Conference
Central Working Committee
Branch Executive Committee
National Executive Council
The country is divided into four zones namely Lagos, Wairi, Port Harcourt and 
Kaduna zones. The Zonal Council meets once in every three months and has the 
power to elect a chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and 
auditor. The chairman presides over the meeting of the zonal council and in his 
absence, the vice chairman or any other member nominated by members present. In 
consultation with the chairman, the secretary summons a meeting of the zone. Two 
thirds of the members of the council can form a quorum and the zonal conference is 
held every 3 years before the national delegates conference. Branch Executive 
Committee comprises of the chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary,
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treasurer and a minimum of 5 other elected members from the units. Branch is 
defined as meaning the whole or part of the workers, employed in one particular place 
by a company within the jurisdiction of NUPENG. The branch executive committee 
is held once in 3 months or as emergency demands and sees to the proper organization 
of the unit at the grass root, represent the members in appropriate cases and follow the 
directives of the higher organs of the union in the conduct of its affairs. The branch 
conference is held every 3 years and the duties of the branch conference are to receive 
reports on its activities, plan future programmes and elect officers and committee 
members. Unit election is usually held before a branch delegate’s conference.
MHWUN
The supreme authority of the union (fig. 8.2) is vested in the National Delegates 
Conference and this comprises national officers, state chairmen and secretaries and 
state delegates. The National Executive Council (NEC) has the power to summon an 
emergency or special National Delegates Conference. The union is administered in 
between the meetings of the National Executive Council by the Central Working 
Committee, which comprises of the Principal National Officers of the Union. The 
supreme authority of the union in the state is vested in the State Delegates Conference 
and comprises of the State Principal Officers, Local Government Area Executive 
Committee Chairmen, elected Secretaries and Chairmen or elected Secretaries of local 
(unit) branch executive committees. State executive council exists in every state 
consisting of a chairman, a vice chairman, an elected secretary, a treasurer and an 
internal state auditor. The elected officers with the chairman and secretary of each 
local government Area Executive committee forms the State Executive Council (SEC). 
Local Government Area Council (LGAEC) exists in every local government area and
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conforms to the number of local government areas established by the state 
government.
Fig. 8.2 Union Government (MHWUN)
State Delegates Conference
State Executive Council
State Working Committee
Central Working Committee
Local Government Area Council
Local ( Unit) Branch Committee
National Delegates Conference
National Executive Council
Each LGAEC has Local (unit) Branches in its area of jurisdiction and co-ordinates the 
activities of all local (unit) branches within the local government area. The LGAEC 
has a chairman, vice chairman, treasurer and an elected secretary. All the chairmen 
and secretaries of the local (unit) branches within the local government area are 
usually members of the committees. The LGAEC supervises the activities of the local 
(unit) branches in its area of jurisdiction and look into member’s problems at the 
grassroots level. It facilitates the implementation of the union’s decisions at local
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government level, ensures the observance of the union’s constitution and carries out 
other duties assigned by the state executive council. The Branch Executive 
Committee (BEC) is elected at branch meetings and comprises of the branch 
chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and a representative from each of the 
sections, which constitute the branch. It is the business of the BEC to provide 
leadership at the local level in the affairs of the union and ensure regular monthly 
meetings of the branch.
There is similarity between the private and public sector unions In terms of union 
government and structure. This is reflected by a hierarchical order which starts with 
branch level and peaks at national level and this pattern is typical of all industrial 
unions in the country. However the number of layers of hierarchy in between the top 
and bottom level depends on individual unions and their constitution as illustrated by 
NUPENG and MHWUN. MHWUN have more layers and thus appear to be more 
bureaucratised than NUPENG. But this situation is arguably based on exigency rather 
than convenience as the health sector is based on a local government system. In Lagos 
state alone, there are at least twenty local governments while in some states there are 
over thirty. Not unexpectedly, this situation often poses problems represented by 
jurisdictional disputes such as one which occurred between members of the Local 
Government Area Working Council and the State Executive Council.
One main difference between the two sectors relates to branch level union 
organisation in which there are three separate branch unions in African Petroleum 
compared to one union in the public sector unions. While MHWUN seems to have 
succeeded in assuming sole representation of workers in its jurisdiction, NUPENG
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and PENGASSAN represents junior (and more recently casual/contract staff) and 
senior staff respectively in the oil sector. But both unions co-exist peacefully and in 
harmony, occasionally joining ranks against management. Pertinently, leaders from 
NUPENG often proceed to assume positions of responsibility in PENGASSAN.
8.3 Union Action: union instrumentality
A union’s known record of successes or failures in fighting for the welfare of workers 
may be partly responsible for a high/low union instrumentality perception of its 
members. For instance, Fashoyin (1987) observed that the majority of respondents 
joined unions because they believed the union is capable of fighting for the rights of 
workers. Arguably, this union instrumentality perception has to be context-specific 
and not just about “the big labour image” in order for it to be relevant to the members’ 
commitment to the union (Desphande and Forioto, 1989). The crux of this argument 
is that unions should be perceived as making a difference in their specific domain in 
order to influence their members’ union instrumentality perception.
NUPENG
NUPENG is renowned for its aggressive and combative approach when it comes to 
pressing for its rights or fighting for its members’ welfare. In some cases this style 
has yielded dividends both for members and the union as a whole, but in most cases 
the union has had to submit to mediation or arbitration. Akinlaja Joseph (1999) is the 
National Deputy General Secretary in NUPENG and was its first National Vice 
President. Some of the cases cited in this section were obtained from his personal 
account of the union’s travails and triumphs but the events has also been documented
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in newspaper archives in the country. The accounts were corroborated by union 
officials in the branches where they occurred (spoken to by author).
NUPENG versus African Petroleum
Akinlaja was a former employee of British Petroleum (now African Petroleum) and 
was its former in-house union president before vacating the post to become the 
pioneer national vice president of NUPENG (while still an employee of BP). Due to 
the growing influence of NUPENG in the early 80s shortly after its formation, it was 
alleged that managements across the oil industry tried to weaken the union by 
attempting to promote its outspoken leaders to senior positions in their respective 
companies thereby rendering them ineligible to remain in the union. According to 
Akinlaja, he was first cajoled to contest against Dubre, the then incumbent National 
President who had earlier refused to rescind his membership of the union as a 
precondition for his company’s (AGIP Oil) offer of promotion. On Dubre’s behalf, 
NUPENG successfully opposed the company’s attempt at suspending him indefinitely 
for this stance.
It soon became Akinlaja’s turn to be promoted by his own company to the position of 
senior staff in charge of pump maintenance all over the country, but on a condition 
that he resigned his union position before the letter of promotion would be issued. 
Akinlaja rejected the condition and was instead issued a letter of redundancy and 
sacked. On informing the workers about his predicament, the company turned topsy­
turvy with visibly angry workers demanding some answers so much so that 
envisaging a reaction by workers, the company had informed uniformed police to 
surround the company. Eventually NUPENG’s National Secretariat and the central
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executive adopted the struggle and immediately summoned a zonal council meeting 
wherein union branches at that level were informed and told to begin mobilizing for 
the struggle to get their National Deputy President reinstated. While high-powered 
meetings were going on, other union leaders showed up in AP installations to 
sensitize workers towards fighting the injustice.
Meanwhile, management adopted a victimization trick whereby workers known to be 
actively supporting Akinlaja were given the sack, but offered instant reprieve if they 
agreed to change camps. At the climax of the crisis, which lasted for about nine 
months, a labour committee set up by the country’s Senate to investigate the matter 
concluded that Akinlaja’s termination amounted to victimization and thus he should 
be reinstated. Meanwhile, all through the long-drawn battle, the union had been 
paying in full his remuneration and treating him like a full-time staff member. Thus 
when faced with the option of returning to AP or continuing with the union, he opted 
for the latter. In giving his reasons for this decision, the union activist reasoned
“because a lot o f bad blood had been generated, I  knew that 
even i f  I  returned to AP after a year or so, I  would still be 
victimized. By then I  would be in the senior staff'association 
(PENGASSAN), which to me was not as effective as 
NUPENG, and NUPENG would be unable to fight fo r  me at 
that stage...secondly, I  realized that staying in the union’s 
secretariat, I  would be in a place where African Petroleum 
will have no control over my destiny ”.
The whole episode had lasted 9 months.
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NUPENG versus Dresser Nigeria Ltd.
In 1979, in Dresser Nigeria Limited oil workers went on strike prompting the 
management of the foreign-owned company to dismiss all of them. NUPENG 
stepped in, but the management refused to accede to the union’s wish that the 
workers be reinstated and that their quest for a better employment deal be 
granted. The case dragged on and became protracted. With the case generating 
bad publicity for its business, the company finally caved in, reinstating all the 
sacked people. The Managing Director was recalled to the oil firm’s home 
country and replaced.
NUPENG versus Kalil and Dibbo/Trans-Continetal and Trans-Nab
In 1979, the government intercepted and took to the arbitrators a case involving 
NUPENG and some haulage companies, Kil and Dibbo, Transcontinental and Trans- 
Nab. The union had issued an ultimatum over the company’s refusal to accede to a 
request that tanker drivers be paid house-rent allowance. Although the matter came 
before the arbitration panel, both parties settled out of court. The management agreed 
to pay a rent subsidy of N23 per month. The case ended within three weeks.
NUPENG versus Schlumberger Nigeria. Ltd.
In 1985, Schlumberger Nigeria limited moved to abolish a clause in conditions of 
service in which employees enjoy an automatic 10 percent annual increment to 
employees. The management claimed it was demotivating its workforce. This 
angered the workers who issued an ultimatum and thereafter embarked on a strike. 
Management and union eventually came to an agreement which fixed 5 percent of the
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annual increase as automatic with any other percentage based on merit. The case 
lasted three months from 17th December 1985 to 12th February 1986.
NUPENG versus Total Nigeria Limited
In July 1990, NUPENG members had altercations with Total Nigeria Limited. It 
began when the workers asked for profit-sharing concessions from the management. 
But after a series of negotiations, they settled for N2500 ex gratia payment. This 
came with the understanding that there would be no more cash awards, education 
endowments and the like. However the following year, a new union executive in the 
company emerged and made demands for profit sharing and house-rent allowance. 
Total management declared a trade dispute and a conciliator was appointed for the 
case. The case was dropped in April 1992 because “there should be honour in 
agreements” according to NUPENG. Eventually an agreement was reached in which 
management agreed to housing policy, which provided Total workers with home- 
ownership grants. No explanation was given as to why the case was dropped.
NUPENG versus Shell Petroleum Development
In October 1980, workers in Shell Petroleum went on strike to protest against the 
company’s decision not to ratify a state issued income-policy in which the regulation 
stipulated 15 percent as the maximum adjustment that could be negotiated for salaries 
in the low-income group. Shell management thought this was not relevant to them 
having given workers over 15 percent adjustments earlier that year. The workers 
insisted that it applied to the company since this was a new directive by government. 
The Industrial Arbitration Panel ruled in favour of the management on the ground that 
the management had earlier granted a more competitive increment than the one
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contained in the government regulation. But the panel ordered the management to 
refund the workers’ pay for the period of the strike. The case lasted 10 months.
NUPENG versus NNPC
In July 1982, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation workers asked for some 
allowances including utility, shift, chemical, out-of-station and housing. They also 
asked for free products so that like workers in Lever Brothers who get soap and other 
company products, NNPC employees could get petroleum products which their 
company produced. But management rejected their demand making the workers to 
embark on a strike action to press home their requests. Based on the trade dispute 
declared by NNPC against NUPENG the tribunal ordered the action called off. The 
management then deducted from the workers’ salaries the sum it calculated to be 
equivalent to the 11 days the strike lasted, following this up with a lockout of the 13 
branch leaders of the union. In reciprocation, the union prevented the entire NNPC 
workforce from resuming. Immediately, the tribunal ruled that preventing the 13 
branch leaders of the union from entering the compound was victimization and 
ordered that they be allowed to return to their duty posts. It also frowned at the no­
work no-pay response of NNPC to the strike and ordered that money deducted from 
the workers’ salary be refunded. The trial went on and at the end the IAP failed to 
give the workers any favorable award on the items that originally led to the trade 
dispute. The case spanned almost two years.
NUPENG versus GULF
In March 1982, workers in Gulf oil commenced a strike action in all the company’s 
locations. This led to the termination of the appointment of four union members on
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10 March 1982, which the workers fought to redress with another strike. The 
company then applied the no-work no pay rule. The management alleged that during 
the strike, four workers at Abiteye Flow station committed sabotage by opening 
valves to waste crude oil, apart from other misdemeanors. Members of the 
Arbitration Panel moved to the location of the alleged sabotage but saw no evidence 
of oil spillage; they became convinced that the allegation was not true. The IAP 
ordered the embattled workers’ recall, while money deducted from staff pay during
tlithe strike period should be refunded. The case at this level started on 30 March 1982
tViand ended on 30 of July 1985, a period of two years and four months. But gulf oil 
proceeded to file a protest to the National Industrial Court (NIC), on the ground that 
the company had appealed the IAP judgment. Two years later, on 2nd June 1987, the 
industrial court reversed the IAP judgment, meaning that the termination of the four 
workers’ appointment stood and the no-work, no-pay status on all the staff subsisted. 
According to Akinlaja, the industrial appeal court did not visit the depots but only 
relied on the documented evidence presented by the parties. In all the case spent five 
years going through the two levels of adjudication.
NUPENG versus NUHPSW
In 1992, an inter-union dispute occurred between the National Union of Hotel and 
Personal Services and NUPENG. The NUHPSW declared a trade dispute against 
NUPENG over the oil union’s jurisdiction. In the oil sector, industrial caterers work 
for petroleum companies offshore on the high seas and in the firm’s guesthouses. On 
the superficial level, their profession -  catering -  places them with hotel and 
personnel services workers but by virtue of work location, convenience, environment 
and association, they had always fallen within the ambit of NUPENG. In 1992,
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NUHPSW said these industrial caterers should be within its own fold and accused 
NUPENG of usurping the hotel union’s authority over them. The IAP ruled in favour 
of the hotel union. But NUPENG protested the judgment and appealed to the 
National Industrial Court, which, also upheld the verdict of the lower of the lower of 
tribunal.
Despite NUPENG’s plea on freedom of association, the arbitration panel and the 
industrial court declared that freedom of association had its own limit and that it must 
be subjective to “partitioning”. The whole process took five years from 1992 to 1997. 
An interesting aspect of this case is that even today and despite the judgments, it has 
been impossible for NUHPSW to organize catering in the oil industry. The workers 
have stubbornly insisted that they belong to the petroleum industry and that their 
interests were best catered for by NUPENG. Caterers in the oil industry may have by 
themselves weighed the advantage of being classified as oil workers and concluded 
that the economic gains often won through NUPENG’ s intervention far outweighed 
the political. And the caterers seem determined that a thousand unfavourable 
judgments will not be allowed to rob them of those gains. At the same time, oil 
caterers work in similar condition as petroleum workers, eating the same food, taking 
the same risks in the same environments (on the rigs over the waters of the Atlantic 
Ocean, in ships or within boats in the swamp). The whole drama exposed the fact 
that court judgments sometimes are at variance with realities on the ground.
NUPENG versus Chevron.
Chevron employs a system of labour contractors, retained by the company to assist in 
hiring contract staff throughout the company’s operational bases in Lagos, Port
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Harcourt, Escravos and Warri. In a move to implement a standing agreement with 
employers and government, the union made moves to unionize the contract workers. 
However, apparently aiming to puncture this move, Chevron introduced a “service 
contract” clause in the relationship with its middlemen contractors, making it 
mandatory to renew their contract yearly with the company. Pressure was thus 
brought on the contractors to ensure they sacked union activists in their work force or 
they would have their contracts with Chevron revoked. Two companies soon ran into 
problem with Chevron. Without thought as to terminal benefits for their workers, 
Olayinka and Sons and Queeneth Gibson Nigeria Limited had their contracts revoked 
in December 1998 and February 1999 respectively.
The others quickly got the message, which Chevron used these scapegoats to pass 
across. In March another contract company Delog Nigeria Ltd. sacked 11 workers, 
many of them leaders of the emerging NUPENG unit. Workers of Delog Nigeria Ltd. 
joined by their counterparts in T.A. Amusah and Sons went on strike to press for the 
reinstatement of their colleagues. The two companies sacked all of them, meaning 
that 400 workers lost their jobs. Soon a full-scale crisis loomed in the oil industry. 
Chevron workers went on strike to protest the shoddy treatment meted out to their 
leaders while other oil workers prepared for a fight. Well aware of the embarrassment 
the crisis promised the nation in the face of its hosting Nigeria’99 (the under 21 FIFA 
World Cup), Chevron management bowed. It called the oil workers for talks and all 
those sacked were reinstated.
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NUPENG versus PTI
The case of Petroleum Training Institute and NUPENG started in 1979 and was 
concluded in 1994 -  15 years. Later, the petroleum institute enjoyed a pride of place 
as the sole specialized higher institution that prepared skilled middle-level manpower 
for the oil industry. The workers and the nation felt the school should enjoy similar 
conditions of service with NNPC, a parastatal within the oil industry. Both 
organizations happened to belong to the Federal government. But while NNPC 
employers enjoyed a unique salary scale, almost competing with the enhanced 
package in the private sector of the oil company, the PTI kept its workers on a 
condition of service similar to that which obtained in the relatively unimpressive civil 
service.
While the union demanded for workers in the institute to be placed on a par with 
colleagues in the NNPC, the school’s management fought to maintain the status quo. 
Several negotiations later and the school’s management still failed to yield, then 
workers gave a notice of strike. This led the management to declare a trade dispute 
thus provoking the intervention of the federal ministry of labour which forwarded the 
case to the Industrial Arbitration Panel. NUPENG lost at the IAP level in 1990. 
However, NUPENG protested the ruling of the panel and the minister for labour 
referred the case to the National Industrial Court. Eventually the case ended in 1994 
and the verdict was in favour of NUPENG. The implication of this being that some 
workers who were earning about Nl,500 a month instantly shot into an enhanced 
salary bracket of N10,000. The 1994 judgment also stipulated that the petroleum 
ministry should pay PTI staffers 10 years arrears of the new salaries, allowances and
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benefits beginning from 1984. Many were able to build houses from the millions they 
received as arrears.
The arbitration procedure has its positive aspects of which the main ones appear to be 
its prevention of total anarchy in industrial relations within the country and providing 
a forum and opportunity for disputing parties to come to an amicable settlement. But 
the process can be too long. The slow processes are sometimes - rightly or wrongly - 
perceived by workers as deliberate delaying tactics employed by managements. But 
the problem is that with its composition of two workers’ representatives and two 
employers’ representatives, at best, there can only be two courts sitting 
simultaneously. For a body that is supposed to adjudicate for a work force reputed to 
be over 20 million-strong, that is grossly inadequate.
There are certain disputes that unionists treat very seriously, such as a company 
terminating the employment of a particular member because he is a trade union 
activist. At the arbitration panel, the longer such a dispute lasts, the worse for the 
worker who is out of employment, no salary; his family suffers. Thus a lengthy 
period of adjudication becomes injurious to this employees’ interest. The GULF 
employees who had to wait for two years to find out they would never be reinstated 
after all said and done must have felt let down by the system. Similarly, even though 
the case of the PTI workers ended on a good note, it took a total of 17 years (it took 
an extra two years to implement the court’s verdict) -  a case of justice delayed, justice 
denied.
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The experience of the GULF workers demonstrates why NUPENG favours the 
aggressive approach and direct dealing with management rather than proceeding to 
the tribunal. The union tries as much as possible to minimize taking industrial cases 
beyond the employer-employee level and believes in dropping any issue failing to be 
resolved at that point. Thus the union rarely declares a trade dispute. But an 
employer may prefer to declare a trade dispute when negotiations for a collective 
agreement breaks down, preferring to waste two years at the industrial arbitration 
knowing full well that during this period, he would have saved a lot money for the 
company. In this situation, to tackle such an opportunistic move by employers seeking 
the slow wheels of the law as safe haven, the union devised means of hurting such 
firms economically not by embarking on direct strike. The economic weapon could 
include workers shunning overtime. Alternatively they may decide to compromise 
efficiency. For example, instead of treating a file in two minutes, they may spend 
three hours working on it. NUPENG employed this style in the early eighties until the 
employers stopped taking undue advantage of the slow pace of the arbitration 
tribunal.
Some of the instances described earlier above suggest that NUPENG is a dynamic, 
and results-oriented union. It can be argued that most workers will not necessarily 
blame the union for the losses encountered in the process of submitting to arbitration 
since it is entrenched in law. Nevertheless, in spite of the bureaucratic bottleneck that 
is the IAP and the NIC, NUPENG has been instrumental in obtaining positive 
outcomes for its members across its numerous branches ranging from enhanced 
salary, allowances and other benefits as well as improved working conditions. For 
example, in terms of the minimum wage, NUPENG agitation has made a significant
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difference. Before NUPENG started, the average worker was said to made do with no 
more than N500. That workers’ salary today stands at about N40,000 a month1. A 
haulage worker used to earn N60 a month, with tanker drivers getting about N100, 
now it has shot up to N7,000 on the average. The seismic sector received a fillip from 
about N200 pre-NUPENG era, but at the present now receives N15000.
Another example can be seen in the matter of “casual workers”. Because part of the 
oil business is seasonal, especially the exploration part, it becomes inevitable for 
petroleum companies to hire “contract staff’ or “casual workers”. Such people’s 
tenure expires as soon as the season closes or the contract ends. And in a short period, 
these ad hoc staffers find themselves back on the unemployment queue. Because of 
the nature of the relationship, oil companies -  many of them believing that they are 
doing such employees a favour -  show little or no obligation to their welfare. The 
conditions of service most often tilts heavily in favour of oil firms.
In 1992, NUPENG elected to lighten the cross of these casuals. A meeting was held 
with government representatives with a view to organizing these contract staff 
(whether on season or monthly employment) into the union. The idea soon became a 
reality. A collective agreement was negotiated leading to improved conditions of 
service which for many would result in higher wages; from a take home pay of N1500 
per month to between N6,000 and N15000. (However as the experience of contract 
staff workers in African Petroleum has demonstrated, this collective agreement is not
1 These figures need to be put in perspective in view o f prevailing rates o f inflations in the country. 
According to the Federal Office o f Statistics (Statistical News, January 2002), between December 
2000 and December 2001, the average consumer price level rose by 16.5 percent. During the same 
period, the urban and rural indices showed increases o f 16.8 and 16.4 percent respectively. The 
average annual rate o f consumer retail prices in 2001 was 18.9 percent. This means that a fixed market 
basket o f consumer goods and services purchased for N100.00 on the average in 2000 sold for N 1 18.9 
on the average in 2001.
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automatic and apparently is not being honored by some employers hence the renewed 
campaign by NUPENG in this regard).
In 2001, NUPENG (junior staff) successfully fought for an increase in their rent
allowance. Furthermore, in the same year, the member was able to buy a car from a
car grant given to junior staff workers as a result of the union’s insistence. Another
member cited a personal experience of how instrumental the union is to the resolution
of a personal issue. He said
“I  came in with ND (National Diploma) certificate and 
observed that I  have to become a fu ll graduate before I  
can move to the senior cadre and when I  was coming in 
we were about five. The other four people because o f  
their geographical background were given supervisory 
grades but I  was given a grade three (clerical grade) and 
we read the same thing and had the same qualification. I  
decided to further my education which I  have done and 
now I  am a B.Sc. holder in Business Administration as 
well as a Chartered Administrator. Having submitted my 
certificate, the management now said it is no more 
automatic (i.e. upgrade to senior cadre) whereas before 
it used to be automatic. I  channeled my problem to the 
union and they have promised to take the issue up as soon 
as the on-going downsizing programme within the 
company is completed”.
Furthermore, at the time of the research, the unions had just successfully secured a 
deal with management concerning the downsizing exercise which was to see a 
significant reduction in the population of the workforce in the company. Although the 
names of the affected workers were yet to be released at the time, every worker the
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author spoke to was happy about the deal and said they did would not mind if they 
were to go or stay. In fact, one member told the author he knew he would not be 
affected but would actually prefer to be! Apparently, the pay-off was very 
substantial. Thus in a broad sense, the unions (in general) seem to enjoy a good 
reputation as far as instrumentality is concerned.
Fig. 8.3: this union is capable o f fighting for w orkers (N = 83)
strongly disagree
1.2 %
disagreestrongly agree
agree
Fig. 8.4: this union is capable o f ensuring that the jobs o f  m em bers are safe (N  = 83).
strongly agree 
32 .5 %
strongly disagree
1.2%
disagree 
8 .4% 
not sure 
12 .0%
agree
45 .8%
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This is supported by the responses of the workers to the individual items of the union 
instrumentality scale2 (figs. 8.3 and 8.4). However, analysis by staff category 
indicate that compared to PENGASSAN, NUPENG members (junior and contract 
staff) seem to have a higher union instrumentality perception as suggested by their 
mean scores (table 8.1). Even some PENGASSAN members themselves (whom the 
author spoke to) also expressed the opinion that NUPENG is more effective than their 
union. A comparison of the degree of sentiments about the perceived instrumentality 
of the respective unions in fighting for workers is shown in table 8.2. Around 48 
percent (Junior staff) and 57 percent (contract staff) of NUPENG members “strongly 
agree ” compared to PENGASSAN’s 3 percent. It is therefore not surprising that 
when it comes to union commitment, NUPENG members had the higher mean scores 
(table 8.3).
Table 8.1 Union Instrumentality Perce ption in AP
N Mean Std. Deviation F Sig.
junior staff 
(NUPENG)
31 25.3871 3.26269
Senior staff 
(PENGASSAN)
30 22.5333 2.88556 8.155 .001
Contract staff 
(NUPENG)
21 25.6190 3.48534
Total 82 24.4024 3.46004
2 As mentioned earlier at the beginning o f this chapter, the data used in this section was from the 
second quantitative survey involving NUPENG and MHWUN respondents. Wherever appropriate, 
analysis o f the workers’ responses to a few selected individual scale items o f union instrumentality, 
satisfaction with union leadership and union socialization experience was used to further elaborate on 
the qualitative study.
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Table 8.2 This union is capable of fighting for workers *staff category
staff category Total
junior staff senior staff Contract staff
(NUPENG) (PENGASSAN) (NUPENG)
strongly 1 1
disagree 4.8% 1.2%
Disagree 1 1 1 3
3.2% 3.3% 4.8% 3.7%
not sure 1 4 1 6
3.2% 13.3% 4.8% 7.3%
Agree 14 24 6 44
45.2% 80.0% 28.6% 53.7%
strongly 15 1 12 28
agree 48.4% 3.3% 57.1% 34.1%
Total 31 30 21 82
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-square = 25.57 p = .001.
Table 8.3 Union Commitment in AP
N Mean Std. Deviation F Sig.
Junior staff 
(NUPENG)
30 21.2000 2.89351 10.897 .000
Senior staff 
(PENGASSAN)
30 17.6806 4.14755
Contract staff 
(NUPENG)
21 21.3810 2.57830
Total 81 19.9434 3.73998
One senior staff in describing the NUPENG members remarked:
“...those guys are more committed than us...I 
respect those guys...they know what they want 
and go all out to get it... normally we wait for  
them to make the first move., you know, due to 
our position some us hesitate ”.
This line of thinking underscores a major reason why NUPENG appear to be more 
effective in AP than PENGASSAN. Some of the senior workers believe they have 
more to forfeit should they decide to appear active in the union. Many may not be
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willing to make such sacrifice, especially those who think they have a realistic chance 
of climbing up to the management cadre.
MHWUN
MHWUN has also been relatively useful in representing the interests of its members 
at all levels. An example of this on a non-branch level is the incident of June 1989 in 
which the national secretariat was challenged by the federal area council over the 
sacking of staffers at the headquarters. Although it seems ironic that the union should 
be accused of unfair dismissal of its workers, yet the way the federal area council 
officials rose to the defense of its staff (maintained by the national secretariat) 
demonstrates its instrumentality in this respect. To investigate the record of the union 
the logbook of the Federal Area Council executive meetings was analyzed. Some 
meetings were normal executive meetings while others were emergency meetings.
The contents of the minutes are presented below (table 8.4).
Table 8.4. Union Activities
Date Notes
13/04/1988 Discussed the removal of the petroleum subsidy by government, its 
effect on members and how the union should respond.
13/06/1989 The union deliberates on the petition received from some retrenched 
staffers of the union. The matter received due attention.
10/10/1989 a 30-day ultimatum was given to the federal government to release 
enabling circular on the union’s scheme of service.
23/02/1991 The union demanded immediate adjustment and payment of the 
minimum wages for members, payment of shift duty allowance and 
extension of the health salary scale to all health workers. The 
government accepted to effect the adjustment of the USS minimum 
wage as requested, confirmed that shift duty allowance would be 
paid, the minimum wage adjusted USS salaries would be paid while 
the implementation of the health salary scale was awaiting only 
circular from the establishment.
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24/11/2001 An ultimatum was given to the Federal Government concerning 
wage/benefits issue.
02/12/2001 Decision was taken to embark on a nation-wide strike on the issue 
of 22% basic salary increase for workers in the teaching and 
specialist hospital as contained in an IAP (Industrial Arbitration 
Panel) award.
12/01/2002 A review of fringe benefits and salary structure for employees in the 
public service was done. Negotiations between the union and the 
government had been concluded for an elongated salary grade levels 
and improved fringe benefits. Satisfaction was expressed 
concerning the agreement and the efforts of the National Secretariat 
toward the achievement was acknowledged.
4/3/2002 The General Secretary wrote: “strike action ... was very effective. 
Branches co-operated with the council by enforcing the strike in 
their domain despite some management opposition to the strike 
action. Management used police patrol to terrorize members and the 
branch officers. In all these, the council were able to counter their 
action by effectively mobilizing against their (management’s) 
wishes. The refusal of management to pay the December salaries as 
earlier reported has been reversed and salaries have been paid to 
members. Although management refused to pay full salary for 
January, a reasonable agreement was reached between management 
and the union”.
Also, the way and manner the union has pursued the minimum wage issue with 
government and managements in the various branches also gives an impression of a 
dynamic and vibrant union. As an attestation to the union’s fighting spirit, in May 
2000, the federal government approved a new harmonized public service salary 
structure (HAPSS) and associated allowances for the federal public service. The 
allowances covers rent subsidy, transport, meal subsidy, utility, etc. The union’s use 
of the strike option to pursue the realization of its demands underscores its resolve to 
use every appropriate means available to fight for its members. And generally, its 
members seem to comply with its directives concerning industrial action thus 
highlighting the former’ s confidence in the union. The union’s calling off its strike
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action in the wake of the occurrence of a major bomb blast in Lagos so its members 
can help to alleviate the situation also demonstrates its magnanimity. It is thus not at 
all surprising that majority of those who participated in the study expressed a positive 
instrumental perception of their union.
8.4. Union Leadership
The literature points to the key role of the union leader in membership behaviour and 
attitude with some emphasis on the importance of union leaders meeting the 
aspirations and expectations of membership if they are to maintain the latter’s 
commitment (Nicholson et al, 1980; Fullagar and Barling, 1992; Barling et al, 1992; 
Gallagher and Clark, 1989). The style and character of leadership exerts a critical 
influence on how the union organization is responsive to general membership 
aspirations and the way in which collective awareness and the activism of the mass of 
workers is stimulated (Hyman, 1979). Fosh (1993) identified how the changing 
patterns of swells and depressions in membership participation were influenced by 
leadership style. Fashoyin (1987) observed an inverse relationship between members’ 
union involvement and the autocratic behaviour of union leaders.
NUPENG
The role of the union leader in facilitating the union commitment of members is thus 
very important. This can be illustrated by citing the issue of arbitration for instance. 
Supposing a matter is referred to the Industrial Arbitration Panel and the panel gives 
an order (since it has the power to give such order) that there should be status quo 
ante. In other words, everything should return to the pre-strike situation (no strike by 
workers, no lock-out by employers), pending the determination of the case. Although
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the disputants are not compelled to obey the order, like in majority of cases, these 
particular parties obey.
But obedience to the arbitrating panel’s order remains a function of the confidence 
workers repose in their leaders. Once an order is given and the leaders are willing that 
the order be obeyed, it would be obeyed as along as the workers have confidence in 
them. But should the workers’ confidence in their union leaders be in question, they 
would not obey (especially when they consider the order as being opposite to their 
desires), although this would not be in direct challenge of the IAP or its order. There 
have been other instances which suggest that union leaders in NUPENG enjoy the 
support of the majority of their members. And when members have confidence in 
their leaders, they seem willing to go to any length to stand by them. The case of 
Akinlaja versus the African Petroleum management (already referred to above) is a 
typical example of the extent to which workers would react when a popular leader is 
perceived to be victimized.
Similarly, there was an incident in 1983 during a period of crisis in NUPENG in 
which a union leader called for a meeting at Shell premises in Warri (South-East 
Nigeria). At the meeting, the leader briefed the gathering of an encounter he had with 
the police earlier that day, and warned that he could be arrested in the course of or 
after the meeting, but felt that he owed an obligation to honour a meeting he himself 
had called no matter the risks involved. The leader asked them if  they wanted him to 
call off the meeting to which the over hundred workers present responded in the 
negative. “What will happen if  they come to pick me?” he asked them to which they 
replied: “all of us will go with you.” He was in the middle of his speech when armed
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policemen stormed the venue. The gathered workers formed a human barricade 
around him, but he pacified them and asked to speak to the police. Afterwards, the 
meeting (with the police) lasted for about an hour before he finally went with them to 
the police station, trailed by the crowd of oil workers. At the station, the workers, 
quite infuriated, chanted solidarity songs, inviting the DPO to use tear gas to disperse 
them. They demanded to know the interest of the police in the matter since their 
meeting had been a worker’s meeting and peaceful. Eventually, the leader was freed 
and left with his workers entourage amidst the chant of solidarity songs.
Another incident which portrays the confidence workers repose in their leaders 
occurred in 1979 at Keydril Nigeria limited. Workers had gone on strike to 
protest the delay of implementation of a successful negotiated conditions of 
service in the company. The scene of the workers’ strike was a rig on the high 
seas off Nigeria’s south-east coastline. Up till the time negotiations towards 
calling off the strike broke down, the management made contact with the 
workers through a two-way radio. The site was only approachable by helicopter 
but workers prevented any helicopter from landing by putting huge meta drums 
on the helipad. To beat the workers, the employers devised a trick which 
capitalized on the trust the workers reposed in the union. A radio message was 
dispatched to the workers that the deputy general secretary of NUPENG from 
Lagos was coming in the helicopter to hold discussions with them thus they 
should clear the helipad for him to land. The strategy paid off. Such was the 
employee’s faith in the union that they readily bought the idea of discussing 
their grievances with a NUPENG official. They cleared the pad. When the craft
232
landed on the rig, troops of mobile policemen stormed out from the helicopter 
and took over the place.
But it must be noted that not all workers share the same perception of their 
leaders and thus it is necessary to consider both sides of the issue. Hardly do 
members offer unconditional allegiance to union officials or exercise blind faith 
in a union leadership. Leaders must have to earn their members’ confidence and 
support. Thus, the conduct and practices of union leaders are always subject to 
members’ scrutiny and it is not unusual for members to sometimes question 
their leaders’ actions or even accuse them of wrong-doing (e.g. selling out to 
management, corruption, ineffectiveness, etc.). For instance, some of the 
members interviewed in African petroleum seem to have an ambivalent attitude 
towards their union leaders.
On the one hand, the leaders are applauded for their dynamism and dedication 
(fig. 8.5 and fig 8.6) but in the same breath are accused of not being forthright. 
The members appear to differ in their opinion as to whether leaders sometimes 
sell out during negotiations with management. For example one member of 
NUPENG (junior staff) said
“...union officials want to be on the side o f management 
instead offighting directly fo r  the workers ’ welfare ”.
Another member from the same union disagreed: “
...although other people may view the union as a sell-out, 
from my own experience, I  have not seen my union sell us 
out because we have a very virile union that will come to
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you and even swear by their family, so that shows the 
level o f trust
Fig. 8.5 union leaders are very hardworking (N = 83)
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19.3% n0tSure
15.7%
a g re e
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Fig. 8.6 union leaders are very effective (N= 83)
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But there seem to be a general consensus that the leaders have fallen short of 
member’s expectations in the area of information dissemination. There were 
complaints which suggests that some leaders hoard information and/or are not 
easily accessible (fig. 8.7). For example, one NUPENG interviewee said that
“the issue o f information has always been a serious bone 
o f contention we members have with our leaders because 
o f their tendency not to inform us on what is happening”
Thus accordingly, information dissemination was relatively poorer in NUPENG 
(table 8.5). An investigation into how the unions pass across information to 
members revealed that in NUPENG (junior staff) and PENGASSAN the 
methods are via word of mouth and use of notice boards while in NUPENG 
(contract staff) the method is by word of mouth only.
Fig. 8.7 how well does your leaders keep you informed on what is 
happening in the union? (N =83)
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Table 8.5 how well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening
in the union
N Mean Std. Deviation F Sig.
junior staff 
(NUPENG)
31 3.6129 .55842
senior staff 
(PENGASSAN)
30 3.0333 .71840 5.268 .007
Contract staff 
(NUPENG)
21 3.2857 .84515
Total 82 3.3171 .73498
* Mean score is inversely proportionate to information dissemination. So the lower the 
mean scores, the better the information dissemination.
Further investigation revealed that this situation may be related to the charges of 
autocracy which was levied against the NUPENG branch president not least by 
the assistant general secretary. In an interview, the latter made the following 
statements:
“ ...most o f the members are not happy with the way the man 
(chairman) is handling matters without consulting anybody...
I  would have loved to be more committed but our chairman 
doesn’t give us the encouragement or the opportunity to 
contribute... commitment is allowing other people’s views 
and opinion alongside your own and not running a one-man
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show... what I  perceive as a one-man unionism they are 
having here is not encouraging me... I  am often not happy 
about how the union leadership handles matters ...there are 
certain questions the leaders parry deliberately which 
infuriates me a lot...I wish I  was the chairman or a zonal 
general secretary ”.
If indeed the chairman runs the union autocratically and is not in the habit of 
informing other executives on union matters as alleged by the assistant general 
secretary, then it might be difficult for ordinary members to obtain relevant 
information from other leaders if the chairman is not available. The situation 
might have been worsened by the chairman’s apparent elusiveness. He was 
hardly in the office and very difficult to “pin down” (the author can attest to 
this) during this research. To be fair, his elusiveness could have been as a result 
of the nature of his job which sometimes required him shuttling between the 
Apapa branch and the company’s head office in Broad street, coupled with his 
involvement with the union’s zonal branch of which he is also the chairman.
Still, there can be no excuse by a leader that should justify a perpetuation of
information chasm within the rank and file of a union. Another interviewed
member opined as follows:
"Communication flow within the union is the only thing that 
is lacking. Personally, it is fine because due to my 
popularity, union leaders want to always communicate with 
me but I  wouldn 't say because I  am always in tune with them, 
there is no communication gap. There is a very big, 
communication gap and that is why we are having certain 
problems; communication is one o f  the big problems we are 
having. The union leaders are not readily accessible
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although personally I  can see any o f them whenever I  want
. )> to
The interviewee seemed particularly pleased about his contribution, he continued:
“Although I  am not an executive, on my own I  had to ensure 
that all workers comply (with strike order) including those 
who are within my domain. This shows my level o f  
commitment.... l a m a  very popular person, outgoing and 
even though la m  not a union executive, I  do more than 
them...I decided not to be union leader fo r  now because I  am 
already an official in my social club but I  am already 
thinking o f running fo r  office and some members are already 
encouraging me to contest ”.
This interviewee’s response proffers an insight into the nature of the 
relationships union leaders forge with individual members and the possible 
existence of preferential treatments. Apparently, some leaders are biased 
towards developing close acquaintance with certain members for certain 
reasons. One of the reasons which has been suggested relates to the relative 
popularity or influence of members. Fashoyin (1987) alluded to an “inner 
caucus” in the unions comprising of members who are often die-hard union 
activists. It can be argued that these people are usually the first ones to know 
whatever may be up in the union as well as privy to union-related information. 
But these are a minority and may not exceed five members or probably few 
more.
The majority of members across unions also feel that there is unity within the 
ranks of union leaders (fig.8.8). This is in spite of earlier observations made in 
the literature about the existence of personality clashes and occasional rivalry
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between union officials as well as inter and intra-union disputes. For example, 
in 1983, a major internal crisis in NUPENG led to two rival factions (i.e. two 
presidents and two secretary generals) fighting for sole custody of the union’s 
secretariat and the union’s account. After a series of court injunctions and 
counter injunctions, the government eventually intervened in 1986 by dissolving 
both executives, and appointed a sole administrator with a mandate to hold fresh 
elections. NUPENG subsequently came back fully in 1987.
Why is the general perception of the rank and file indicative of a coherent and 
united leadership despite the above? One possible explanation for this is that 
members probably defined “unity” in the context of the union fighting for 
workers i.e. a mentality of “them” (management/government) against “us” 
(workers/leaders). Also some argued that cases of personality clashes or 
divisions are exceptions rather than the norm and thus cannot be regarded as 
permanent characteristics of the unions. Alternatively, one could assume that 
the responses were probably indicative of events at AP in particular and not 
necessarily of NUPENG in general.
Fig. 8.8 there is unity amongst union leaders (N = 82)
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Table 8.6 Union Leadership Satisfaction in AP
N Mean Std. Deviation F Sig.
junior staff 
(NUPENG)
31 20.7419 2.71990 6.934 .002
senior staff 
(PENGASSAN)
30 18.2667 2.72831
Contract staff 
(NUPENG)
21 20.6190 3.16980
Total 82 19.8049 3.04468
Mean scores on aggregate union leadership satisfaction items indicate that the 
membership attitude is more positive in NUPENG than PENGASSAN (table 
8.6). Junior staff NUPENG scored higher than contract staff NUPENG 
suggesting that overall, members in the former are more satisfied with their 
leaders. The result was significant as the tables indicates.
MHWUN
It is interesting how MHWUN the union leadership handles discipline within its ranks 
(table 8.7). The example of the vice chairman who was suspended for two months for 
a misdemeanor is only one case out of several others. Other examples were reported 
in a newsletter dated 14/12/1998 which indicated that a total of seven union officials
strongly d isagree 
3.6%
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were dismissed by the union’s Central Working Committee: 4 officials (2 organizing 
secretaries and 2 senior clerical officers) had their appointments terminated on 
disciplinary grounds; 1 head of department and 1 assistant secretary general were 
sacked based on official fraud; 1 federal area council chairman was removed from 
office and banned for 5 years from holding any union’s office. All actions were taken 
on the recommendation of a 3-man investigation panel set up by the union.
It appears that there is no sacred cow as far as the issue of discipline in the union is 
concerned. For instance, the National General Secretary was asked to proceed on a 
six-month accumulated annual leave (story also reported in Daily Labour, vol.7 no.2, 
February 28, 2002). The leave which became effective January 15 2002 was part of 
the decisions reached by the Central Working Committee which alleged that the GS 
had no good intention for the union but would rather pursue personal interests at the 
detriment of the organization. He was forced to go on leave following alleged 
contradictions in the way and manner he headed a public relations committee set up 
by the union.
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Table 8.7 Leadership issues: interpersonal conflicts inter-union rivalry,
corruption, etc.
Dates Notes
18/12/1985 A misunderstanding between the two organs of the union : the state president 
queried the federal organ representatives for not bringing him up to speed 
concerning the activities of the assistant organizing secretary who was 
supposed to be responsible to him but was acting otherwise.
14/09/1988 Rivalry between the two organs intensifies: meeting called to asked the 
Federal Executives why they decided to stop the payment of their cheques 
through the State Council. The Federal Executives responded that they took 
the decision because of frustration due to the non-financial assistance and 
delay in payment of their shares by the State Council.
22/09/1988 An impending court case with a rival union competing for same members was 
discussed.
14/07/1988 Branches are not reporting their activities nor submitting their “Branch 
Activity Report Form” as expected.
17/08/1989 An anonymous letter was written from one of the branches (psychiatric 
hospital) to the Inspector General of police on cases of fraudulent practices 
within the union.
23/02/1991 Problems encountered from rival a union (NASU i.e. Non-Academic Staff 
Union of Nigeria). Secretary noted: “through the steadfastness of our loyal 
officers and men.. .we were able to contain them (rival union)..”
19/12/2001 Council’s vice chairman accused of giving false information as regards a 
strike action in his branch. He was suspended for 2 months.
The union in a bid to help itself out of a pressing fundamental problem resolved to set 
up a public relations committee. The committee was given a grant of N500,000.00. 
The general secretary headed the committee and allegedly muzzled down other 
members. He didn’t allow others to take part in the committee thereby preventing the 
committee from functioning. The chairman was summoned by the CWC to defend 
himself and account for the N500,00.00 granted his committee. His defense and 
explanations on how the fund was disbursed were not satisfactory hence he was sent 
on leave to pave way for the new tempo in the union to stabilize. At the time of this 
study, the GS was yet to be recalled.
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One could appreciate why the union needed to adopt a tough stand on accountability 
and responsible behaviour by its leaders. The union was hit by financial crisis in June 
2001 when it relocated to its headquarters in Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) 
without appropriate cost implication analysis of such a political decision. Sources in 
the union hinted that the movement affected substantial finances of the union. It was 
estimated that over N3million was expended on secretarial accommodation, 
transportation, office partitioning, furnishing and equipment among others. A critical 
source in the union blamed the problems on the poor secretariat administration. 
According to the source, excessive, frivolous and unaccountable number of fraudulent 
travel claims accounted for over 40% of the union’s current crisis.
Money incurred via bogus travel claims whereby officials go about their private 
affairs spending weeks in the process and are paid heavy claims and allowances has 
allegedly brought the union to its present crisis. Financial recklessness, over 
invoicing and deliberate diversion of check offs by some state officials and brazen 
looting of the union’s treasury in some instances were the problems cited. At the end 
of January, 2002, November 2001, staff salaries have not been paid. Over 
N3.5million left in the union’s coffers by the previous executive was squandered 
without any concrete achievement to show for it beside relocation to Abuja. This 
situation led to the re-organization of the national secretariat and state councils across 
the country the consequence of which was the various sackings mentioned earlier. 
However at the branches where members were asked their opinions about their union 
leaders, the responses were largely positive with the majority saying that they 
believed their leaders were very effective (fig. 8.9), hardworking (fig. 8.10) and
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responsible (fig. 8.11). This results suggest that to the majority of the rank and file, 
the leaders are getting the job done. In one of the branches for instance (health 
management board), there was a successful strike which resulted in increased salary 
for workers. Similarly, a branch at Apapa had recently successfully negotiated 
increase in bonuses for its members from N500.00 to N l,000.00.
Fig. 8.9 Union leaders are very effective (N = 111)
strongly disagree
Missing
.9%
.9%
strongly agree 
34.8%
disagree
2.7%
not sure
55.4%
agree
5.4%
Fig. 8.10 union leaders are very hardworking (N = 112)
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strongly  ag re e  
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Fig. 8.11 union leaders are very responsible (N = 112)
strongly d isag ree
.9%____________
strongly a g re e  
41.1%
d isag ree
5.4%
not su re  
5.4%
ag ree
47.3%
But one area which the leaders appear to be lacking is in the area of information 
dissemination (fig. 8.12), a situation which mirrors a similar position in NUPENG. 
The initial impression which these findings convey is one of leaders who are 
undemocratic and who probably run the unions without consideration for their 
members’ input. Some workers probably feel this way, but this is apparently not the 
case with most members. A majority o f respondents in both unions indicated that 
decisions within the union are taken in general meetings of workers. Thus, the 
information gap cited could be related to issues concerned with management-union
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negotiations and its outcomes, the bottom line being that many workers feel they are 
not being told everything they need to know concerning what goes on in the union.
Fig. 8.12 How well informed do your leaders keep you on what is happening in 
the union? (N = 110)
M issing
1.8 %
v ery  poorly
ra th e r  poorly 
29.5%
In a way, the issue is related to the question of trust between the members and their 
leaders. In one of the branches for instance, the union and management meets every 
two years (biennial contract negotiations) to review workers’ contracts. Before the 
meeting, the leaders normally have a general meeting with their members during 
which proposed demands are discussed and agreed upon (e.g. car allowance, salary 
increase, etc.). The next stage entails sending this proposal to management who sets a 
date for a meeting (usually two days after the notification). This meeting usually 
takes place outside the work premises and staff buses are used to convey the leaders 
involved in the negotiation to the venue.
According to the secretary interviewed, the last negotiation which took place in 2000 
concluded with the union winning a modest salary increase for the workers. But 
because the percentage increase which was agreed upon at the workers general
246
meeting was much higher than what was eventually won, some workers became 
suspicious. In fact one of the members interviewed said that although he appreciates 
the efforts of the union in general, he is convinced that union leaders “sell-out” to 
management during negotiations. But the secretary claimed that they do their best to 
hold out on their original demands, but sometimes management comes up with 
genuine reasons why these cannot be met and hence why both parties needed to arrive 
at a compromise.
This example demonstrates the intricate position which union leaders often find 
themselves. It is difficult for leaders sometimes to balance their members’ demands 
and expectations with realistic and achievable goals. But if  there is trust, then there is 
no reason why members should not believe that what their leaders tell them is the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth. However, trust between two parties is arguably 
a function of past experiences or precedents. In other words, it is something that is 
developed over a period of time. Therefore, if  members are finding it difficult to trust 
their leaders, then it is necessary for the latter to discuss these issues with their 
members, get them in the open and be totally sincere about them (a truth and 
reconciliation type kind of meeting). This will help set past records straight so that 
both parties can embark upon building a relationship based on trust, sincerity and 
openness.
The nature of leadership rivalry in MHWUN appears to differ from that observed in 
NUPENG. To start with, since its existence, there has never been a situation whereby 
the national leadership in MHWUN was disputed to the extent that two or more 
factions tried to seize control of the union (as it occurred in NUPENG). In both
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unions however, there have been personality clashes occurring vertically between 
leaders in the same executive council or horizontally between executives from 
different strata of union leadership. This situation is neither strange nor peculiar to 
the unions. It is hardly possible for every single individual within a group situation to 
see eye to eye or agree on everything. Unfortunately, certain arguments become 
overheated while some disagreements become personal, leading to clash of 
personalities. In other cases leaders may fall out over jurisdictions, positions or issues 
of seniority. But as long as these issues are amicably resolved and not allowed to 
interfere with the business of running the union, they are usually not terminal.
Inter-union disputes are also a feature of both MHWUN and NUPENG.
Although the federal government has supposedly outlined the criteria for the 
membership of industrial unions, these criteria are often contested in courts. It 
is not surprising that unions compete with one another over the right to organize 
workers since there is much to gain from a high membership figure in terms of 
finance (checked-off dues) and influence (strike action). Arguably when unions 
are busy fighting one another at the work place and in the law courts (table 8.8), 
they could be distracted from the business of fighting over issues that really 
matter to the workers. The tussle between MHWUN and NASU in one of the 
branches and between the former and NULGE (Nigerian Union of Local 
Government Employees) in another branch was an unwelcome distraction to the 
unions and one which must have played into the hands of the management.
Besides, it can be argued that non-union members would not have been at all 
impressed at the activities of the unions. Hence it is necessary for the unions to 
devise means of resolving these issues peacefully amongst themselves, with the
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NLC possibly acting as conciliator. Unfortunately, disputing unions seem 
happy going to court to settle their differences rather than accept the 
intervention of the NLC.
8.5 Early Union Socialization Experience
Early union socialization experience has been found to be positively correlated 
with all aspects of commitment to the union (Van Maanen and Schein, 1979;
Gordon et al, 1980). However, Clark et al (1993) found that formal and 
informal socialisation experiences each made an independent contribution to 
membership commitment. Formal socialisation involves a systematic program 
or events aimed at orientating new members into the life of the union whereas 
informal socialization entails discretional inductions of new members by 
existing members or union officials through personal meetings within or outside 
of the work environment. This enquiry thus needs to establish the type of early 
socialisation experience the Nigerian members were exposed to.
NUPENG
There is no formal programme aimed at socializing new members into the ways and 
life of the union. In this study, formal socialisation experience is defined as organised 
orientation programmes conducted by union officials and designed to introduce the 
new members to the union. In all the interviews held with officials from NUPENG 
and PENGASSAN, the response was the same: there were no special arrangements or 
specific program for new members. The normal practice seems to be to leave new 
members to their own devices and hope they become used to attending meetings,
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voting in union elections and so on. New members are ‘socialized’ informally on a 
one to one basis via interacting with other members in the workplace.
Union leaders may interact with new members on an individual basis such as 
when a supervisor reports a member to his leader for misdemeanor or the 
member has a personal grievance to report to the leader. Otherwise, the onus is 
usually on the new members to make enquiries concerning anything that 
pertains to the union -  if they are interested. One NUPENG member 
interviewed said that “..when new people join the union, they feel at home, they 
come we chat, and all that...others will usually refer them to me and I try to 
orientate them concerning the rudiments of what it really takes to be in the 
union”. For those with a previous background in trade unionism, integration 
into the union is relatively faster.
Fig 8.13 Understanding of union goals (N = 82)
Missing
1.2%_____________
very little understa 
26.5%
fair understanding
32.5%
When asked about their understanding of their union goals within the first few 
weeks and months of joining the union, around 26% said they had good 
understanding, just about the same number who said they had very little
very good understand
12.0%
understanding
27.7%
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understanding (fig. 8.13). In terms of help and assistance received from old 
members and union leaders, very few respondents complained of outright lack 
of support (fig. 8.14 and 8.15). This suggests that old members seemed 
generally willing to help new members of the union. The nature of assistance 
usually include advising new members on the grievance procedure, offering 
support when they encounter problems at work (e.g. problems with supervisor), 
lending support during special occasions (birthdays, weddings, etc.) and 
offering morale and financial support in times of illness or bereavement.
Fig. 8.14 support and encouragement received from other members (N= 80)
Missing
3.6%
very great amount
little amount
16.9%
-------------------------  8.4%
fair amount
great amount
31.3%
30.1% ------------------------
Fig. 8.15 Support and encouragement received from leaders (N = 81)
M issing
2 .4%____________
very  g re a t am o u n t 
24.1%
g re a t a m o u n t 
31.3%
very little amount
9.6%
very  little am o u n t
9 .6%
little am o u n t 
6 .0%
fa ir  am o u n t 
26 .5%
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Table 8.81 Jnion Socialization experience
N Mean Std. Deviation F Sig.
Junior staff (NUPENG)) 30 10.0667 3.20488 6.517 .002
Senior staff (PENGASSAN) 30 8.2000 2.57843
Contract staff (NUPENG) 21 10.9762 2.62905
Total 81 9.6111 3.02903
Comparison of the unionization process across the three unions suggests that 
NUPENG members had a better experience (table 8.8). The tendency to relegate 
socialization issues to the background in the PENGASSAN union appear to be 
more pronounced. In a general sense, the results suggest that despite the absence 
of a formal socialization system within the unions, most members responded 
favorably to the informal procedure. The absence of an institutionalized 
mechanism for integrating new members into the union can be explained as due to 
a variety of reasons. Firstly, finance is arguably a factor. To organize seminars 
towards orientating new members cost money which the unions complained is in 
short supply. Apart from the usual cost of general organizing (e.g. hiring a venue, 
providing induction packs, etc.), some workers often require extra incentive - such 
as the promise of refreshments - to ensure their attendance. Such workers are 
usually in the habit of first asking to see the agenda hoping that ‘item 7’ 
(traditionally ‘menu’ at most functions) is there. Some even interpret the 
acronym R.S. V.P (usually at the end of an invitation) to mean ‘rice and stew very 
plenty’!
Another reason can be best explained in relation to the activities of trade unions 
as they are perceived by the generality of workers. It is argued that the average 
non-unionized Nigerian worker does not need a lecture to associate a trade 
union with three things: class identity, benefits and strikes. The concept of an
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‘association’ or ‘union’ is not new to most workers because many are already 
members of a tribal and/or social union comprising people of similar identity. 
Thus, most people know that the union is for the working class as much as an 
employers association is for the ‘ruling class’. Also, it can be argued that all 
workers have the idea that trade unions exist for the benefit of workers (even if 
some exponents of free market economies may disagree) and often use the 
strike option to obtain these benefits.
Thus, having this basic untutored understanding of the union, it is not surprising 
that most members rarely complained about the absence of an ‘orientation 
program on trade unionism’ for new members in the company. Apparently, it 
is assumed that everybody knows what the union is generally about. When it 
comes to breaking down these general benefits into specific objectives (e.g. 
wage increase, improving conditions of service, education of members, 
promoting industrial harmony, rendering social benefits, etc.) and union 
strategies, the leaders expect members to learn “on-the-job”.
The socializing of members in non-formal settings (e.g. while at work, in 
cafeterias during lunch, at bus-stops waiting for bus or on the bus, etc.) seem to 
compensate for the lack of a more regimented approach. However this does not 
eradicate the need for the unions to have a well-organized and regular forum to 
orientate new members on its activities. By so doing the unions stand to help 
the members to maximize the benefits of the socialization process. Also, the 
unions cannot afford to be complacent about showing genuine interest in new 
members’ personal lives and well being as this can enhance and strengthen the
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process of bonding with such members. Leaders should not wait until these 
members are reported by their superiors before having the first individual 
contact with them. By deliberately initiating personal contacts, leaders open up 
the possibility for the formation of friendships which have the potentials of 
growing even beyond the boundaries of trade unionism.
MHWUN
The analysis proffered in the case of NUPENG concerning the approach of the union 
concerning the socialization of its members equally applies in this context. Union 
officials seem to enjoy some financial and social benefits (table 8.9) e.g. loans, mobile 
phones, etc. perhaps more than ordinary members could aspire. This is not surprising 
since they are the ones making the decisions by virtue of their positions. This coupled 
with the other benefits that come with the holding of union office such as honorariums 
/sitting allowances / transportation allowance, it is not surprising that union leaders in 
Nigeria are usually more committed to union activities than ordinary members 
(Fashoyin, 1987).
The union occasionally organizes seminars and workshop programs. A few examples
t l i  tf»include a 3-day national seminar which took place on the 18 to 20 June 1996 with 
its theme on “the Nigerian trade union and the democratic culture”. Another example 
is a 3-day national workshop on “team building in labour relations” which was hosted 
on 12th -14th and 18th -20th of Sept 2001 for all principal national and state officers, 
chairmen, secretaries of each MHWUN LGA branches and various management 
executives. The first one was free (sponsored by the American labour center) but the 
latter was at a fee of N15,000. By way of organizing seminars both at national and
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regional levels, MHWUN appear to be more committed than NUPENG towards the 
enlightenment and education of its members concerning trade unionism. But the 
majority of these seminars are usually for high ranking union officials and in some 
cases are revenue-driven (as in the latter example).
Table 8.9 Socialization, financial benefits and related matters
Dates Notes
13/04/1988 Send-off party organized for a retiring comrade. Sitting allowance which 
overdue for members also discussed.
14/07/1988 Sitting allowance discussed.
20/10/1988 Traveling expenses of the chairman discussed and transportation allowance 
(N300.00) approved. A wedding notice of one of the officers was read to 
members.
9/03/1989 Transportation allowance at N5.00 per visit was approved for officials 
encountering problems commuting to the office for their duties. Wedding 
invitations discussed and a loan application by an official (for school fees 
and attendance at a residential 5 day course) approved.
24/11/2001/ Decision taken to acquire GSM (mobile phones) for executive members.
At the branch level, the socialization situation is not much different from what was 
observed at NUPENG whereby no special arrangement is made for members’ 
socialization or education (even though the constitution of both unions states this as 
an objective). The author’s observation was that individual branches are seemingly 
required to see to the education and socialization of their respective members. Hence 
in one particular branch, one finds some effort being made by the branch executive 
towards formal socialization of new members whereas in others, reliance is solely on 
informal method of integrating members. Nevertheless, members’ responses 
concerning what their experience was like within the first few weeks and months of
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their journey revealed that the majority o f them had at least a fair understanding of the 
union goals (fig. 8.16), received support and encouragement and support from 
members (fig. 8.17) and union leaders (fig.8.18).
Fig. 8.16 Understanding of union goals (N = 111)
Missing
.9%_______________
very littte understa 
22 .3%
fair understanding 
29 .5%
Fig. 8.17 Support and encouragement received from members (N = 111)
Missing
.9%____________
very great amount 
10.7%
great amount 
28.6%
very good understand
20 .5 %
understanding
26 .8%
very little amount
8.9%
little amount 
15.2%
fair amount 
35.7%
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Fig. 8.18 support and encouragement received from union leaders (N = 112)
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25.9%
8.5. Conclusion
In concluding, it is necessary to examine the questions set out at the beginning of this 
chapter in the light of the findings above.
(1) To what extent has the structure and organisation o f  the unions contributed to 
their commitment levels and participation in union activities?
From the previous chapter (see tables 7.3 and 7.4), the relevance of branch level 
organisation to the commitment and participation has been suggested and this study 
simply confirms it. In a situation where one company has one union representing all 
categories of workers and another has a union for each category of workers, there 
could be varying degree of effectiveness. For example whilst NUPENG and 
PENGASSAN are able to focus on the needs of their respective constituents with less 
distractions, some senior staff members in MHWUN have been known to show 
resentment towards the latter and there have been reports of attempts by some to 
actually form a rival union although this has not been successful. This situation also
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engenders differences in union policies, organization, style of leadership and leaders’ 
accessibility and these have been known to play a role in facilitating the involvement 
of the rank-and-file membership, as well as a key role in union-management relations 
(Barling et al, 1992). In other words, variations in these factors probably results in 
variations in the commitment level in the two sectors. It would be noted from the 
previous chapter that perception of information dissemination varied significantly in 
accordance with staff typology (table 7.5).
(2) Judging from  the significant role played by union instrumentality as revealed in 
the quantitative surveys, how has the unions fared in this respect ?
The records of unions in both sectors with respect to fighting for the rights of workers 
seems laudable enough and NUPENG’s record seem to suggest that it is more 
aggressive and dynamic than MHWUN. In African Petroleum, NUPENG members 
appeared to have a higher instrumental perception as well as a higher level of union 
commitment than PENGASSAN members. Furthermore, some revealed MHWUN 
branches provide some sort of social benefits for their members in the form of loans ( 
to purchase medicines). Officials in these unions also enjoy benefits such as loans for 
educational purposes, special occasions (e.g. wedding) or to enable them to attend 
non-union related conferences, seminars or workshops.
Admittedly, it might not be sufficient to form a conclusion on the causes of members’ 
union instrumentality perception based on the evidence presented here alone. Union 
instrumentality perception could have been influenced by a whole range of other 
events predating the ones cited in this study; similarly some events not covered could 
have induced negative perceptions of the unions by some members. At best, it can be
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argued that the successes recorded by the unions and covered in this study form a part 
of the factors that have helped to shape the union instrumentality perception of the 
members. The unions do have records which appear worthy enough to elicit their 
members instrumentality perception.
(3) Since evidence from the surveys indicate that leadership satisfaction also 
occupied a central role in the union commitment process, to what extent can it be 
said that the leaders enjoyed their members* loyalty and trust?
Generally, union leaders in both sectors have the support of their members and this 
arguably informed the positive correlation between leadership satisfaction and union 
commitment. In African Petroleum, NUPENG members have a more positive view of 
their leaders than PENGASSAN members with respect to the leaders’ effectiveness.
A significant number within the membership in both sectors seemed unimpressed 
with the level of information sharing within the union. That this situation appeared 
not to have affected members’ overall leadership satisfaction suggests that as long as 
the leaders are effective in other areas (e.g. winning financial concessions) the 
members may not be too concerned about the situation.
With regards to information dissemination, NUPENG leaders were adjudged poorer 
by their members than PENGASSAN leaders were of their members. Most of the 
branches currently rely on word of mouth and notice boards to pass across 
information and it may be argued that these mediums are probably not effective 
enough. The use of newsletters and bulletins are also employed but only at a higher 
level (national and state) and even then this seemed to be happening only in
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MHWUN. But the problem may not be solely connected to the medium of 
information dissemination. It might also be a function of the willingness of members 
to believe that their leaders are actually telling the whole truth. In other words, there 
could be a problem of trust such as when members think there is certain information 
management and union leaders connive to keep from workers (e.g. leaders “selling 
out” to management by easing up on workers’ demands). This situation was 
reflected in the NUPENG branch when a member said he appreciates the effort of the 
union leaders but insisted the latter “normally sell out during negotiations regarding 
workers’ benefits”. Where this happens to be valid, workers’ confidence and trust in 
their leaders is shaken and as a consequence the union commitment of the workers 
affected.
(4) What sort o f  union socialisation programme exists in these unions?
Unions in both sectors lacked any special format regarding the socialization of their 
new members but informal socialization at the work place may have compensated for 
this inadequacy. It seems that the relatively weaker influence of early socialization 
experience is down to the general absence of a formal socialization program within 
the unions. All the same the informal socialization taking place appear strong since it 
was almost solely responsible for the factor’s contribution to union commitment and 
union participation. In a sense, this situation of informal socialization is actually a 
reflection of the wider society which is characterized by a culture of close-nit 
extended family relationships. This situation arguably permeates other informal 
social settings such as tribal unions, social clubs, etc. Consequently, union members 
may be treating new members as they would members of an extended family thus 
making it relatively easy for informal socialization to exist and flourish.
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Summary
This chapter has attempted to build on the quantitative findings of previous chapters 
through a qualitative study of the unions’ settings and individual experiences. It is 
apparent from the results that the significance of union attitudes in the quantitative 
study is arguably related to the branch level organization of the unions, level of active 
union interventions in matters of economic benefits to the unions, extent to which the 
leaders are trusted and the manner of early union socialization of members.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Introduction
This research has investigated the factors responsible for the development and 
sustenance of union commitment amongst trade union members in Nigeria. In this 
concluding chapter, the applications, implications and limitations of the study’s main 
findings are discussed against the backdrop of the hypotheses which guided the 
investigation. First a discussion of the hypotheses is done followed by the 
implications of the findings, the study’s limitations and suggestions for future 
research.
9.1 Discussion of findings
Hypothesis 1. Attitudes towards management, extrinsic job satisfaction and 
satisfaction with life will have a direct effect on union commitment level and union 
participation. This hypothesis was not confirmed. In particular the hypothesis of job 
satisfaction predicting union commitment and union participation were disconfirmed. 
This supports the findings of Barling et al (1990), Deery et al (1994) and Magenau et 
al (1988). One possible explanation may be found in the members’ perception of 
union-management relations which the majority of respondents said was very good. 
Arguably for job dissatisfaction to translate into any gains for unions in terms of 
members’ commitment and participation, the union would need to persuade their 
members that management is to blame for their job grievances (Premack and Hunter, 
1988). However, in the unions studied, members and leaders seemed to be generally 
positive towards management. For example, the restructuring at AP which saw some
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workers being laid off was handled very maturely on both sides after the management 
explained the rationale for the exercise. Apparently, the measure was aimed at saving 
the company from liquidation and members seemed happy with the explanation 
proffered.
Still, it is pertinent to note that correlation results indicated a weak positive correlation 
between job dissatisfaction and union commitment (r = 0.20, p < .000) and 
participation (r =0.18, p < .002). This suggests that one cannot conclusively dismiss 
the relevance of job dissatisfaction to the union commitment process. For instance, 
the most cited reason for union joining by contract/casual workers in AP was “to win 
more wages and better working conditions”. This supports an observation that 
perceived inequity in wages is positively and significantly related to the willingness to 
unionise among blue-collar workers (Kochan 1979; Smock, 1969; Fashoyin, 1987). 
The contract workers seem to have the highest level of job dissatisfaction due to their 
poor working conditions. It should also be noted that they have their own union 
within the same company. This suggests that the type of union under investigation 
may influence the relationship between job dissatisfaction and union commitment.
The non-confirmation of the hypothesis concerning life satisfaction may be due to the 
fact that only one item was used for the scale. The item was the last of Warr et al, 
(1980)’ 10 item-scale which assesses satisfaction with various aspects of individual 
life. Members were required to summarise their overall life experience by being 
asked if they were satisfied with their life as a whole (although a few instances were 
given in parenthesis such as health, family, education etc. to give the respondents an 
idea of the various aspects of life worth considering). This situation probably posed
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some problems to some who may have preferred to respond in specific terms rather 
than summarise their overall experiences. An initial questionnaire which was drawn 
up was perceived to be too lengthy and a pruning was considered necessary.
Although correlation results indicate a weak and positive relationship (r = .27, p 
< .000), multiple regression results indicated that satisfaction with management was 
not a significant predictor of union commitment for the Nigerian sample. There is 
evidence that a good number of union members were persuaded to join their unions 
by management. The second highest response across sector (31%) was one in which 
members claimed they were persuaded by management to join, next to those who said 
they joined on their own (40%). This supports Ubeku’s (1980) observation that 
managers in Nigeria encourage their workers to join unions.
Hypothesis 2, Demographic characteristics will have a direct effect on union 
commitment levels as well as union participation. Demographic variables of age, 
education, membership tenure, and ethnic group were not significantly related to 
union commitment and union participation. But because gender and sector were 
found to be significant in the model, the hypothesis that demographic factors will be 
significantly related to the two dependent variables was partially confirmed. The 
significance of gender in the case of union participation {beta = .15) supports earlier 
findings (Gordon et al, 1980; Gallagher and Clark, 1989; Dale, 1992; Okoronkwo, 
1985; Olajunmoke, 1985).
Males participated more in union activities than females and this result was significant 
(t = 2.84, p <.01). This arguably reflects their higher levels of integration into the
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union. Males also did significantly better in all the various dimensions of union 
participation with the exception of voting in union elections. These results support a 
similar observation within the Nigerian literature (Fashoyin, 1987; Okoronkwo, 1985; 
Olajunmoke, 1985). No variation was found for voting in union elections probably 
because it is a quadrennial event and not as frequent as the holding of union meetings. 
The knowledge that another election will not come up until another four years may 
have persuaded female voters - who otherwise would not have participated for one 
reason or the other - to make the necessary “sacrifice” to vote in the elections.
Also, the persuasion from campaigners during elections may have ensured that 
women were not significantly outdone by men in voting at elections. It is pertinent to 
point out that the significant variation in union participation between the sexes 
occurred despite the fact that males and females did not differ significantly in their 
level of union commitment. This situation is similar to Gordon et al’s (1980) finding 
except that Gordon et al found females’ expression of union loyalty to be significantly 
higher than males.
The fact that men participated significantly more in union activities than women in 
the case of the Nigerian sample could be a reflection of other factors such as the 
greater experience of work/family conflict among working women and their 
traditional family responsibilities. For example, in one of the unions (MHWUN), a 
female executive member requested a change in meeting time in order for her to be 
able to juggle her union role with family responsibilities. She attributed her late 
comings to meetings and occasional absence as due to these responsibilities. A 
female union auditor was not so lucky. In one of the union executive meetings, on
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observing that she had not been turning up for sometime, the house moved to have an 
interim replacement for her. Thus, female members were as committed as their male 
counterparts but their traditional family responsibilities could have played a part in the 
results on union participation. Sector was a moderator in the model (beta = .27).
There were significant differences in union commitment and participation across 
sector (union commitment: t = 3.522, p <.000; participation: t = 3.522, p <.01). This 
partially supports Roy (1992)’s finding which showed that union commitment is 
different for public and private sector employees (see below).
The non-confirmation of the hypothesis on education negates studies (Warmington, 
1960; Smock, 1969; Lubeck, 1975) which have suggested that the degree of 
participation of members is predicated on their level of education. There is however 
support for those that found no significant relationship between education and union 
commitment (Fashoyin, 1987; Barling et al, 1990; Fukami and Larson, 1984;
Magenau et al, 1988). This situation could be related to the fact that most of the 
respondents have had some education, the great majority having attained some post 
secondary school qualification. The Nigerian labour force has also become more 
educated within the last decade (Nigerian Embassy, 2001). The results also suggest 
that union commitment and participation for the union member in Nigeria is not really 
about qualifications but about knowing what the union stands for and what it can 
achieve for the members. Union commitment and participation thus did not 
discriminate between the various cadres of certificate holders in the sample because of 
a general awareness of the usefulness of trade unions among the membership.
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The result on age supports several studies which have found no significant 
relationship between age and union loyalty (Bemmels, 1995; Deery et al, 1994; 
Magenau et al, 1988; Sherer and Morishima, 1989). In the case of Nigerian workers, 
it can be observed that a significant majority of them are in their thirties which shows 
that the Nigeria workforce is young. Fashoyin (1987) whose sample had a majority of 
respondents less than 35 years old also found no significant effect of age on union 
participation. Lubeck’s (1975) observation that union leaders were recruited from 
older and more experienced workers is supported by this study. In the qualitative 
study, out of a total of 54 respondents who said they occupied union office, 33% were 
between 25 - 34 years and 44% between 35 - 44 years and only 3% were between 19- 
24years. Fashoyin (1987) observed that office holders tended to participate more in 
union activities. This may not just be informed by the leaders’ sense of obligation 
connected with their status. Financial incentives could have played a significant role 
by acting as an inducement and source of motivation for the union officers. 
Investigation in this study reveal that union leaders are paid honorariums each time 
they attend meetings. The amount differs according to levels of leadership. For 
example, in MHWUN, sitting allowance at the national level is N2000 per sitting for 
the duration of the meeting, state level is N500.00 while the branch level varies from 
branch to branch but ranges between N250.00 and N300.00.
Union membership tenure was also found not to be a significant predictor for either 
union commitment or union participation. The present study shows that there is no 
empirical basis to support any notion that those who have been union members for a 
longer period will be more committed to the union or engage more frequently in union 
activities. Although Fashoyin (1987) suggested that there is a positive relationship
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between the length of membership in the union and the propensity to contest elections, 
it should be noted that contesting elections is only one dimension of union 
participation. From a multidimensional perspective, union tenure appears not to be a 
significant source of variation within the sample.
Ethnicity was also found not to constitute a significant source of variance in the 
members’ union commitment and participation. This might be due to changing 
attitudes within the labour movement regarding the objectives of worker 
representation in relation to clan or tribal affiliations. According to Akinlaja (1999), 
NUPENG’s leaders eschewed tribalism because they realised that irrespective of their 
ethnic background, they all have the same objective and faced the same threats in the 
work place. Generally speaking, members and leaders of different ethnic 
backgrounds get along within the unions studied. In AP for example, the workers 
interviewed all hailed from different parts of the country and all of them responded in 
the negative when asked if they observed divisions or problems within the union 
which were based on ethnicity or tribalism. However, in one union where the general 
secretary (an easterner) accused the chairman (southerner) of single-handedly running 
the union, the former claimed that there is tribalism in the union. But the secretary 
may be either correct or displaying “displacement of aggression” i.e. extrapolating 
from his personal differences with the chairman to generalise his accusation.
On balance, it appears that the union members are capable of divorcing their ethnic 
identities from union allegiances and not allowing the former to dictate the latter.
This situation should be viewed positively by the unions because it is a good sign if 
the situation can be maintained. Worker representation should be about the working
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class organising to improve the collective lot of workers regardless of their race, 
ethnicity, colour or creed. Ethnic and tribal considerations exerting a significant 
effect on the commitment of members can potentially interfere with this collective 
objective. When a section of a union membership withholds their loyalty to the union 
because the leader is not “our son” (like the 36% who preferred to have top officers of 
the union from their part of Ibo land in Smock (1969)’s study) or in protest against 
“politically motivated” decisions by leaders, the overall effectiveness of the union 
could be affected.
Hypothesis 3: Perceptions about the instrumentality o f the union, union socialization 
experiences, and attitudes towards union leaders will have a direct influence on the 
union commitment levels and union participation. The hypothesis that union attitudes 
will impact significantly on the union commitment levels of the members was 
confirmed. From the results of correlation and multiple regression, the significant 
predictors of union commitment were factors associated with union characteristics 
and perception namely union instrumentality perception (r = 0.73, p < .000; beta 
= .47), satisfaction with union leadership (r = 0.74, p <. 000; beta = .35) and early 
union socialisation experience^ = 0.44, p < .000; beta = .13). The results support 
earlier studies (Fullgar and Barling, 1989; Kelloway et al, 1990; Bamberger et al, 
1999; Fuller and Hester, 1993; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1994) and suggest that when 
members have a positive instrumental perception of their unions, they are more likely 
to express feelings of commitment towards their union.
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Union Instrumentality
The observation that union members in Nigeria have a strong union instrumentality 
perception is also mentioned within the Nigerian literature (Fashoyin, 1987; Cohen, 
1974). However, this research has added to our knowledge by showing the 
connection between union instrumentality perception and union commitment. The 
study has demonstrated how Nigerian workers’ perceived union instrumentality 
impacts on their affective commitment before resulting in behavioural commitment 
(union participation). It is easy to conceive of why the union members expressed a 
positive instrumentality perception of their unions. Apparently the unions have a 
record of notable achievements of which the members seemed to be aware. In 
addition, there were on-going union-management negotiations in some of the 
branches in which the unions were either making headway or had recorded some 
breakthroughs. Thus it can be argued that the members’ union instrumentality 
perception was not merely a reflection of a theoretical understanding of what unions 
are supposed to do but rather was based on their specific perception of what their 
unions had done or were seen to be doing. Thus the respondents, arguably were not 
reacting to “the big labour image” (Deshpande and Fiorito, 1989) or expressing 
abstract general union attitudes (Youngblood et al, 1984; Kochan et al, 1986) but 
rather demonstrated specific union instrumentality.
Leadership Factors
The results support Magenau et al (1988), Morishima (1995) and Sverke and 
Sjoberg’s (1994) studies which highlighted the role of leadership attitudes. There is a 
general impression amongst Nigerian authors of a leadership crisis within the labour 
movement as a whole (Fashoyin, 1987; Smock, 1960; Remy, 1975; Cohen, 1974).
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This present study has gone a step further by showing that the attitudes of Nigerian 
members towards certain aspects of union leadership behaviour significantly 
predicted the former’ s commitment to the union. Positive leadership attitudes 
predicted union commitment for the union members such that the extent to which 
members perceived their leaders to be responsible, united and democratic was 
significantly related to the former’ s union commitment. Furthermore membership 
satisfaction is not simply a matter of unions delivering tangible gains at the bargaining 
table but also involves the extent to which the union leaders keep members informed, 
give them a say in running the union and respond to their concerns. This supports 
previous studies within the literature (Fiorito et al., 1988; Jarley et al. 1990; Iverson 
and Kuruvilla 1995; Snape and Chan 2000).
One leadership behaviour which a majority of the respondents were negative was 
information dissemination. Apparently, members felt union leaders were not up­
front with them concerning certain issues. Although the members appear to accept 
most of what their leaders tell them, they do not believe everything. For example, one 
member in a particular branch (AP) opined that he believes his leaders usually sell-out 
when it comes to negotiating with management for members’ allowances. 
Interpersonal clashes amongst leaders also play a part in the information problem.
The case of the union chairman (in AP) accused by the assistant general secretary of 
single-handedly running the union is a typical example of interpersonal clashes 
occurring between leaders. In a similar vein, the national general secretary of 
MHWUN accused the union executive of a particular branch (NAFDAC) of failing in 
their duty to keep him informed about an issue they had with management.
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that overall, most of the respondents seem to have a 
positive impression of their leaders, believing them to be hardworking and efficient.
Early Union Socialisation Experience
The results of this study support research which has suggested that early socialisation 
experiences are positively correlated with all aspects of commitment to the union 
(Van Maanen and Schein, 1979; Gordon et al, 1980). The results also give credence 
to Clark et al (1993)’s findings which found that formal and informal socialisation 
experiences each made an independent contribution to membership commitment. It 
was revealed that the unions studied lacked a formal programme of socialisation for 
new union members. But despite this apparent omission by the unions, a significant 
number of respondents still appeared to have experienced a reasonable level of 
socialisation through the informal procedure. This informal procedure of early union 
socialisation includes contacts or experiences with more senior members of the union 
in informal settings both within and outside of the work environment. The support 
and encouragement members received both in good times (birthdays, weddings, child 
dedications, etc.) and bad times (bereavement, illness, supervisor problems) formed 
an important part of this informal socialisation process.
A general excuse for the lack of formal programmes to orientate new members 
concerning union objectives seems to hinge on a notion that all workers have a basic 
understanding of the philosophy of trade unionism. From this premise, the unions did 
not seem to consider a formal approach to union socialisation as all that important or a 
priority. But this line of reasoning might be tenable only if all new members can be 
assumed to have had a trade union background (e.g. union member in a previous
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organisation or company). But this is not always the case. Even if  it is the case, 
different unions often differ in terms of what provisions and restrictions their 
members are governed by as set out in their constitutions. For example, the exact 
nature of social benefits NUPENG and MHWUN offer their members based on their 
constitution differs. Members would thus need to understand these provisions hence 
the need for a formal orientation of some sort. For example, MHWUN’s constitution 
stipulates as one of its objectives the “.. .provision of legal or other assistance when 
necessary in matters pertaining to the interest of members”. But apparently not all 
members are aware of this provision; even one MHWUN official showed ignorance 
of this objective.
Hypothesis 4. Marxist beliefs and union-politics orientation will have a direct effect 
on union commitment levels and union participation. Hypotheses concerning union 
ideological beliefs were not confirmed. Union-politics orientation had very weak 
correlations with union commitment (r= .18, p < 0.01) and union participation (r =
0.26, p < .000). Correlation with union commitment (r =. 06, p < .15) and union 
participation (r = 0.08, p < . 15) was almost non-existent in the case of Marxist beliefs. 
Thus Marxist beliefs system did not have any significant impact on the union 
commitment and participation of the union members. But there is evidence that 
union-politics orientation significantly predicted one of the dimensions of 
participation namely campaigning at union elections. More specifically, members 
who expressed the view that the unions should form a labour party engaged more in 
campaign activities and vice versa (Chi-square = 35.26; p < .000). Thus in this 
context it can be argued that there is a limited support for the hypothesis that union- 
politics orientation exert some influence in the union commitment process.
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The results also support an observation of the existence of political and economic 
unionism in Africa (Essenberg, 1985) and Cohen (1974)’s observation that Nigerian 
workers displayed considerable cynicism about politicians and politics generally. But 
contrary to Cohen (1974)’s findings that around 45 percent were prepared to tolerate 
the notion of a workers’ political party, around 50% of respondents in this study were 
not in favour of a labour party compare to 27% who were in favour. This suggests 
that since Cohen’s study, there has been a shift in attitude of the workers.
The workers at the time of Cohen’s study might have been willing to support the idea 
of a labour party despite their reservations probably because of the consideration that 
everyone deserves to be given the benefit of the doubt. But the current Nigerian 
workers apparently feel that labour has had its chance considering past abortive 
attempts (Akinlaja, 1999). Also some of the workers opposed to the idea of a labour 
party expressed the view that labour leaders cannot be trusted with political power 
and if elected will become like their predecessors. To further show that this attitude 
shift is quite significant, the workers were asked (during the second survey) if  they 
were in favour of the recent decision by the NLC to form a labour party. Seventy 
three (73%) said they did not support the idea.
Nevertheless, the overall union commitment and participation of the members seem 
not to be affected whatever their perceived orientation. This may be related to the 
argument that both economic unionists and political unionists seek the same outcomes 
albeit through different avenues. And since members generally had a relatively high 
instrumental perception of their unions based on the view that the unions seem to be
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getting the job done, there was probably found no need to base their commitment to 
the union on any particular orientation. Furthermore it is important to stress that the 
term ‘political unionists’ and ‘economic unionists’ were loosely used because they 
can be fickle, depending on the economic and political mood in the country. Also it 
has to be taken into consideration that there were other workers (around 20%) who 
did not fit into any of the labels (Undecided) and were not interested in union policies.
Marxist beliefs as a factor were not significant at all either in the tests of correlation or 
multiple regression. This result contradicts the findings of Fullager and Barling 
(1989) who argued that Marxist-related work beliefs are stronger predictors of union 
commitment among black disenfranchised workers. They found that stronger 
personal feelings of alienation and exploitation and a strong development of class 
consciousness characteristic caused greater loyalty to the union among less privileged 
sectors of the blue-collar labour force in South Africa. But this scenario is very 
different as far as the present study is concerned. Barling and Fullager’s subjects 
were black workers in an Apartheid South Africa working in an environment where 
their work situations were deliberately structured differently from the whites. Thus 
the workers were most likely aware that their situation was political rooted. Therefore 
the idea of seizing economic and political power to change the apartheid system must 
have appealed to the South African workers and made them more committed to their 
unions. Not surprisingly, COSATU played a major role in the liberation of South 
Africa from Apartheid.
But contrast this scenario with the Nigerian situation and it becomes clear why 
Marxist beliefs probably failed to exert a similar predictive effect on workers’ union
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commitment. For example the contract/casual workers within the Nigerian oil 
industry may also feel alienated, exploited and reduced to ‘third class citizens’ by the 
various managements but the main difference lie in the perceived source of the 
problem and perceived options available to address the problem. In the case of the 
South African black workers, they were probably convinced that their white 
employers had no apologies for their (workers) predicament because that was the way 
it was designed to be. In other words, it was a by-product of the apartheid system.
But the workers in Nigeria knew their unions had considerable margins to explore 
towards reducing the perceived inequality without necessarily having to adopt any 
Marxist ideology. But this is not to suggest that the Nigerian workers did not 
subscribe to Marxist beliefs. In the study, 79% of respondents were in favour of 
workers having more say in the society while 72% believed factories would be better 
run if workers had more of a say in management. However, these beliefs were not 
connected with their commitment to the union nor were they associated with their 
union participation. Their unions arguably could still be effective via negotiations, 
dialogue and the use of the strike option. Thus, the Marxist beliefs about workers 
controlling economic and political power obviously had its intuitive appeal to the 
respondents but lacked predictive value in terms of their union commitment and 
participation. Perhaps if  the situation of the Nigerian workers was similar to the one 
experienced by the black south African workers of the apartheid era, then the results 
would probably have mirrored that of the latter.
Hypothesis 5. Pro-union attitudes will act as moderators within the model; union 
commitment will predict union participation. The hypothesis that pro-union attitudes
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will act as moderators within the model was confirmed thus supporting earlier studies 
(Newton and Shore, 1992; Fullager and Barling, 1989). Newton and Shore suggested 
that the link between union instrumentality and union commitment is mediated by 
prounion attitudes. Also, in Fullager and Barling’s (1989) study, it was found that 
union instrumentality perception moderated the relationship between union loyalty 
and its antecedents of early socialisation experience, life satisfaction and work ethic 
beliefs.
In this study, controlling for union leadership attitudes, instrumentality perception and 
socialisation experiences resulted in a weaker union commitment-union participation 
link. This further reinforces the view that pro-union attitudes are the most important 
factors in the unionisation process. Also, the strength of the union instrumentality 
perception-union commitment link was significantly influenced by the moderating 
effect of union leadership attitudes. Similarly, controlling for union instrumentality 
perception weakened the relationships between union commitment and other union 
attitudes. It was only in the case of early socialisation experience that a separate 
control procedure failed to result in a weakening of the relationships between union 
commitment and other union attitudes. This may be due to observations made earlier 
on about the absence of formal socialisation programmes which could have helped the 
unions to maximise the effect of commitment of members.
It was also hypothesised that in addition to the factors impacting on union 
participation indirectly via union commitment, they will also exert a direct significant 
influence on union participation. These were confirmed in the case of union attitudes
i.e. union instrumentality perception (r = 0.42, p < .000; beta = .38), satisfaction with
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union leadership (r = 0.35, p < .000; beta = .34) and early union socialisation 
experience (r = 0.45, p < .000; beta = .16). The results of the influence of union 
instrumentality perception on participation supports Fullager and Barling (1989) who, 
firstly, found that perceived union instrumentality influences union participation 
indirectly by affecting union commitment, which in turn leads to union participation; 
and secondly that perceived union instrumentality affects union participation directly.
This is an important finding in the sense that it suggests that affective commitment is 
not the only avenue through which the members’ participation in union activities can 
be obtained. This also probably explains why some workers may occasionally or 
frequently participate in union activities without necessarily having affective 
commitment towards their union. Thus, some workers may engage in union activities 
based on the union’s instrumentality while others may be drawn to the meetings 
through the charisma of a dynamic leader and yet none of these workers may be 
affectively committed to the union. Thus when the going gets rough thereby affecting 
the union’s instrumentality and the leadership appeal from the standpoint o f these 
workers, they may decide to curtail their involvement.
The results also show that union commitment predicted union participation for the 
overall sample (beta = .21, p < .000) thus confirming the hypothesis relating the two 
variables. This result also supports the notion that commitment to the union is a key 
antecedent of the willingness to participate actively in the union (e.g. Bamberger et al. 
1999; Fullager and Barling, 1989; Fuller and Hester, 1998 Gallagher and Clark, 1989). 
This is a significant finding from the viewpoint of the Nigerian industrial relations 
literature because previous studies have yet to demonstrate the connection between
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union commitment (affective commitment) and union participation (behavioural 
commitment). This result also suggests that the model could be universally 
applicable and not subject to cultural or contextual variations. Thus it may be argued 
that members who are affectively committed to their unions are more likely to 
participate in formal union activities than those who do not express any affective 
commitment to their unions irrespective of their geographical or cultural background.
A multidimensional approach to union participation was adopted in this study and the 
aspects covered included attendance at union meetings, speaking or contributing at 
union meetings, voting at union elections and campaigning for candidates during 
union elections. Each of these dimensions were predicted by different sets of 
antecedents. For meeting attendance, the antecedents were union instrumentality 
perception and satisfaction with union leadership; contributing at meetings had union 
instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union 
socialization experience; voting at union elections was predicted by union 
instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union 
socialization experience; lastly, campaigning for candidates had as antecedents early 
union socialization experience and union-politics orientation. This finding justifies the 
multidimensional approach and also supports Kelly and Kelly (1994).
Hypothesis 6 and 7. Internal Union Dynamics will exert a significant impact on the 
predictors o f union commitment and the union commitment; the influence o f the 
internal union dynamics will vary across the private and the public sector i.e. sector 
will be a moderator in the model. Hypothesis 6 was partially confirmed in the sense 
that not all the five internal union dynamics studied were significant predictors in the
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model. Union commitment was significantly greater in the public sector while union 
participation was significantly greater in the private sector thus confirming hypothesis 
7. In accounting for this apparent discrepancy, reference was made to the relative 
impact of the internal union dynamics on the relationship between pro-union attitudes, 
union commitment and union participation. In the case of union commitment, 
perception of information dissemination - apparently the most significant in terms of 
impact on the pro-union attitudes and the dependent variables - was observed to be of 
more influence in the private sector. In the case of union participation, perception of 
information dissemination was more influential in the public sector.
Another explanation for the apparent discrepancy took into account the rational 
choice theory (Klandermans, 1984,1986; Montgomery, 1989; Zalesny, 1985). This 
relates to the members viewing their participation as a function of the goal-related 
costs and benefits of participation and the perceived value of the outcomes of 
participation. Branch meetings received a high turnout mostly when financial or 
economic matters are involved, especially the ones involving wage increases and 
allowances. Workers in the private sector especially, who may not have expressed 
affective commitment to the union still participated in union activities nonetheless 
because they perceived the benefits as high, and the costs low.
In conclusion, the Nigerian workers’ attachment to their union is primarily based on 
the consideration of the latter’s instrumentality, leadership behaviour and the informal 
socialisation experiences that takes place within the union. The impact of internal 
union dynamics on union attitudes highlights the importance of contextual elements 
as far as different union settings are concerned. The dynamics partly explained why
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union members in the public sector were apparently more committed to their union 
and yet performed significantly less in union participation. For all the members, the 
dynamic of information dissemination was perceived as a significant influence in the 
union commitment process. But it not only referred to intra-union communication 
mechanisms but also the transparency and sincerity of union leaders in the whole 
process. Men participated more in union activities but this is not because women 
were less committed to the union than men but rather because women were restricted 
by their traditional roles.
9.2 Limitations of Study
Certain limitations of this study need mentioning and a few concerns methodology. 
Some scales (socialisation experience and Marxist beliefs) had low reliability in the 
first survey but the reliability estimates were high in the second survey and suggest 
that this situation need not have any major impact on the overall outcome and 
application of the study. Also some scales (union-politics orientation and life 
satisfaction) had too few items. This situation was a trade-off for a good response rate. 
There was also the inability to obtain data on actual membership of the research 
population which prevented statistical authentication of the representativeness of the 
samples used. Nevertheless the samples appear to reflect the average Nigerian worker 
on some demographic factors (Fashoyin, 1987). Also the study was only limited to 
the south of the country thus the full impact of the ethnic factor remains inconclusive. 
Because all the respondents from the three ethnic groups all reside in the south, their 
attitudes may have been similar due to their sharing the same urban experience. But 
in defence, at the time of the research until the present, inter-ethnic skirmishes were
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taking place in the northern part of the country which made it highly risky and 
unrealistic to conduct any meaningful study there.
9.3 Implications of Findings
In terms of practical and policy implications, the findings on union instrumentality 
perception underscore the importance of unions having a record of significant 
achievements to which their members can relate. In the final analysis, the unions’ 
instrumentality is more likely to be based on members’ consideration of this record 
than on preconceived notions of the “big labour image”. It helps when unions have 
demonstrated some considerable effectiveness in the past but the unions must also be 
seen by members as relevant in their current situation because past successes may not 
always guarantee continued success as the decline of unions in the west -  e.g. 
America and Britain - aptly illustrates. Thus, to sustain their members’ commitment 
through the members’ perception of the unions’ instrumentality, it is essential for 
unions to strive to maintain a reasonable degree of consistency in their level of 
performance.
The findings on members’ leadership attitudes emphasise that union leaders’ conduct 
and behaviour has the potential of either enhancing or decimating their members’ 
union commitment. Related to this is the need for the leaders to build or rebuild their 
members’ trust. This might necessitate the unions having special meetings whereby 
grievances, both past and current, are discussed openly with members and dealt with. 
The reason being that failure to resolve such issues may lead to a situation whereby 
members might continue to find it difficult believing everything their leaders tells 
them although they may accept them. In addition or alternatively, avenues can be
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provided for members to report any branch official(s) perceived to be abusing their 
trust to relevant higher authorities within the union.
It is pertinent to note that union leaders may be appreciated and acknowledged by 
their members for their hard work and yet be accused of not being straightforward. It 
is therefore very important for the leaders to focus on regaining the trust of their 
members by being transparent and forthright in their dealings with members. The 
unions should not relent in punishing errant and corrupt branch union officials so as to 
instil a sense of confidence into the rank and file some of whom may think some 
officials are sacred cows or above the law. A system of checks and balances should 
be in place within the union and also effectively monitored and enforced so that no 
leader(s) irrespective of their level of leadership is perceived to be circumventing 
these checks thereby taking the members for a ride. To influence the attitudes of 
members who are usually distrusting and sceptical in the aftermath of union- 
management negotiations, the leaders should always brief their members or 
constituency at every stage of the process before a signing a final deal with 
management. This admittedly should be a standard practice, but apparently, some 
union leaders seem to unilaterally make the final decision without consultation with 
their constituency.
Findings on early socialisation experience suggest that unions can maximise the 
commitment of their members by adopting both the formal and informal structure in 
their approach. The unions have a need for socialisation programmes aimed at 
educating members about the activities of their unions. The induction of new 
members into the union, by providing them with accurate information about union
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policies and how the union operates is important. Union leaders have a duty to 
perform in this respect through initiating contacts with new members and emphasising 
the importance of workplace unionism. Leaders’ approachability, accessibility and 
amiableness are important ingredients in this process. Where differences do not arise 
between members and their leaders in terms of class distinction, union members are 
likely to have greater commitment to their union.
Union leaders should endeavour to fulfil the role of agents of socialization in the 
union, acting as important as sources of information. Related to this is the need for 
union recruitment policies to focus on the skills and capabilities of leaders as a 
medium for union socialization. Socialisation programmes specifically targeted at 
breaking down social and cultural barriers should be fashioned out by leaders 
especially in unions where cultural diversity may be salient. New members should be 
able to receive help and encouragement from other members irrespective of their 
ethnic, social or religious background. Also union leaders should devise ways of 
providing social support and direction and integrating the newcomer into his/her role.
Lastly, a comparison of the findings in this study with the research findings within the 
western literature suggests that first and foremost there is support for the union 
commitment-participation link. This means that the general argument that context 
restricts the application of models emanating from developed countries does not apply 
in this particular case. Some researchers in developing countries are apparently 
convinced that all theories from the west are bound to be automatically dysfunctional 
in developing settings (Fajana, 1995). The premise upon which this conclusion is 
based has its merits (Hartley 1995; Otobo, 1995; Fajana, 1995) but the conclusion by
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itself in the absence of an objective enquiry arguably lacks merit. This study has 
shown that the case of union commitment and union participation existing as distinct 
measurable constructs with a positive causal link, is applicable within the Nigerian 
context. In essence, one could argue that union commitment is likely to predict union 
participation in a developing country just as much as it would in a developed country. 
Admittedly the strength (i.e. regression coefficient) of this connection may be 
moderated by contextual factors, but the connection remains nonetheless and probably 
has a universal applicability. Related to this observation is the support for the view 
that it is necessary to subject social theories to empirical enquiries rather than settling 
for tentative generalisations or armchair conjectures. Hopefully this will lead to more 
research activity in cross-cultural evaluations of social and psychological theories.
In view of the fact that not all the hypotheses based on the model were confirmed, 
thus providing limited support for the view that antecedents of union commitment 
differ across countries or contexts, caution still has to be taken in generalising 
research findings across contexts. One major similarity between the two literatures 
concerns the case of union attitudes predicting union commitment. It can be argued 
that this is a reflection of the universal applicability of the general philosophy behind 
trade unionism. Across the world, the fundamental objective of a trade union is to 
fight for its members. Globalisation, socio-economic and political realities may 
engender a transformation in the roles and tactics adopted by unions and the 
individual experience of unions in different countries may have to reflect this situation. 
In spite of this however, the basic and traditional principle of fighting for the rights of 
workers remains the same. If this principle is compromised, the unions would hardly 
be regarded as trade unions in the fundamental sense of the word. Thus union
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attitudes might continue to be correlated with union commitment regardless of context 
or country.
As far as other factors are concerned (e.g. demographic, work experiences, Marxist 
beliefs, etc.) the study showed no correlation in the Nigerian context, whereas, in the 
western studies, evidence seems to point in a particular direction in certain areas (e.g. 
work experience) but mixed in others (e.g. demographic). Work experiences though 
mainly significant in western studies (Snape, 2000) were not significant in this study 
probably because the factor may be related more to the type of industrial workers used 
and the type of industry in which they are employed (Remy, 1975). Work attitudes in 
international and multinational corporations may be different from Nigerian-owned 
industries. Also similar to the situation whereby a typical committed member in 
terms of demography is difficult to identify from the western literature (Snape, 2000), 
future studies might need to further explore demographic factors in the Nigerian 
context.
It is significant to point out that the western literature on union commitment is replete 
with numerous studies from which definitive conclusions could be made (Snape, 
2000). However, this study appears to be the first major attempt in the Nigerian 
context. Thus while it is acceptable to make comparisons with the western literature 
at this point, drawing final conclusions might be premature. A body of work 
exploring different themes on the subject of union commitment in Nigeria or a similar 
developing context will need to evolve before a definite picture of the antecedents of 
union commitment for Nigerians can emerge. But this study has at least advanced a 
provisional outlook.
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9.5 Future Research
Future research on union commitment should focus on cross-national collaboration 
between developed and developing countries in order to bridge the gap between the 
two. The role of ethnicity should be further established by drawing samples from the 
northern and eastern part of the country rather than from the same geographical 
location. Also, dual commitment was not investigated per se in this study due to the 
limited focus of the research. Future union commitment models aimed at developing 
countries could operationalise it as a unique construct. Research on dual commitment 
has been criticized for failing to establish dual commitment as a unique construct with 
significant explanatory power beyond that of employer commitment and union 
commitment (Bemmels, 1995).
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A P P E N D IC E S .
AlrQuestionnaire: First Survey
CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE
As attitudes and opinions have been found to differ to some extent according to age and 
other personal characteristics, it would help if you could give the following details about 
yourself. Your name is not required. Unless stated elsewhere, please answer each 
question by putting a tick in the dotted line beside the statement, which most represent 
your opinion or attitude.
1. What is you state of origin.............................
2. Are you male or female (tick one).
Male...........
Female........
3. What is your highest educational qualification? (tick one)
primary....................
secondary................
higher institution (OND, HND,BSc, etc.).
4. How old are you?............
5. For how long have you been a trade union member? (tick one)
I-5years 
6-10years
II-15years 
16-34years
Please indicate whether you strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree or 
strongly disagree with the following statements. Circle one answer only for each 
statement.
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Statements
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not
sure
Agree Strongly
Agree
6. I feel a sense o f  pride being a 
member o f  this union
7. the record o f  this union is a good 
example o f  what dedicated 
people can get done
8. I have gained a lot by joining 
this union
9. this union is capable o f fighting 
for workers
10. deciding to join this union was a 
smart move on my part
11. the union is capable o f  ensuring 
that the jobs o f  members are 
safe
12. this union helps in improving 
earnings and conditions o f  
service
13. this union protects the interests 
and rights o f  workers from being 
encroached upon
14. this union attends to grievances 
o f  members.
15. management is doing its best for 
workers
16. management can be trusted
17. management’s actions towards 
workers are fair.
Questions 18-19: Within the first few weeks and months o f joining your union, to 
what extent would you sat that you:
18. Understood the goals o f your union? (tick one)
I had a very good understanding..........
I had a good understanding...................
I had a fair understanding.......................
I had very little understanding............
19. Received support and encouragement from other union members? (tick one)
I received very great support and encouragement.........
I received great amount o f  support and encouragement 
I received a fair amount o f support and encouragement
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20. How often do you attend your union meetings
I attend very often 
I attend sometimes 
I attend rarely
21. How often do you contribute (i.e. speak)
I contribute very often 
I contribute sometimes 
I contribute rarely
22. How often do you vote at union elections?
I vote in all elections 
I vote in few elections 
I rarely vote.
23. Have you ever campaigned for candidates?
Yes, very often 
Yes sometimes 
No
Please indicate whether you strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree or 
strongly disagree with the following statements. Circle one answer only for each 
statement.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly
Agree
24. Union leaders are very 
responsible.
25. Union leaders are very 
united
26. Union leaders are very 
democratic
27. Unions should form 
their political party
28. Workers should have 
more say in the running 
of society
29. Factories would be 
better run if workers 
had more say in
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management.
The following items (30 -  33) deal with various aspects of your job and life and 
how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with each. Indicate whether you are 
extremely satisfied, very satisfied, moderately satisfied, not sure, moderately 
dissatisfied, very dissatisfied, or extremely dissatisfied with each item.
Items Extremely
satisfied
Very
satisfied
Moderately
satisfied
Not
sure
Moderately
dissatisfied
Very
dissatisfied
Extremely
dissatisfied
30. Your 
salary
31. Your job 
as a whole
32.Your living 
Standard
33. Your life 
in general (i.e. 
health, 
education, 
family, etc.)
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A 2:Q uestionnaire: Second  Survey
CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE
As attitudes and opinions have been found to differ to some extent according to age and 
other personal characteristics, it would help if you could give the following details about 
yourself. Your name is not required. Unless stated elsewhere, please answer each 
question by putting a tick in the dotted line beside the statement, which most represent 
your opinion or attitude.
1. Are you male  female.....
2. What is your state of origin (please state).......
3. Are you
Single...............
Married...................
Separated.................
Widowed................
4. What is your highest educational qualification
Primary school.....................
Secondary school................
BSc........................
MSc and above.......................
5. What section or department do you work in ? 
(Please state).....................................................
6. What is the name of your union?.....................
7. What type of staff are you?
Junior staff...........
Senior staff...........
Other (please indicate)....................
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8. For how long have you been working for your current employer?
Less than one year...........
I -  4 y rs..............
5 -  9 y rs...............
10 -  14 y rs...........
15 and above.........
9. Do you have any dependant(s) (e.g. children, relatives)
Yes........
No.........
30. What is your age?
Less than 18 yrs.........
19-24 y rs..............
25 -  34 y rs..............
35 -  44 y rs..............
45 -  45 y rs..............
31. For how long have you been a member of your union?
Less than one year........
1-5 yrs..................
6 -  10 y rs............
II -  15 y rs...........
16-34 y rs...........
32. Are you a union official ?
Y es............
No..............
33. Have you ever contested for union office before?
Yes............
No............
34. How well did you understand the goals and objectives of your union within the first 
few weeks and months of your joining the union?
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I had very good understanding...............
I have good understanding...............
I have a fair understanding..............
I have very little understanding..........
35. How much support and encouragement did you receive from other union members 
within the first few weeks and months of your joining the union?
very great amount...........
great amount..............
fair amount...............
little amount............
very little amount...........
36. How much support and encouragement did you receive from union leaders within the 
first few weeks and months of your joining the union?
A very great amount............
A great amount..............
A fair amount...............
A little amount............
A very little amount...........
37. How did you become a member of your union?
I joined on my own........
I was persuaded by friends........
I was persuaded by union leaders........
Management made me to join...........
38. Why did you join your union?
To win more wages and better working conditions........
To get protection from being sacked.........
To enjoy social benefits from the union........
Because most people join.........
The union is capable of fighting for workers.........
The union has more time and resources to deal with management.........
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39. Do you pay your union contributions regularly?
Yes...........
No.............
40. How often do you attend your union meetings
I attend very often...............
I attend occasionally..........
I attend rarely................
41. How often do you speak at union meetings?
I speak very often.........
I speak sometimes........
I speak rarely.........
42. How often do you vote at union elections?
I vote in all elections........
I vote in few elections......
I rarely vote in any election........
43. Have you ever campaigned for candidates during union elections?
Yes, very often.........
Yes, sometimes........
No..........
44. How well informed does your union leaders keep you on what is happening in the 
union?
Very well.....
Fairly well.....
Rather poorly.....
Very poorly.......
45. How are decisions made in your union?
Through a meeting of all workers...........
Through a committee of the union..........
Union leaders decide..............
Workers are always informed after decision had been taken.............
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Please tick your response to the following statements. The statements 
refer to your your trade union, organisation and your job.
Statements
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Not
sure
Agree Strongly
Agree
46. I feel a sense o f  pride being a 
member o f  this union
47. the record o f  this union is a good 
example o f what dedicated 
people can get done
48. I feel great loyalty towards this 
union
49. I have much confidence and 
trust in most members o f  my 
union
50. I have gained a lot by joining 
this union
51. this union is capable o f  fighting 
for workers
52. deciding to join this union was a 
smart move on my part
53. the union is capable o f  ensuring 
that the jobs o f  members are 
safe
54. this union helps in improving 
earnings and conditions o f  
service
55. this union protects the interests 
and rights o f workers from being 
encroached upon
56. this union attends to grievances 
o f  members
57. I feel very much loyalty to this 
organisation.
58. union leaders are very 
hardworking
59. there is unity amongst union 
leaders
60. union leaders allow members to 
express their views.
61. What do you think o f  the
decision by the Nigerian Labour 
Congress to form a labour party?
That is the end of the survey. Thank you very much for your co-operation.
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A3: Personal Interview Schedule (Union Officials)
1. History of trade unionism in the establishment
■ Structure of union
- Total number of members
- how many union officers in all?
- what are their titles/ offices
■ When was the union formed?
■ History of relations with management / strike history: any 
records?
■ Instances of disputes with management: reasons and outcome
■ Nature of executive meetings: weekly, monthly, etc.
■ General meetings: how often: weekly, monthly?
■ Duration of general meeting (I hour? 2hours, etc.)
2. Union membership
■ Closed shop /voluntary/optional/compulsory
3. Nature of relations between unions and management
■ Is management supportive
■ Antagonistic
■ All of the above? None of the above?
4. Does your union provide any social benefits for its members? (e.g. cooperative 
Schemes, hardship funds, etc.)
5. Do you have any socialisation programmes for new members?; Do you have 
any programmes aimed at educating members about the objectives of trade 
unionism?
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6. Union elections
■ When are they held?
- annually, bi-annually, etc.
■ Eligibility criteria
■ Balloting procedures (open or secret?)
7. Information dissemination within the union.
■ Word of mouth?
■ Newsletters
■ Notice boards
■ Other?
8. Union composition. How ethnically diverse /homogeneous is your 
membership? Any tribal tensions, divisions, etc?.
9. How are negotiations (over wage and other matters) conducted with 
management?
■ At the departmental level?
■ Company level?
10. Describe the grievance settling procedure. If an employee has a grievance, 
How do they proceed?
11. Give examples of issues within the workplace which have warranted union 
intervention e.g. wage and benefits (pension, car, housing, allowances, 
training, etc).
12. Shed more light on the following objectives
■ Grievance handling
■ Informing workers of union meetings and urging them to attend
■ Political education of the union
■ Recruiting new members
■ Collecting union dues
■ Negotiating improvements in employment conditions
■ Participating in joint consultative bodies.
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13. Information on employing institution.
■ When was it established?
■ Total number of employees in location
- males and females
- graduates and non-graduates
- employees’ job tenure
A4: Personal Interview Schedules: (Union Members)
1. How will you describe your experiences since joining your union?
2. How do you relate to new members in your union?
3. Are you satisfied with the way union leaders are handling union matters?
4. Are you satisfied with the level of communication between the union 
leadership and members?
5. What is your view of union-management relations in this establishment?
6. Do you consider your union leaders to be easily accessible?
7. Do you consider your union leaders to be easily approachable?
8. Have you ever raised any work-related grievance with your union leaders 
before? If not why not?
9. Have you ever discussed any personal problem with any union leader before? 
If not why not?
10. Do you get along with union members of different ethnic backgrounds?
11. Are your union leaders united and co-operative?
12. Do union leaders seek the opinion of members before taking important 
decisions?
13. How do you normally receive information concerning union matters?
14. What is your view of union-management relations in this establishment?
15. Overall, do you regard your union as being effective?
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A5: R aw  F requencies: F irst S urvey
U n ion  C om m itm en t
I feel a sense o f pride 
being a member o f this 
union
9.3 13.4 10.5 42 24.6 317 0
The record o f this union 
is an example o f what 
dedicated people can 
get done
10.9 17.7 10.1 41.5 19.9 314 3
I have gained a lot by 
joining this union
11.0 18.4 12.9 36.8 21.0 314 3
Deciding to join the 
union was smart move 
on my part
13.1 20.1 12.8 38.0 16.0 316 1
Union Instrumentality
The union is capable 
of fighting for workers
7.7 12.6 11.6 44.8 23.5 317 0
The union is capable 
o f ensuring that the 
jobs o f workers are 
safe
9.6 18.6 10.9 41.0 19.9 316 1
The union helps in 
improving earnings 
and conditions o f 
service
4.5 9.3 5.5 55.6 25.1 317 0
The union protects the 
interests and rights o f  
workers from being 
encroached upon
2.6 12.3 9.0 52.3 23.9 316 1
The union attends to 
grievances o f members
2.3 13.2 12.2 55.0 17.4 317 0
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S atisfaction  w ith  M an agem en t
Management is doing 
its best for workers
13.6 25.0 15.2 38.0 8.2 316 1
Management’s actions 
towards workers are fair
11.4 29.5 19.7.5 34.6 4.8 315 2
Management can be 
trusted
19.2 30.6 27.4 17.7 5.0 317 0
Early Union Socialisation Experience
Understanding of 
union goals
12.9 27.8 30.6 28.7 317 0
Very great Great fair Very little
Support and 
encouragement 
from old 
members
13.0 27.6 32.1 27.3 315 2
Satisfaction with Union Leadership
Union leaders are 
very responsible
10 15.2 19.7 40.6 14.5 316 1
Union leaders are 
very united
8.4 22.9 19.0 36.8 12.9 317 1
United leaders are 
very democratic
7.5 16.4 12.8 45.6 17.7 315 2
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U n ion -P olitics O rien tation
Workers should form 
their own political 
party
jr>.- 26.4 ^ 2 0 ^ ' 1 4.'7 12.1 3! 4 3
Marxist Beliefs
Workers should have 
more say in the running of 
society
4.2 6.5 10.7 45.6 32.9 316 1
Factories will be better 
run if  workers had more 
say in management
3.2 10.4 13.2 39.1 33.9 316 1
Job Satisfaction
How
satisfied
are you
with
your
salary?
1.6 6.1 50.5 2.6 11.3 15.2 12.6 313
(4
missing)
How
satisfied
are you
with
your
standard
of
living?
1.9 9.6 49.7 5.4 9.3 10.9 11.2 316
(1
missing)
How 
satisfied 
are you 
with 
yourjob 
as a 
whole?
6.4 27.5 44.4 2.6 5.6 5.8 5.4 315
(2
missing)
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L ife  Satisfaction
How
satisfied
8.2 24.0 43.8 6.0 5.4 5.7 6.1 314are you 
with life 
in general 
(e.g.
education,
health,
etc.)
(3
missing)
Union Participation
How often do you 
attend your union 
meeting?
45.4 35.6 18.9 317 0
How often do you 
contribute during 
meetings?
Contribute very 
often
Contribute sometimes Contribute rarely
25.2 47.9 26.8 317 0
How often do you 
vote at union 
elections?
Rarely vote in 
any election
Vote in few elections Vote in all 
elections
N
19.9 28.1 51.7 316 1
Have you ever 
campaigned for 
candidates?
N o never Yes sometimes Yes very often N
45.1 37.9 17.0 317 0
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A6:Raw Frequencies: Second survey (IUD Items)
How are decisions made in your union
Frequency Percent
Valid through a meeting of all workers 113 57.9
through a committee of union 27 13.8
union leaders decide 15 7.7
workers are informed after decision have 
been taken.
27 13.8
Total 182 93.3
Missing System 13 6.7
Total 195 100.0
How well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the
union
Frequency Percent
Valid very well 10 5.1
fairly well 25 12.8
rather poorly 69 35.4
Very poorly 89 45.6
Total 193 99.0
Missing System 2 1.0
Total 195 100.0
Why did you join your union
Frequenc
y
Percent
Valid to win more wages and better working 
conditions
53 27.2
to get protection from being sacked 13 6.7
to enjoy social benefits from the union 19 9.7
because most people join 13 6.7
the union is capable of fighting for 
workers
73 37.4
the union has more time and resources 
to deal with mgt
19 9.7
Total 190 97.4
Missing System 5 2.6
Total 195 100.0
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How did you become a member
Frequenc
y
Percent
Valid 1 joined on my own 79 40.5
1 was persuaded by friends 38 19.5
1 was persuaded by union leaders 14 7.2
management made me to join 62 31.8
Total 193 99.0
Missing System 2 1.0
Total 195 100.0
Relations between managers and the union are very good
Frequency Percent
Valid strongly disagree 5 2.6
disagree 23 11.8
not sure 40 20.5
agree 79 40.5
strongly agree 44 22.6
Total 191 97.9
Missing System 4 2.1
Total 195 100.0
A7:TRADE DISPUTES
Year Trade Dispute Work stoppage Workers
Involved
Man-Days
Lost
1990 174 102 254,540 1339105
1991 204 117 460471 2257382
1992 221 124 238324 966611
1993 160 90 880244 1537890
1994 175 103 1,537,890 2,3429,9461
1995 196 124 1,546,328 235069010
1996 114 101 1,246,119 165901430
1997 97 89 1,128,575 141762772
1998 115 108 1,307,007 180911070
Source: Federal ministry of employment and productivity
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Testing for Moderated Relationships: Union Attitudes
Table A5.1 Partial correlation coefficients controlling for SUL
UC SOEXP UI
u c 1.0000 .2207 .4503
( 0) ( 190) ( 190)
p= . P= .002 P= .000
SOEXP .2207 1.0000 .2052
( 190) ( 0) ( 190)
P= .002 P= . P= .004
UI .4503 .2052 1.0000
( 190) ( 190) ( 0)
P= .000 P= .004 P= .
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance)
Table A5.2 Partial correlation coefficients Controlling for UI
UC SUL SOEXP
UC 1.0000 .4732 .1640
( 0) ( 190) ( 190)
P= . P= .000 P= .023
SUL .4732 1.0000 .0742
( 190) ( 0) ( 190)
P= .000 P= . P= .307
SOEXP .1640 .0742 1.0000
( 190) ( 190) ( 0)
P= .023 P= .307 P= .
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance)
Table A5.3 Partial correlation coefficients Controlling for SOEXP
UC SUL UI
UC 1.0000 .7135 .6959
( 0) ( 190) ( 190)
p= . P= .000 P= .000
SUL .7135 1.0000 .6636
( 190) ( 0) ( 190)
P= .000 P= . P= .000
UI .6959 .6636 1.0000
( 190) ( 190) ( 0)
P= .000 P= .000 P= .
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance)
Table A5.4 Descriptive statistics and significance tests on  
_________ demographic variables for union com mitment.
Gender
Male
Female
Sector
Private
Public
Ethnic group
Southerners
Northerners
Educational Status
Primary School 
Secondary School 
Higher Institution
Membership Tenure
I - 5  years 
6 - 1 0  years
I I - 1 5  years 
1 6 - 3 4  years
Age
2 1 - 2 9  years 
30 -  39 years 
40 -  49 years 
50 and above
Means
13.95
13.75
13.9563
14.8735
13.7273
13.4652
13.0980
13.7046
13.3994
14.0816
13.8368
12.6491
13.0145
14.83
13.23
12.17
12.21
Standard
Deviation
4.04
4.30
4.71866
4.80776
4.4600
4.2941
6.3243
4.4638
4.1006
4.1618
3.8040
4.8642
4.3120
4.136
4.914
5.334
5.177
Statistics
t = .35
t=  1.95* 
t = .330
F = .688
F =  1.938
F =  1.787
* P <  04
Table A5.5 Descriptive statistics and significance tests on
demographic variables for union participation.
Gender Mean
Standard
Deviation Statistics
Male 8.40 2.45 t = 2.84*
Female 7.51 2.30
Sector
Private 8.7595 2.27706 t = 2.922*
Public 7.7017 2.39534
Ethnic grouping
Northerners 7.47 2.2980 t = .427
Southerners 7.75 2.5477
Educational Status
Primary School 7.33 2.44
Secondary School 7.65 2.30 F = .454
Higher Institution 7.74 2.38
Membership Tenure
1 -5  years 7.81 2.2328
6 - 1 0  years 7.39 2.3139 F = .96
1 1 - 1 5  years 7.77 2.5778
1 6 - 3 4  years 8.01 2.3400
Age
20 -  29 years 7.83 2.26
30 -  39 years 7.66 2.27 F = .49
40 -  49 years 7.85 2.50
50 and above 7.07 2.75
*P<.01
Table A6.1 Multiple regression: Union Commitment (optimal scaling)
Model Summary
Multiple R R Square Adjusted R Square
L -803 .645 .627
ANOVA
Sum of Squares Df | Mean Square F Sig. |!
Regression | 191.513 14 | 13.680 36.5701
^1oo
Residual 105.487 2821 .374 I I 1
Total 297.000 2961 i I
Coefficients
........................................mmm
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
F
Std. Error
Ethnic group -6.575E-03 .037 3.075E-02
Gender 1.531E-02 .037 .174
Educational background -5.068E-02 .037 1.909
Age 9.730E-03 .037 7.016E-02
Membership tenure 3.244E-02 .040 .664
Sector .157* .041 14.941
Union instrumentality .466* .039 145.655
Satisfaction with 
Management
1.630E-02 .037 .184
Satisfaction with Union 
Leadership
.348* .040 77.103
Early Socialization 
experience
.129* .040 10.114
Marxist beliefs 7.033E-02 .039 3.335
Job satisfaction -6.004E-02 .040 2.284
Satisfaction with life -6.118E-02 .038 3.370E-02
Union-politics orientation 6.507E-02 .039 2.808
* significant.
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Table A6.2 M ultiple regression: UP
Model Summary
Multiple R | R Square |Adjusted R Square
.667 | .445 .417
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F I Sig. |
Regression 132.022 14 | 9.430 16.119| .000!
Residual 164.978 2821 .585 r. . . . . . i, i
Total 297.000 2961
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized Coefficients
F
Std. Error
Union instrumentality .381* .052. 53.168
Union Commitment .206* .051 16.618
Satisfaction with 
Management
-9.304E-02 .048 3.802
Satisfaction with Union 
Leadership
.341* .049 48.020
Early union socialization 
experience
.155* .049 11.102
Marxist beliefs 022E-02 .046 1.506
Job satisfaction -7.756E-02 .054 2.794
Ethnic group 2.726E-02 .046 .346
Gender .148* .046 7.399
Educational background 6.504E-02 .046 1.987
Age -4.516E-02 .050 .831
Membership tenure -7.756E-02 .048 2.611
Sector .278* .046 10.849
Satisfaction with life 6.285E-03 .052 1.462E-02
Union politics orientation 4.105E-02 .047 .777
* Significant
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Table A6.3 M ultiple regression: Union Commitment (linear regression)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
V
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .661 .437 .435 2.44984 .437 240.106 .000
2 .716 .513 .510 2.28239 .076 48.002 .000
3 .733 .537 .533 2.22862 .024 16.043 .000
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL
3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL, SOEXP
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 1441.043 1 1441.043 240.106 .000
Residual 1854.526 309 6.002
Total 3295.569 310
2 Regression 1691.101 2 845.550 162.315 .000
Residual 1604.468 308 5.209
Total 3295.569 310
3 Regression 1770.783 3 590.261 118.843 .000
Residual 1524.786 307 4.967
Total 3295.569 310
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL
3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL, SOEXP 
Dependent Variable: UC
Coefficientswm
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) .623 1.787 .075
UI .028 .661 15.495 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) .624 -.773 .440
UI .029 .520 11.633 .000 .791
SUL .052 .310 6.928 .000 .791
3 (Constant) .952 2.570 .011
UI .029 .482 10.810 .000 .757
SUL .053 .261 5.775 .000 .735
SOEXP .084 .172 4.005 .000 .818
Dependent Variable: UC
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Table A6.4 M ultiple regression: Union Participation (attendance at union meetings)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .421 .177 .175 .688 .177 67.277 .000
2 .504 .254 .249 .656 .077 31.906 .000
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 31.845 1 31.845 67.277 .000
Residual 147.683 312 .473
Total 179.529 313
2 Regression 45.587 2 22.793 52.924 .000
Residual 133.942 311 .431
Total ; 179.529 313
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL
Dependent Variable: Union Participation (meeting attendance)
Coefficients
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) .134 5.311 .000
UI .023 .412 7.956 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) .252 7.735 .000
UI .024 .309 5.864 .000 .880
SUL .008 .300 5.701 .000 .880
Dependent Variable: Union Participation (meeting attendance)
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Table A6.5 M ultiple regression: Union Participation (contribution at meetings)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics ■ ■
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .353 .125 .122 .675 .125 43.987 .000
2 .425 .181 .176 .654 .056 21.217 .000
3 .438 .192 .184 .651 .011 4.180 .042
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL
3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL, SOEXP
ANOVA
Sum of Squares Df Mean Square
LL
1 Regression 20.059 1 20.059 43.987 .000
Residual 140.912 309 .456
Total 160.971 310
2 Regression 29.140 2 14.570 34.041 .000
Residual 131.831 308 .428
Total 160.971 310
3 Regression 30.911 3 10.304 24.321 .000
Residual 130.060 307 .424
Total 160.971 310
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL
3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL, SOEXP 
Dependent Variable: UP (contribution at meetings)
Coefficients
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) .131 8.958 .000
UI .023 .353 6.632 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) .252 8.642 .000
UI .024 .265 4.830 .000 .880
SUL .008 .253 4.606 .000 .880
3 (Constant) .278 8.717 .000
UI .024 .235 4.136 .000 .735
SUL .008 .208 3.526 .000 .757
SOEXP .015 .122 2.045 .042 .818
Dependent Variable: UP (contribution at meetings)
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Table A6.6 M ultiple regression: Union Participation (voting at union elections)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .343 .118 .115 .735 .118 41.029 .000
2 .405 .164 .158 .716 .046 17.030 .000
3 .418 .175 .167 .713 .011 3.964 .047
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP
3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP, SUL
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 22.151 1 22.151 41.029 .000
Residual 166.287 308 .540
Total 188.439 309
2 Regression 30.891 2 15.445 30.097 .000
Residual 157.548 307 .513
Total 188.439 309
3 Regression 32.905 3 10.968 21.580 .000
Residual 155.533 306 .508 IHHHHHI
Total 188.439 309
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP
3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP, SUL 
Dependent Variable: UP (voting at union elections)
Coefficients
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) .187 15.186 .000
UI .008 .343 6.405 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) .276 7.171 .000
UI .009 .263 4.733 .000 .880
SOEXP .026 .230 4.127 .000 .880
3 (Constant) .305 7.355 .000
UI .009 .219 3.668 .000 .757
SOEXP .027 .199 3.461 .001 .817
SUL .017 .121 1.991 .047 .735
Dependent Variable: union participation (voting at union elections)
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Table A6.7 M ultiple regression: Union Participation (campaigning for candidates)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .299 .089 .086 .707 .089 30.277 .000
2 .366 .134 .128 .691 .045 15.826 .000
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, UPO
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 15.150 1 15.150 30.277 .000
Residual 154.618 309 .500
Total 169.768 310
2 Regression 22.706 2 11.353 23.778 .000
Residual 147.062 308 .477
Total 169.768 310
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, UPO
3 Dependent Variable: UP (campaigned for candidates)
Coefficients
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) .138 11.261 .000
UI .024 .299 5.502 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) .173 11.475 .000
UI .024 .250 4.591 .000 .949
union-politics
orientation
.029 .217 3.978 .000 .949
Dependent Variable: UP (campaigning for candidates)
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Table A6.8 UPO (unions should form their own political party)
campaigned 
for candidates
strongly
disagree
disagree uncertain Agree strongly
agree
Total
yes very 
often
12
15.6%
8
9.4%
7
11.1%
8
19.0%
19
40.4%
54
17.2%
yes
sometimes
23
29.9%
29
34.1%
30
47.6%
19
45.2%
19
40.4%
120
38.2%
no 42
54.5%
48
56.5%
26
41.3%
15
35.7%
9
19.1%
140
44.6%
Total 77
100.0%
85
100.0%
63
100.0%
42
100.0%
47
100.0%
314
100.0%
N = 314 (Chi-square = 35.26; p < .000).
Table A 6.9 M ultip le regression (private sector)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .744 .554 .549 2.48498 .554 98.219 .000
2 .768 .590 .580 2.39740 .036 6.877 .010
1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL
2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, UI
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Collinearity
Statistics
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) 1.843 .997 .322
SUL .092 .744 9.911 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) 2.007 -.302 .764
SUL .128 .547 5.237 .000 .481
UI .113 .274 2.622 .010 .481
Dependent Variable: UC
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Table A6.10 M ultiple regression (public sector)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .797 .635 .631 1.71160 .635 189.439 .000
2 .843 .710 .705 1.53156 .075 28.133 .000
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Collinearity
Statistics
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) 1.223 3.436 .001
UI .048 .797 13.764 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) 1.177 1.617 .109
UI .058 .551 7.941 .000 .556
SUL .066 .368 5.304 .000 .556
Dependent Variable: UC
Table A 6 . l l  UI * UC * Sector C rosstabulation
UC Total
Low High
Public UI Low 32 5 37
Sector 88.8 11.6% 46.8%
High 4
11.1%
38
88.4%
42
53.2%
Total 36
100.0%
43
100.0%
79
100.0%
Private UI Low 84 32 116
Sector 73.7% 25.8% 47.9%
High 30
26.3%
92
74.2%
122
51.3%
Total 114
100.0%
124
100.0%
238
100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
sector Value Sig. (2-sided)
public Pearson Chi- 
Square
7.919 .005
N of Valid 
Cases
79
private Pearson Chi- 
Square
54.495 .000
N of Valid 
Cases
238
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Table A6.12 SUL * UC * Sector Crosstabulation
Public
Sector
SUL Low
UC Total
Low
25
64.1%
High
10
25.0%
35
49.4%
High 14
35.9%
30
75.0%
34
44.3%
Total 39
100.0%
40
100.0%
79
100.0%
Private
Sector
SUL Low 81
62.8%
28
26.4%
109
46.4%
High 48
37.2%
78
73.7%
126
53.6%
Total 129
100.0%
106
100.0%
235
100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
sector Value Sig. (2-sided)
public Pearson Chi- 
Square
6.691 .010
N of Valid 
Cases
79
private Pearson Chi- 
Square
23.348 .000
N of Valid 
Cases
235
Table A6.13 Meeting attendance and gender Crosstabulation
male female
meeting
attendance
I attend very often 119 25 144
48.8% 34.2% 45.4%
I attend sometimes 86 27 113
35.2% 37.0% 35.6%
I attend rarely 39 21 60
16.0% 28.8% 18.9%
Total 244 73 317
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi square = 7.508 (significance level= 0.023)
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Table A6.14 Contribution at meetings and gender Crosstabulation
h b b h h h h i m i
male Female
contribution at 
meetings
1 contribute very often 67 13 80
27.5% 17.8% 25.2%
1 contribute sometimes 122 30 152
50.0% 41.1% 47.9%
1 contribute rarely 55 30 85
22.5% 41.1% 26.8%
Total 244 73 317
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi square= 10.217 (sig. = 0.006)
Table A6.15 Voting at union elections and gender Crosstabulation
male female
voting at union 
elections
I vote in all elections 129 35 164
52.9% 48.6% 51.9%
I vote in few elections 70 19 89
28.7% 26.4% 28.2%
I rarely vote in any election 45 18 63
18.4% 25.0% 19.9%
Total 244 72 316
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi square= 1.498 (sig. = .473).
Table A6.16 Campaign for candidates and gender Crosstabulation
male female
campaigned for 
candidates
yes very often 45 9 54
18.4% 12.3% 17.0%
yes sometimes 97 23 120
39.8% 31.5% 37.9%
No never 102 41 143
41.8% 56.2% 45.1%
Total 244 73 317
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi square = 4.811 (sig. level = 0.090)
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Table 6.17 Multiple regression: attendance at union meetings (males)
Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Sig. F Change
.515 .266 6g3 j m g g g g g g m m
.580 .337 .317 .663 .010
1 Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP
2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, UI
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 11.628 1 11.628 24.240 .000
Residual 32.140 67 .480
Total 43.768 68
Regression 14.742 2 7.371 16.761 .000
Residual 29.026 66 .440
Total 43.768 68 ■ ■ ■ ■ H
1 Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP
2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, UI
Dependent Variable: UP (meeting attendance)
Coefficients
Std. Error Beta Tolerance
(Constant) .271 2.486 .015
SOEXP .053 .515 4.923 .000 1.000
(Constant) .562 3.559 .001
SOEXP .061 .336 2.783 .007 .689
UI .023 .321 2.661 .010 .689
Dependent Variable: UP (meeting attendance)
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Table A6.18 M ultiple regression: attendance at union meetings (females)
Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Sig. F Change
-^00 .160 W K tB tB K K M W tK K t -669 M a i l  .oqq h
.483 .233 .226 .641 .000
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df IVlean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 19.881 1 19.881 44.443 .000
Residual ■ 1104 .230  S 233 .447
Total 124.111 234
2 Regression 28.926 2 14.463 35.251 .000
Residual 95.185 232 .410
Total 124.111 234
1 Predictors: (Constant), UI
2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL
Dependent Variable: UP (meeting attendance)
Coefficients
Std. Error Beta Tolerance
(Constant) .135 18.628 .000
UI .009 .400 -6.667 .000 1.000
(Constant) .201 8.957 .000
UI .009 .315 -5.230 .000 .910
SUL .026 .283 4.695 .000 .910
Dependent Variable: union participation (meeting attendance)
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Table A6.19 M ultiple regression: speaking at meetings (males)
Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Sig. F Change
.387 .150 .146
H a H H H
.646 .000
.445 .198 .191 .629 .000
.481 .232 .222 m m m m m .617 .002
1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL
2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, SOEXP
3 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, SOEXP, UI
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 17.149 1 17.149 41.136 .000
Residual 97.132 233 .417
Total 114.281 234
2 Regression 22.584 2 11.292 28.569 .000
Residual 91.697 232 .395
Total 114.281 234
3 Regression 26.459 3 8.820 23.199 .000
Residual 87.822 231 .380
Total 114.281 234
1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL
2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, SOEXP
3 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, SOEXP, UI
Dependent Variable: union participation (contribution at meetings)
Coefficients
Std. Error Beta Tolerance
(Constant) .129 21.154 .000
SUL .015 .387 -6.414 .000 1.000
(Constant) .207 10.248 .000
SUL .016 .299 -4.716 .000 .859
SOEXP .027 .235 3.708 .000 .859
(Constant) .227 10.769 .000
SUL .017 .220 -3.275 .001 .740
SOEXP .026 .203 3.214 .001 .837
UI .009 .208 -3.193 .002 .784
Dependent Variable: UP (contribution at meetings
322
Table A6.20 Multiple regression: speaking at meetings (females)
Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Sig. F Change
.313 .098 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ I  H i o> CD CO .009 m
Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 3.561 1 3.561 7.290 .009
warn Residual 32.729 67 .488 ■ ■
Total 36.290 68
1 Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP
2 Dependent Variable: union participation (contribution at meetings)
Coefficients
Std. Error Beta Tolerance
(Constant) .273 5.597 .000
SOEXP .054 .313 2.700 .009 1.000
1 Dependent Variable: union participation (contribution at meetings)
323
Table A6.21 M ultiple regression: voting at union elections (males)
Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Sig. F Change
.327 .107 .103 .726 m m m .000
.389 .151 .144 .710 .001
.414 .172 .161 .703 .017
1 Predictors: (Constant), Ul
2 Predictors: (Constant), Ul, SOEXP
2 Predictors: (Constant), Ul, SOEXP, SUL
ANOVA
odel Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 14.741 1 14.741 27.937 .000
Residual 122.944 233 .528
Total 137.685 234
2 Regression 20.792 2 10.396
COCOCOdCM .000
Residual 116.893 232 .504
Total 137.685 234
3 Regression 23.642 3 7.881 15.962 .000
Residual 114.043 231 .494
Total 137.685 234
1 Predictors: (Constant), Ul
2 Predictors: (Constant), Ul, SOEXP
3 Predictors: (Constant), Ul, SOEXP, SUL 
Dependent Variable: UP (voting at union elections)
Coefficients
Std. Error Beta Tolerance
(Constant) .147 16.200 .000
Ul .010 .327 -5.286 .000 1.000
(Constant) .223 8.044 .000
Ul .010 .261 4.119 .000 .910
SOEXP .029 .220 3.465 .001 .910
(Constant) .258 8.188 .000
Ul .011 .201 2.968 .003 .784
SOEXP .030 .175 2.677 .008 .837
SUL .019 .167 2.403 .017 .740
Dependent Variable: UP (voting at union elections)
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Table A6.22 M ultiple regression: voting at union elections (females)
Model Summary________________________________________________________
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Sig. F Change
.497 .247;® H H H H 236  f l l H  .715 W ttK M M ttK K K M
.542 .294 .272 .697 .042
1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL
2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, Ul
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 11.054 1 11.054 21.651 .000
Residual 33.696 66 .511 —
Total 44.750 67
2 Regression 13.138 2 6.569 13.507 .000
Residual 31.612 65 .486
Total 44.750 67 1 —
1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL
2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, Ul
Dependent Variable: UP (voting at union elections)
Coefficients
Std. Error Beta Tolerance
(Constant) .280 1.837 .071
SUL .055 .497 4.653 .000 1.000
(Constant) .592 2.705 .009
SUL .065 .352 2.797 .007 .688
Ul .024 .260 2.070 .042 .688
Dependent Variable: UP (voting at union elections
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Table A6.23 M ultiple regression: campaign for candidates (males)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Sig. F Change
.270 .073 .069 .715 .000
.346 .120 .112 .698 .001
1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL
2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, UPO
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 9.386 1 9.386 18.361 .000
Residual 119.108 233 .511 ■ 1
Total 128.494 234
2 Regression 15.356 2 7.678 15.744 .000
Residual 113.138 232 .488
Total 128.494 234
1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL
2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, union-politics orientation
Dependent Variable: UP (campaigned for candidates)
Coefficients
Std. Error Beta Tolerance
(Constant) .131 12.943 .000
SUL .028 .270 4.285 .000 1.000
(Constant) .175 12.095 .000
SUL .028 .223 3.531 .000 .954
UPO .033 .221 3.499 .001 .954
Dependent Variable: UP (campaigned for candidates)
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Table A6.24 Multiple regression: campaign for candidates (females)
Model Summary _____________
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Sig. F Change
.426 .182 .169 .653
Predictors: (Constant), SUL
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 6.350 1 6.350 14.872 .000
Residual 28.607 67 .427
Total 34.957 68
Predictors: (Constant), SUL
Dependent Variable: UP (campaigned for candidates)
Coefficients
u a
Std. Error Beta Tolerance
(Constant) .256 5.859 .000
SUL .050 .426 3.856 .000 1.000
Dependent Variable: UP (campaigned for candidates)
Table A6.25 Gender * UP * Sector Crosstabulation
UP Total
Private
Sector
Gender
Total
Male
Low High
50
63.3%
136
85.5%
186
78.2%
Female 29
36.7%
23
14.5%
52
21.8%
79
100.0%
159
100.0%
238
100.0%
Public
Sector
Gender
Total
Male 27
64.3%
31
83.7%
58
73.4%
Female 15
35.7%
6
16.2%
21
26.6%
42
100.0%
37
100.0%
79
100.0%
Chi-Square Tests
sector Value Sig. (2-sided)
public Pearson Chi- 
Square
3.832 .050
N of Valid 
Cases
79
private Pearson Chi- 
Square
2.026 .155
N of Valid 
Cases
238
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Table A6.26 Multiple regression output.
Model Summary
R Square Adjusted R Square |Std. Error of the Estimate
.652 .425 .419 2.56598
Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP, Ul, SUL
ANOVA
Sum of Squares | df Mean Square F Si9-
Regression | 1520.783 | 3 | 506.928 76.991 .000
Residual 2060.864 | 3071 6.584
Total 3581.647 | 310
Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP, Ul, SUL 
Dependent Variable: UC
Coefficients
Standardized Coefficients t Sig.
Model Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 1.094 | 5.7491 .0001
Ul .033 .419 | 8.491 | .0001
SUL .060 .246 | 4.9051 .0001
| SOEXP .096 .150 | 3.149| .0021
Dependent Variable: UC
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Table A6.27 M ultiple regression output.
Model Summary
R | R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
.5461 .298 .289 2.01001
a Predictors: (Constant), UC, SOEXP, SUL, Ul
ANOVA
| Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square F Si9-
[Regression 536.142 | 4 [ 134.035 33.176 |.000
Residual 1260.527 1312 ( 4.040
Total 1796.669 1316 [
a Predictors: (Constant), UC, SOEXP, SUL, Ul 
b Dependent Variable: UP
Coefficients
Standardized Coefficients t |Sig.
Std. Error Beta |
(Constant) .865 10.513 |.000
Ul .031 .294 5.446 (.000
| SUL .049 .182 2.841 I-005
SOEXP .077 .069 1.177 |.240
UC .051 | .152 2.187 (.030
a Dependent Variable: UP
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Table A7.1 M ultiple regression: UC
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
Model Sig. F Change
1 .279 .078 .073 3.08498 .000
2 .330 .109 .098 3.04197 .016
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 137.687 1 137.687 14.467 .000
Residual 1627.429 171 9.517
Total 1765.117 172
2 Regression 192.010 2 96.005 10.375 .000
Residual 1573.107 170 9.254
Total 1765.117 172
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR
Dependent Variable: UC
Coefficients
Model Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) 19.412 .000
P-ID .279 3.804 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) 11.617 .000
P-ID .305 4.172 .000 .978
P-UMR .177 2.423 .016 .978
1 Dependent Variable
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T ab le  A 7.2  M u ltip le  regression: U P
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .308 .095 .090 2.15836 .095 17.633 .000
2 .364 .133 .122 2.11914 .038 7.276 .008
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 82.141 1 82.141 17.633 .000
Residual 782.630 168 4.659
Total 864.772 169
2 Regression 114.814 2 57.407 12.783 .000
Residual 749.958 167 4.491
Total 864.772 169
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA 
Dependent Variable: UP
Coefficients
Model Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) 9.533 .000
P-ID .308 4.199 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) 9.928 .000
P-ID .308 4.281 .000 1.000
IA .194 2.697 .008 1.000
Dependent Variable: UP
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Table A7.3 M ultiple Regression: U l
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .275 .076 .070 3.28821 .076 14.038 .000
2 .336 .113 .103 3.23081 .037 7.131 .008
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 151.782 1 151.782 14.038 .000
Residual 1848.911 171 10.812
Total 2000.693 172
2 Regression 226.215 2 113.107 10.836 .000
Residual 1774.478 170 10.438
Total 2000.693 172 ■ s m m m m w m m w M
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR 
Dependent Variable: Ul
Coefficients
IBB
Model Std.
Error
Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) .950 22.693 .000
P-ID .285 .275 3.747 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) 1.371 13.756 .000
P-ID .283 .304 4.164 .000 .978
P-UMR .236 .195 2.670 .008 .978
Dependent Variable: Ul
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T ab le  A 7 .4  M u ltip le  R egression: SU L
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .303 .092 .087 2.79844 .092 17.338 .000
2 .411 .169 .159
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, P-ID
2.68565 .077 15.665 .000
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 135.777 1 135.777 17.338 .000
Residual
Total
1339.149
1474.926
171
172
7.831
2 Regression 248.766 2
Residual 1226.161 170
Total 1474.926 172
Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR 
Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, P-ID 
Dependent Variable: SUL
124.383
7.213
Coefficients
Model Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) 22.606 .000
P-UMR .303 4.164 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) 12.396 .000
P-UMR .345 4.874 .000 .978
P-ID .280 3.958 .000 .978
Dependent Variable: SUL
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T ab le  A 7.5  M u ltip le  R egression: SO E X P
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics m
am mmm
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .421 .177 .172 2.74473 .177 36.732 .000
2 .465 .216 .207 2.68679 .039 8.455 .004
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 276.726 1 276.726 36.732 .000
Residual 1288.240 171 7 . 5 3 4 ^  ■ ■ ■ I
Total 1564.965 172
2 Regression 337.758 2 168.879 23.394 .000
Residual 1227.207 170 7.219
Total 1564.965 172
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM
Dependent Variable: SUL
Coefficients
■ ■ ■ ■
Model Beta Tolerance
1 (Constant) 5.767 .000
P-ID .421 6.061 .000 1.000
2 (Constant) 6.535 .000
P-ID .395 5.771 .000 .984
UJM .199 2.908 .004 .984
a Dependent Variable: SOEXP
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T ab le  A 7.6 M ultip le regression: U C  (p rivate sector)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Square the Estimate
Change
Statistics
. -• i~ \ . •, i
M lI iM
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .443 .197 .186 3.31496 .197 18.118 .000
Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 199.104 1 199.104 18.118 .000
Residual 813.184 74 10.989 m m m m
Total 1012.288 75
Predictors: (Constant), P-ID 
Dependent Variable: UC
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Collinearity
Statistics
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) 1.770 7.077 .000
P-ID_ .521 
Dependent Variable: UC
.443 4.257 .000 1.000 1.000
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Table A7.7 Multiple Regression: UP (private sector)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
.270 .073 .060 1.80652 .073 5.665 .020
Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 18.487 1 18.487 5.665 .020
Residual 234.974 72 3.264 M l
Total 253.461 73
Predictors: (Constant), P-ID 
Dependent Variable: UP
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Collinearity
Statistics IB
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) .971 7.161
■ooo ■Mi
P-ID .288 .270 2.380 .020 1.000 1.000
Dependent Variable: UP
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Table A7.8 M ultiple Regression: U l (Private sector)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
.474 .225 .214 2.95861 .225 21.470 .000
Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 187.934 1 187.934 21.470 .000
Residual 647.750 74 8.753
Total 835.684 75
Predictors: (Constant), P-ID 
Dependent Variable: Ul
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Collinearity
Statistics ■
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) 1.580 10.899 .000
P-ID .465 .474 
Dependent Variable: Ul
4.634 .000 1.000 1.000
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Table A7.9 Multiple Regression: SUL (private sector)
Model Summary ___________
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .357 .127 .115 2.77787 .127 10.785 .002
2 .446 .199 .177 2.67945 .072 6.536 .013
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 83.224 1 83.224 10.785 .002
Residual 571.026 74 7.717 ■ ■ ■ ■
Total 654.250 75
2 Regression 130.149 2 65.074 9.064 .000
Residual 524.101 73 7.179
Total 654.250 75
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR
Dependent Variable: SUL
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Collinearity
Statistics I B
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) 1.483 o o "4
oop
P-ID .437 .357 3.284 .002 1.000 1.000
2 (Constant) 1.817 6.673 .000
P-ID .423 .334 3.181 .002 .993 1.007
P-UMR .346 .269 2.557 .013 .993 1.007
Dependent Variable: SUL
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Table A7.10 M ultip le  regression R: USOCIAL: (private sector) 
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .417 .174 .163 2.78076 .174 15.595 .000
2 .496 .246 .225 2.67570 .072 6.925 .010
3 .540 .292 .263 2.60991 .046 4.727 .033
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM
3 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM, P-UMR
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 120.587 1 120.587 15.595 .000
Residual 572.213 74 7.733 \w a m
Total 692.799 75
Regression 170.165 2 85.082 11.884 . o o o
Residual 522.635 73 7.159
Total 692.799 75 ■ ■ ■ ■ I
Regression 202.363 3 67.454 9.903 .000
Residual 490.436 72 6.812
Total 692.799 75
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM
3 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM, P-UMR 
Dependent Variable: USOCIAL
Coefficients
Standardized t Sig. Collinearity
Coefficients Statistics ■■H
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) 1.485 2.616 .011 i n
P-ID .437 .417 3.949 .000 1.000 1.000
2 (Constant) 1.665 3.684 .000 ■■1
P-ID .432 .355 3.397 .001 .948 1.055
UJM .158 ■ 1 2 7 5  1 ; -2.632
oo
.948 1.055
3 (Constant) 1.922 2.028 .046
P-ID .424 ■■■■■I 3.250 .002 .939 1.065
UJM .154 .292 2.863 .005 .942 1.061
P-UMR .338 .217 2.174 .033 .987 1.013
Dependent Variable: USOCIAL
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Table A 7 .ll  Multiple Regression: UC (Public Sector)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics ■ ■
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .219 .048 .038 2.63165 .048 4.783 .031
2 .301 .090 .071
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA
2.58585 .043 4.395 .039
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 33.127 1 33.127 4.783 .031
Residual 657.930 95 6.926 ( ■ M B
Total 691.057 96
2 Regression 62.514 2 31.257 4.675 .012
Residual 628.543 94 6.687
Total 691.057 96
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA 
Dependent Variable: UC
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
Sig. Collinearity
Statistics i
Model
1 (Constant)
P-ID
(Constant)
P-ID
IA
Std. Error 
.904 
.275 
1.050 
.271 
.217
Dependent Variable: UC
Beta
.219
.213
.206
21.247
2.187 .031 
19.406 .000 
2.167 .033
-2.096 .039
Tolerance
1.000
.999
.999
1.000
1.001
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Table A7.12 Multiple regression: UP (public sector)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .312 .097 .088 2.34637 .097 10.119 .002
2 .376 .141
1 Predictors: (Constant),
2 Predictors: (Constant),
.123 
P-ID 
P-ID, IA
2.30071 .044 4.768 .032
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 55.707 1 55.707 10.119 .002
Residual 517.511 94 5.505
Total 573.218 95
2 Regression 80.944 2 40.472 7.646 .001
Residual 492.273 93 5.293
Total 573.218 95 m m m m i
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA 
Dependent Variable: UP
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Collinearity
Statistics ■■
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) .831 6.892 .000
P-ID .252 .312 3.181 .002 1.000 1.000
2 (Constant) .944 7.169 .000
P-ID .247 .312 3.247 .002 1.000 1.000
IA .195 .210 2.184 .032 1.000 1.000
Dependent Variable: UP
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Table A7.13 Multiple regression: U l (public sector)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
.256 .066 .014 3.38215 .066 1.282 .279
Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, UJM, P-DMP, P-ID, IA
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 73.308 5 14.662 1.282 .279
Residual 1040.945 91 11.439
Total 1114.253 96
Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, UJM, P-DMP, P-ID, IA 
Dependent Variable: Ul
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Collinearity
Statistics
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) 2.142 10.228 .000
P-ID .373 .214 2.006 .048 .899 1.112
P-DMP .305 .091 .853 .396 .907 1.102
UJM .207 .012 .110 .913 .925 1.081
IA .303 .006 .056 .956 .875 1.143
P-UMR .311 
Dependent Variable: Ul
.141 1.335 .185 .918 1.090
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Table A7.14 Multiple Regression: SUL (public sector)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics H H H I
Model R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
1 .293 .086 .076 2.61314 .086 8.940 .004
2 .419 .176 .158 2.49493 .090 10.215 .002
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, P-ID
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 61.047 1 61.047 8.940 .004
Residual 648.706 95 6.828 m m w m
Total 709.753 96
2 Regression 124.631 2 62.315 10.011 .000
Residual 585.122 94 6.225
Total 709.753 96
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, P-ID 
Dependent Variable: SUL
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Collinearity
Statistics ■
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) .908 20.676 .000
P-UMR .230 .293 2.990 .004 1.000 1.000
2 (Constant) 1.360 11.336 .000
P-UMR .226 .367 3.807 .000 .942 1.061
P-ID .269 .308 3.196 .002 .942 1.061
Dependent Variable: SUL
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Table A7.15 Multiple Regression: USOCIAL (public sector)
Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
Change
Statistics
R Square 
Change
F Change Sig. F 
Change
.418 .175 .166 2.71660 .175 20.144 .000
2 .472 .223 .206 2.65079 .048 5.776 .018
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR
ANOVA
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 148.659 1 148.659 20.144 .000
Residual 701.094 95 7.380
Total 849.753 96
2 Regression 189.246 2 94.623 13.466 .000
Residual 660.507 94 7.027
Total 849.753 96 ■ ■ ■ II U L d  O ^ v / .  I  J O
1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID
2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR 
Dependent Variable: SOEXP
Coefficients
Standardized T Sig. Collinearity
Coefficients Statistics
Model Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) .933 5.238 .000 HHHH
P-ID .284 .418 4.488 .000 1.000 1.000
2 (Constant) 1.445 5.248 .000
P-ID .286 .364 3.888 .000 .942 1.061
PJJMR
oC
\|■ .225 2.403 .018 .942 1.061
Dependent Variable: SOEXP
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Table A7.16 why did you join your union * sector Crosstabulation
Sector Total
Private Public
To win more wages and better working conditions 31
38.8%
22
20.0%
53
27.9%
To get protection from being sacked 1
1.3%
12
10.9%
13
6.8%
To enjoy social benefits from the union 4
5.0%
15
13.6%
19
10.0%
Because most people join 4
5.0%
9
8.2%
13
6.8%
the union is capable of fighting for workers 33
41.3%
40
36.4%
73
38.4%
the union has more time and resources to deal with mgt 7
8.8%
12
10.9%
19
10.0%
Total 80
100.0%
110
100.0%
190
100.0%
Chi-Square = 16.796 (sig. = 0.005)
Table A7.17 how did you become a member * sector Crosstabulation
Sector Total
private Public
I joined on my own 44
53.7%
35
31.5%
79
40.9%
I was persuaded by friends 9
11.0%
29
26.1%
38
19.7%
I was persuaded by union leaders 2
2.4%
12
10.8%
14
7.3%
management made me to join 27
32.9%
35
31.5%
62
32.1%
Total 82
100.0%
111
100.0%
193
100.0%
Chi-Square = 15.724 (sig. = 0.001)
Table A7.18 relations between managers and the union are very good * sector 
Crosstabulation
Sector Total
Strongly disagree
Private public
5
2.6%
5
4.6%
disagree 11 12 23
13.4% 11.0% 12.0%
Not sure 20 20 40
24.4% 18.3% 20.9%
Agree 39 40 79
47.6% 36.7% 41.4%
Strongly agree 12 32 44
14.6% 29.4% 23.0%
Total 82 109 191
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square = 10.541 (sig. = 0.032)
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Table A7.19 how are decisions made in your union * sector Crosstabulation
Sector Total
Private Public
Through a meeting of all workers 56
70.9%
57
55.3%
113
62.1%
Through a committee of union 7
8.9%
20
19.4%
27
14.8%
union leaders decide 11
13.9%
4
3.9%
15
8.2%
workers are informed after decision has 
been taken.
5 22 27
6.3%
79
21.4%
103
14.8%
182
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square = 17.376 (sig. = 0.001)
Table A7.20 how well informed does your leaders keep you on what 
is happening in the union * sector Crosstabulation
Sector Total
Private Public
Very well 2 8 10
2.4% 7.3% 5.2%
Fairly well 7 18 25
8.4% 16.4% 13.0%
Rather 36 33 69
poorly 43.4% 30.0% 35.8%
Very poorly 38 51 89
45.8% 46.4% 46.1%
Total 83 110 193
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square = 6.826 (sig. = 0.C>01)
Correlation results analysis involving UC, UP, SUL and SOEXP and descriptive 
statistics involving UP and UC are shown in table A7.21 and tables 7.22 to 7.25 
respectively. It was pertinent to perform these tests to show that the data is 
comparable with the one obtained in the first survey and therefore the analysis of the 
IUD items can be applied to both.
Table A7.21 Correlations: UC, U l, SUL, SOEXP and UP
UC
Ul .547**
.000
SUL .660**
.000
.698**
.000
SOEXP .355**
.000
.342*
.000
.288*
.000
UP .380*
.000
.397**
.000
.428
.000
.355**
.000
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table A 7.22 C om parisons o f  C orrelation findings (1st and 2nd survey)
Second survey
Involving 2 industrial 
Unions.
First survey
Involving 4 industrial 
Unions.
UC UC
Ul .547** .735**
UP .380* .438**
SOEXP .355** .438**
SUL .660** .744**
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table A7.23 Descriptive statistics : union commitment.
N Means
Standard
Deviation Statistics
Private (AP) 82 19.9563 3.71866
.012Public (MHWUN) 112 20.8735 2.80776
Table A7.24 Descriptive statistics : Union Participation.
N Means
Standard
Deviation Statistics
Private (AP) 81 9.2181 1.88721
.000Public (MHWUN) 110 8.0424 2.52938
Table A7.25 Comparisons of descriptive statistics (1st and 2nd survey)
Second survey
Involving 2 industrial Unions.
First survey 
Involving 4 industrial Unions.
Private sector 
(Mean score)
Public sector 
(Mean score)
Sig.
Private sector 
(Mean score)
Public sector 
(Mean score) Sig.
UC 19.9563 20.8735 .01 13.9563 14.8735 .04
UP 9.2181 8.0424 .000 8.7595 7.7017 .01
Reliability test indicate that the scales used in the second survey are reliable (table 
A7.1).
Table A7.26 Reliability Coefficients
Variable N of Items N of Cases Alpha
Union Participation (UP) 4 176 .7330
Union Commitment (UC) 5 185 .7972
Union Instrumentality (Ul) 6 193 .8220
Socialisation Experience (SOEXP) 3 191 .8373
Satisfaction with Union Leadership (SUL) 5 189 .8552
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The analysis of the interaction between the IUD items and demographic factors using 
descriptive statistics and ANOVA tests is shown in table A7.27. An elaboration of 
this finding is given in Tables A7.28 to A7.30.
Table XI .21 Summary of T and F tests results of members’ demographic
factors and IUD
UJM IA P-UMR P-DMP P-ID
T/F test Sig. T/F
test
Sig. T/F
test
Sig. T/F
test
Sig. T/F
test
Sig.
Gender .873 .38 1.894 .06*. .888 .37 1.262 .20 .374 .70
Ethnic group 1.016 .36 1.016 .36 .631 .53 1.662 .19 1.647 .19
Marital status 3.814 01* 3.814 .01* 1.872 .13 1.646 .18 1.586 .19
Membership
Tenure
1.253 .625 1.253 .764 .617 .65 .897 .47 .746 .56
Age 1.788 133 1.788 .133 .514 .72 .634 .63 .125 .97
Education 1.760 .156 1.760 .156 .634 .59 1.294 .27 1.319 .79
♦  cisignificant one / two-tailed.
Table A7.28 how did you lecome a member * gender Crosstabulation
gender Total
Male female
1 joined on my own 64
47.4%
15
26.3%
79
41.1%
1 was persuaded by friends 22
16.3%
15
26.3%
37
19.3%
1 was persuaded by union 
leaders
8
5.9%
6
10.5%
14
7.3%
management made me to 
join
41
30.4%
21
36.8%
62
32.3%
Total 135
100.0%
57
100.0%
192
100.0%
Chi-square = 8.104 (sig. = .04)
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Table A7.29 why did you join your union * marital status Crosstabulation
marital status Total
single married separated widowed
to win more wages and better working 
conditions
20
47.6%
29
22.1%
1
12.5%
3
33.3%
53
27.9%
to get protection from being sacked 2
4.8%
6
4.6%
2
25.0%
3
33.3%
13
6.8%
to enjoy social benefits from the union 1
2.4%
15
11.5%
1
12.5%
2
22.2%
19
10.0%
because most people join 2
4.8%
8
6.1%
3
37.5%
13
6.8%
the union is capable of fighting for 
workers
14
33.3%
59
45.0%
73
38.4%
the union has more time and resources 
to deal with mgt
3
7.1%
14
10.7%
1
12.5%
1
11.1%
19
10.0%
Total 42
100.0%
131
100.0%
8
100.0%
9
100.0%
190
100.0%
Chi-square = 47.377 (sig. = 0.000)
Fig. A7.1 relations between unions are very good.
50  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table A7.30 why did you join your union * sector Crosstabulation
Sector
to win more wages and better working conditions
Private
31
38.8%
Public
22
20.0%
Total
53
27.9%
to get protection from being sacked 1
1.3%
12
10.9%
13
6.8%
to enjoy social benefits from the union 4
5.0%
15
13.6%
19
10.0%
because most people join 4
5.0%
9
8.2%
13
6.8%
the union is capable of fighting for workers 33
41.3%
40
36.4%
73
38.4%
the union has more time and resources to deal with mgt 7
8.8%
12
10.9%
19
10.0%
Total 80
100.0%
110
100.0%
190
100.0%
Chi-square = 16.796; sig = 0.005
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